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Abstract
This thesis examines industrial development in early 19th century France, a period of
momentous sea-change often referred to as the ‘Age of Revolution’. A novel dataset
makes it possible to examine key sectors of the economy as they developed from ru-
ral cottage industries into modern, factory-based production units. The Napoleonic
Blockade against British trade (1803-1815) provides within country, exogenous vari-
ation in trade protection from the industrial leader, Britain.
In the first chapter, “The Spatial Dynamics of Structural Transformation in
France”, I present the new dataset and document some spatial patterns which seem
to comove with the switch to modern technology. I find that the time period was dis-
ruptive to the existing spatial structure of the economy, at least for the modernising
sectors which I observe.
The second chapter, “Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence
from the Napoleonic Blockade”, uses an exogenous shock to trade protection, driven
by the Napoleonic Blockade against British trade, to assess whether temporary
protection from trade with industrial leaders can foster development of infant in-
dustries in follower countries. I show that in the short-run, regions (départements)
in the French Empire which became better protected from trade with the British
increased capacity in mechanised cotton spinning to a larger extent than regions
which remained more exposed to trade. Moreover, temporary protection affected
the long-term location of mechanised cotton spinning in France.
The third chapter, “Inter-Industry Linkages: The Indirect Effects of the Napoleonic
Blockade” explores the wider implications of the exogenous shock to trade protec-
tion. Using variation in the location of post-blockade mechanised cotton spinning
caused by the trade shock, I find evidence of coagglomeration for technologically
proximate spinning sectors. The effects do not seem to be driven by input-output
linkages, suggesting a role for technology spillovers or labour market pooling.
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Chapter 1
The Spatial Dynamics of
Structural Transformation in
France
1.1 Introduction
One of the most salient features of the contemporary spatial landscape is the extent
to which economic activity is concentrated.1 Concentration is higher than what
can be explained by natural advantage alone (Ellison et al., 2010). Increasing re-
turns to scale (IRS), either internal or external to the firm, feature prominently
in theories of agglomeration.2 In light of this, we would expect that moving from
an economy in which most output is produced using a constant returns to scale,
cottage industry technology, to a world in which increasing returns to scale feature
more prominently would disrupt the existing spatial structure along a number of
interesting dimensions.
The Industrial Revolution in the early 19th century entailed precisely this type
of switch in production technology. In the late 18th century, manufacturing activity
in Europe had been organised as a cottage industry. Workers generally worked in
their own homes using very simple equipment. A “merchant-manufacturer” supplied
workers with the raw material and capital used in production, and secured outlets
for their output (Mokyr, 2009). In many ways it is a textbook example of a constant-
returns to scale production technology.
One of the major changes to take place during the Industrial Revolution was the
widespread adoption of the factory system. Production methods across a large num-
1Rosenthal and Strange (2004) discuss the evidence on agglomeration economies.
2Krugman (1991) showed how agglomeration economies arise from the interaction of transport
costs and IRS internal to the firm. Marshall (1920) was the first to emphasise labour market
pooling and technology spillovers.
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ber of industries became more capital intensive and increasingly reliant on inanimate
sources of power (Landes, 1969). Work was now organised in large-scale factories,
where the management of labour and the careful organisation of work-flow presented
new problems (Allen, 2009). As such, scale economies arguably became much more
prevalent. The historical literature has also argued the technology spillovers, a form
of external IRS central to some models of agglomeration, was an important engine
of innovation (Mokyr, 2009).
In this chapter, I examine the spatial dynamics of a number of industries during
the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in 19th century France. I explore how
industry concentration (localisation), persistence in industry location over time, and
coagglomeration patterns changed as various sectors in France switched from a CRS,
cottage industry technology to a method of production in which IRS were arguably
increasingly important.
I examine these patterns by exploiting a unique, newly constructed dataset on a
number of industries, observed at various points in time between the late 18th and
mid-19th century in France. Importantly, I observe some sectors both while they
were organised as a rural industry, and once they began to mechanise and organise
work in factories. Moreover, the industries I observe mechanised at different points
in time, which mitigates concerns that aggregate trends, such as decreasing transport
costs, were driving these patterns.
I observe five sectors between 1790-1860; cotton spinning and weaving, wool
spinning and weaving and the leather industry. The dataset is constructed from a
number of large-scale, industrial surveys conducted between 1790-1815. I link these
surveys to two industrial censuses which were conducted in the 1840s and 1860s.
For each industry, I observe employment at the level of the department, along with
a number of other variables. For mechanised cotton spinning, I also observe data at
the level of the firm at two points in time, allowing me to examine how the scale of
the firm and its capital intensity changed as mechanisation proceeded.
The range of sectors covered in the dataset was dictated by data availability.
However, these five sectors provide insight into one of the most important industries
during this time period, textiles. Moreover, the leather industry is a natural bench-
mark, as it remained more or less a rurally organised industry throughout this time
period.
Textiles was one of the leading industries in the Industrial Revolution. Its patent
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intensity was second only to engines. In Britain, cotton manufacturing is estimated
to have accounted for 25% of TFP growth between 1760-1860 (Crafts, 1985). In
France, textile manufacturing accounted for 60% of all manufacturing employment
in 1840. In contrast to the changes taking place in textiles, leather was one of the
industries in which change seems to have been almost imperceptible. It was one
of the least patent intensive industries, and it mostly remained rurally organised
throughout my time period of interest. As late as 1840, the median firm in leather
production in France had four employees.
A further advantage of the data is that I am able to observe developments within
the textile industry. In particular, I observe developments for two different fibres at
two different part of the production process. This provides some interesting time
variation, as there were significant time lags in mechanisation, both across wool and
cotton, and between upstream spinning and downstream weaving.
Among textiles, cotton spinning was the sector where mechanisation was first
invented around 1760. Efforts were soon under way to adapt the technology to
spinning other fibres, and to mechanising other parts of the production process. Both
took time. Woollen spinning was not mechanised until after 1820, and it did not
become widespread on the Continent until the 1840s (Jenkins, 2003). Mechanising
downstream weaving took about half a century. Power looms only began to replace
hand-loom weaving in the middle of the century (Mann, 1850).
I document a number of interesting patterns which seem to comove with mech-
anisation. First, I examine variables observed at the level of the firm in order to
document the extent to which industries were indeed modernising in France during
the period I examine. Mechanised cotton spinning firms became larger and more
capital intensive between 1806 and 1840, suggesting that scale economies internal
to the firm became increasingly important. Looking at firm level variables in 1840
across the different industries, I also find that firms seemed to be more reliant on
inanimate power sources in industries which mechanised sooner.
I then turn to examining persistence in the location of activity between 1810
and 1860, and 1840 and 1860. The pairwise raw correlations for employment across
the time periods are smaller for industries in which there was more mechanisation
taking place between the two points in time, suggesting that mechanisation may
have disrupted the location of manufacturing activity. It should be noted that this
pattern would also be consistent with changing natural advantage requirements for
15
industries.3
I then show that localisation, that is the concentration of a particular industrial
activity, seemed to increase with mechanisation. Finally, I examine coagglomeration
patterns over time. I find that initially, coagglomeration was strongest for industries
with strong input-output linkages. Over time however, these correlations weakened,
and the horizontal linkages between cotton and wool became stronger. This latter
would be consistent with technology spillovers or labour-market pooling.
While these patterns are certainly suggestive of an explanation in which the
switch from cottage industry to modern factory based production caused a change
in the spatial structure of the economy along a number of important dimensions,
the aim of the present chapter is not to establish causality. In Chapters 2 and 3, I
focus on establishing causality for two outcomes of interest. Chapter 2 deals with
the question of how trade affected the location of the mechanised cotton spinning
industry within France, while Chapter 3 exploits exogenous variation in the loca-
tion of cotton spinning to examine the coagglomeration of textile spinners. In this
chapter, my aim is to document a larger number of spatial regularities associated
with mechanisation without establishing causality for any specific outcome.
Irrespective of the specific mechanisms driving my results, the patterns docu-
mented in this chapter contrast with an emerging literature which shows a surpris-
ing amount of persistence in the location of economic activity (Davis and Weinstein,
2002 and Bleakley and Lin, 2012). Seen in this light, the contribution of the chapter
is to document that, at least for the case of France, industrialisation disrupted the
existing spatial structure along a number of interesting dimensions.
A number of papers have examined the spatial dynamics of economies over longer
time horizons. The paper most closely related to this chapter is Rosés (2010), which
examines the regional dynamics of Spain across 8 regions during the 19th century.
One of the main findings is that while traditional industries grew more or less equally
across the 8 Spanish regions, modern sectors had far more uneven growth, eventually
leading to uneven industrialisation across Spain. Relative to that paper, the main
advantage in this chapter is that I am able to observe the same industry before and
during modernisation, albeit for much a smaller set of industries.
A number of other papers have documented the bell-shaped curve in spatial
3As machines were increasingly powered by water or steam, proximity to fast-flowing streams
or coal could be a location-specific, exogenous natural advantage which changed firms’ location
decisions.
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inequality predicted by new-economic geography (NEG) models.4 In these models,
steadily falling transport costs lead first to an increase, and then a decrease in
regional disparities. Most importantly, Combes et al. (2011) confirms the bell-
shaped pattern in regional disparities in value added across departments in France
for agriculture, manufacturing and services for the period between 1860 - 2000. Kim
(1995) shows this pattern using US manufacturing employment data between 1860
- 1987, while Rosés et al. (2010) shows the same for Spain, where the turning point
did not occur until the 1970s. Relative to these papers, the focus of this chapter is
not on the role played by transport costs, but rather on how spatial dynamics for
a number of key industries evolved during the period when production technology
switched from CRS to a technology where internal, and potentially external, scale
economies became increasingly prevalent.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I discuss the historical
context. In Section 3, I introduce the dataset. Section 4 documents the firm level
variables and discusses the spatial dynamics observed. The final section concludes.
A detailed description of the dataset, its construction and potential limitations can
be found in Appendix A.
1.2 Historical Context
The first half of the 19th century brought momentous changes to the French econ-
omy. For the textile industry in particular, both the method of production and the
organisation of labour were transformed during this period, fundamentally altering
the way in which economic activity was organised. The new technology, which was
adopted from Britain, had enormous effects on the economy. It is estimated that
cotton accounted for an extraordinary 25% of TFP growth in British industry be-
tween 1780 - 1860, for 22% of British industrial value added, and 50% of British
merchandise exports in 1831 (Crafts, 1985). In France the textile industry became
similarly dominant. Cotton manufacturing alone accounted for 18% of manufactur-
ing employment in 1840, while textiles in general claimed 58%. Chapter 2 deals in
detail with the adoption of mechanised cotton spinning technology in France, which
initially proved difficult. Chapter 3 discusses how the technology in spinning, and
downstream cotton weaving was adapted to suit other fibres in the textile industry,
4See Fujita et al. (2001) for an overview of the literature.
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and how this affected coagglomeration patterns in the industry. In this chapter, I
focus on documenting a larger set of patterns related to how the spatial structure
of the economy changed over this time period, at least for the subset of industries
which I examine. To this end, I focus on two aspects of the historical setting which
are important for interpreting the patterns in the data.
1. New technology entailed a switch from CRS to IRS
As a consequence of the new technology used to spin cotton yarn, the capital inten-
sity of production and the location of production changed dramatically. As late as
the end of the 18th century, textile manufacturing was predominantly a rural activity
across Europe organised as a cottage industry. It was performed using very simple
equipment, generally in the workers’ own homes, often as a means of supplement-
ing income during agricultural down-time. Workers were organised by merchants
and middle-men who supplied them with the raw materials, and sometimes also the
equipment that they used (Mokyr, 2009). In many ways, it could be thought of as
the quintessential constant returns to scale technology. Production was scaled up
or down depending on the eb and flows of demand.
During the 1760s, a number of key inventions in cotton spinning revolutionised
almost the entire textile industry. Previously, a spinner had used one wheel to spin
a single yarn. The new machines now made it possible for one spinner to simulta-
neously spin multiple threads as twist was imparted to the fibre not by using the
workers’ hands, but rather by using spindles. In the space of a generation, the new
machines invented for spinning cotton yarn were adopted across the British country-
side and production moved into modern factories where work-flow was organised by
managers, and workers were employed at a wage. As early as the 1780s, machines
powered by inanimate sources (initially water, and later steam) were developed.
For all these reasons, the fixed costs of production increased, suggesting that IRS
internal to the firm became more important with the adoption of the technology.
The changes were dramatic relative to the technology that was replaced, however,
at least initially, the fixed costs for most firms were arguably fairly modest. The
early spinning jenny was estimated to cost about 70 shillings, which was about 7
times a worker’s weekly wage (Allen, 2009). The machines did become more so-
phisticated over time and production seems to have become more capital intensive.
However, as late as the 1840s, the median mechanised cotton spinning firm used no
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steam-powered motors and one water-powered motor in France.
The historical literature has focused to a much larger extent on IRS at the level
of the localised industry, and in particular on learning-by-doing externalities. There
are at least three reasons for this.5. First, the machines were fairly crude devices
to begin with. Many important innovations were made by anonymous workers or
inventors who were able to improve upon existing designs by tweaking the machines.
These improvements were not patented, but rather they became part of the tacit,
best-practice knowledge embedded in machine builders skills (Mokyr, 2009). Second,
for both the spinners and the downstream weavers, working with the new technology
and using machine-spun yarn required different skills. Horn (2006) describes in detail
how both the pre-1789 Bourbon government and private entrepreneurs in France
paid for English workers to spend time in France to train spinners in working the
new machines.6 Third, Allen (2009) argues that there were important spillovers
generated by the invention of factory based production. Indeed, Chapman (1970)
has found that cotton mills in Britain had a remarkably similar structure. The
reason for this has to do with the fact that they were all built by the same person,
who had acquired his skills on the job. In sum, the new technology in cottons
disrupted the existing structure in several important dimensions.
2. Time lags in mechanising other parts of the production process and
other sectors
One attractive aspect of the setting is that there was a significant amount of variation
in the extent to which different sectors had mechanised and adopted factory based
production at any given point in time. As I will show, many of the patterns which
emerge in the data seem to be systematically related to the degree to which a given
sector was mechanised at the time. It is therefore useful to establish approximately
when different sectors mechanised.
While there is significant debate in the historical literature about the extent to
which developments in textiles were matched by similar changes in other sectors, the
limited set of industries which I examine in this paper (cotton, wool and leather) are
fairly straightforward to rank in terms of the timing and extent to which they mech-
5In Chapter 2, I document the historical evidence in support of learning-by-doing spillovers in
far more detail.
6It should be noted that this was illegal, as Britain prohibited both the emmigration of textile
workers and machine builders, and the export of the machines themselves.
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anised.7 Following Voigtländer and Squicciarini (2014), I match French industries
from the census data to Nuvolari and Tartari’s (2011) data on British patents by
industry.8 Table 1.1 shows that the leather industry was one of the least innovative
industries in terms of patent intensity, while the textile industry was second only
to engines. This is very much in line with historical evidence. Bonin and Langlois
(1997) emphasise that the industry served mostly local markets and used predomi-
nantly local materials. The only locational constraint was its dependence on access
to water, which makes it an ideal comparison to cotton and wool, which both become
reliant on access to fast flowing streams as production methods mechanised.
Within the dynamically changing and highly innovative textiles sector, there was
a significant amount of variation in the extent to which different fibres and different
parts of the production process mechanised, and also large differences in the onset of
these changes. With the notable exception of silk manufacturing, textile production
was a technologically very similar process for the three other fibres which dominated
19th century textile production in Europe. In the case of cotton, wool and flax, the
production process entails the following four steps; (1) Preparation of the fibre
(called carding for wool and cotton and heckling for flax). (2) Spinning the fibre
into yarn. This is the stage which imparts the twist to the fibre necessary to produce
yarn. (3) Weaving, which is the stage at which cloth is produced by weaving together
the yarn. (4) Finishing, which can involve printing, dyening and/or bleaching.
As a result of the large productivity gains in mechanising the production of
cotton yarn, efforts were soon under way in Britain and elsewhere to adapt the
spinning machines to the spinning of other fibres and to mechanise other parts of
the production process, notably downstream weaving.9 However, because of inherent
differences in the fibre, adapting the machines for other fibres took decades. In the
case of woollens, Jenkins (2003) estimates that mechanised spinning replaced hand-
spinning by the 1820s in Britain, and by the 1840s on the Continent. What this
implies is that there was variation in the extent to which two technologically very
similar sectors (wool and cotton) employed CRS or IRS technologies at any given
7For two opposing views on the extent to which the Industrial Revolution was limited to a few
innovative sectors see Crafts and Harley (1992) and Sullivan, 1990.
8These data cover the period 1617 - 1841 and thus stop slightly short of the last point in time
(1860), when I observe employment data for the industries in the sample.
9Allen (2009) estimates that with the first spinning jenny, the cots of spinning a pound of cotton
yarn decreased from 7 to 2.33 shillings for the coarsest yarn, where the productivity gains were the
lowest.
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point in time.
Mechanising downstream weaving proved to be more difficult than mechanising
spinning. Mann (1954) estimates that weaving lagged mechanisation in spinning by
about fifty years, as the power-loom did not become more productive than hand-
loom weaving until about 1840. In the case of both cotton and wool, mechanisation
of downstream weaving lagged mechanisation of spinning by decades.
1.3 Data
Data are compiled from a variety of primary and secondary sources which cover the
period 1792-1865. Table 1.2 summarises the years for which data are available for the
cotton, woollen and leather industries. For the later 18th - early 19th century, I have
collected data from a number of large-scale industrial surveys conducted either by
the Revolutionary French government in the early 1790s, or the Napoleonic regime in
the early 19th century.10 In each case, the data were requested by the government in
Paris. For each department, the prefect was responsible for collecting and compiling
the data. Of the 83 departments which made up France at the time, data are
consistently available for about 70 departments throughout my period of interest.11
Importantly, these data were never used for the purposes of taxation, reducing the
incentive to hide or misrepresent economic activity.
I link data from these industrial surveys to two industrial censuses from the 1840s
and 1860s which covered almost all manufacturing activity. Chanut et al. (2000)
collected, cleaned and classified the data published by the French government at the
time. Data from the first census are available at the level of the firm, while data
from the second is available at the level of the arrondissement.12
The outcome variable which is consistently observed across industries and time is
the level of employment. This will be the outcome variable of interest which I focus
on, however, I also report summary statistics for other variables of interest. For
10For the latter, the data cover all of the departments of the Continental French Empire. To
ensure consistency across earlier and later years, I only use data from departments of the French
Empire at its 1789 borders.
11These departments correspond, with a few exceptions, to the departments which make up
present-day France. The only territorial discrepancy in the time period which I examine is "Tarn
et Garonne" which was formed in 1808 from a number of surrounding departments. In post-1808
years, I add Tarn et Garonne to Tarn.
12One important missing variable is spinning capacity (number of spindles) for each firm, which
I have collected from the original data in order to be able to compare outcomes for cotton spinners
across time.
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mechanised cotton spinning, physical capital (measured as the number of spindles)
is measured across a large number of time periods.13 For weaving, the number
of non-mechanised weaving frames used in pre-industrial production is observed in
the initial periods. For leather tanning, the number of tanning pits, a measure of
physical capital, is observed for the initial time periods. Finally, the census data
report sales and variables measuring the intensity of use of water and steam-power
for both periods and all industries.
In the analysis, I focus on outcomes measured at the level of the department.
The borders of these administrative units were drawn during the Revolution with
the intention that the boundary of any department should be within a day’s travel
from the prefecture. In the case of mechanised cotton spinning firms, I observe data
at the firm level at two points in time, 1803-06 and 1840, making it possible to
examine along a number of dimensions how firms evolved during this time period.
Appendix A describes all data sources, construction of the data set, the imputation
models used to impute missing spindle data and possible limitations.
1.4 Patterns of spatial dynamics
In this section, I document some of the patterns which emerge from the data. My
interest lies in examining whether the spatial structure of the economy changed in
interesting ways in line with the differential timing in the adoption of mechanisation.
To this end, I begin by examining the firm level outcomes. I then examine industry
specific persistence in order to discern the extent to which the spatial structure
in France displayed interesting dynamics over this time period. I then examine
whether the patterns on persistence are related along other dimensions to the timing
of mechanisation. Finally, I look at coagglomeration patterns across industries and
over time.
1.4.1 Firm level outcomes
I begin the analysis by establishing some pattern at the firm level. Table 1.4 ex-
amines how mechanised cotton spinning firms evolved between 1806 and 1840. In
general, cotton spinning firms became much larger and more capital intensive be-
13Spindles are imputed for firms which report the number of machines instead of the number of
spindles. Details of the imputation model are provided in Appendix A.
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tween the two points in time. In particular, the median firm had 664 spindles (which
corresponds to around 3-4 state of the art machines at the time) and 30 employees
in 1806. By 1840, this number had risen to 4,000 spindles and 72 employees. We
also see a large increase in terms of the capital intensity of the firms; the median
firm had 24 spindles per employee in 1806. By 1840, this number had increased
to 55. Despite the increase in the size of the firm and the capital intensity of the
technology used, most firms used very little inanimate power. As late as 1840, the
median firm used no steam-powered motors, and only one water-powered one.
It is useful to contrast cotton spinners to firms in other industries, which we are
able to do in Table 1.5 for 1840. The most interesting comparison is that of woollen
spinning, where the technology was similar, however, developments lagged those in
cotton spinning.14 Consistent with a lag in technology adoption, the firms seemed to
be smaller, and they used less inanimate power. The median firm in woollen spinning
employed only 40 workers relative to 72 in cottons. Similar to cotton spinning, the
median firm employed no steam-powered motors, and only one water-powered one,
however, the means were smaller for both water and steam power in the case of
woollens.
Both cotton and wool weaving firms seemed to be generally larger in size than
their counterparts in spinning. The median cotton weaving firm employed 80 workers
(relative to 72 in spinning), while the median wool weaver employed 55 (relative to 40
in spinning). However, they both used far less steam and water-power. In fact, the
median firm in both cotton and wool weaving used neither steam, nor water-power,
consistent with mechanisation lagging developments in spinning. Finally, firms in
the leather industry were far smaller in scale. The median firm had 4 employees,
and used no steam or water-powered motors.
1.4.2 Persistence patterns
Table 1.3 examines persistence in the location of economic activity by calculating
the raw correlation and rank correlation for employment between the given year and
1860. A number of interesting patterns emerge.
First, I compute persistence correlations for aggregate employment levels across
the five industries for each department in my sample. The raw correlation of per-
14Recall that by 1840, mechanised woollen spinning technology had mostly replaced hand-
spinning across the Continent.
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sistence for France in these five sectors between 1810-1860 is 0.66 , while the same
number for the period between 1840 and 1860 is 0.81.15
It is interesting to compare these numbers to those calculated for Japan during
industrialisation from Davis and Weinstein (2002). Persistence relative to 1998,
calculated using the density of population across regions, is 0.76 for 1872 (about the
time when Japanese industrialisation began, and thus corresponds to the figures for
1810 in France) and 0.94 for 1920, a point in time when industrialisation was well
under way, but 50% of the population was still working in farming. As can been
seen, these numbers relate to much longer time horizons, yet are somewhat larger.
However, when comparing the results to the French data, it is worth bearing in
mind that despite the fact that wool and cotton textiles alone accounted for about
30% of manufacturing employment in 1840 in France, and could be thus argued to
capture a sizeable share of manufacturing activity, my measure in no way accounts
for employment in agriculture, which is where the large majority of the population
was employed in this time period.
Persistence between 1810 and 1860 was lower for industries which mechanised, or
began to mechanise during this period. As a benchmark, it is useful to examine the
leather industry which did not undergo significant change throughout this period.
The raw correlation in employment between 1810 and 1860 is 0.65, while it is 0.63
between 1840 and 1860.
For mechanised cotton spinning, the persistence coefficient with 1860 is 0.63 in
1810, while the same number for rural, woollen hand-spinning is 0.34. That is, the
location of woollen spinning changed to a far larger degree between 1810-1860 than
it did for mechanised cotton.
Other industries, which were also rurally organised in the early 19th century, but
later mechanised display a similar pattern of persistence; cotton weaving and wool
weaving have persistence parameters in the range of 0.40 - 0.45, which are lower
than non-mechanising leather, and mechanised cotton.
Similarly, in 1840, the raw correlation with employment levels in 1860 is higher
for sectors that were more mechanised by 1840. It is 0.98 for mechanised cotton
spinning, and 0.89 for woollen spinning. The numbers are somewhat lower for cotton
15I also computed persistence for the entire manufacturing sample in the years between 1840 -
1860. For this period the raw correlation is 0.90, and the rank correlation is 0.82. These numbers
omit the Seine and Rhone departments as data reporting was not consistent across the two points
in time.
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and wool weaving at 0.63 and 0.57. Recall that mechanisation only started to diffuse
in weaving from around the 1840s, while in cotton and wool spinning the technology
had diffused much earlier. In sum, the aggregate numbers mask a substantial amount
of spatial industry dynamics. Moreover, at any given point in time, persistence seems
to have increased in the degree of mechanisation.
1.4.3 Industry-level concentration
I now turn to examining how localisation of each industry evolved over time. To do
this, I use two measures. Top share measures the share of total industry employment
claimed by the five largest departments, while I also examine the Gini coefficient
to account for changes taking place across the entire size distribution.16 In general,
concentration appears to have increased in the level of mechanisation.
I observe the concentration of mechanised cotton spinning activity at different
points in time between 1806 and 1840. The top share is relatively high in 1806 at
63%, and it increases to 78% by 1860. As we will see in the following, this is a modest
increase, from a high initial level. The Gini coefficient shows even more stability as
it increases from 83% to 88% throughout the time period. Interestingly, industry
concentration drops from 63% to 54% in the space of 3 years between 1803 and 1806,
and then recovers to 70% by 1812. I show in Chapter 2 that between 1803-1815, the
location of mechanised cotton spinning underwent a fundamental change as a result
of the Napoleonic Blockade against British trade. The initial drop in concentration
is consistent in its timing with these events.
It is most interesting to contrast localisation patterns in mechanised cotton spin-
ning to woollen spinning. Concentration in woollen spinning was far lower in both
1792 and 1810, when the industry was still organised as rural hand-spinning. The
top share for the two years was 39% and 40% respectively, while the Gini coefficient
was also fairly stable at initially 66% and then 71%. These numbers are far smaller
than those measured in mechanised cotton spinning at the same point in time. As
woollen spinning mechanised in later years, it is interesting to see how localisation
patterns changed. Indeed, concentration is measured to be markedly higher both in
1840 and again in 1860. The top share in employment was 63% and 67% respec-
tively, while the Gini coefficients were 82% and 84%. By the 1860s, the industry had
16Another measure which is often used in the literature is the Theil index. I do not use this
because of the large number of departments which have zero employment in a given industry.
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a localisation pattern which was almost as concentrated as that of cotton spinning.
To what extent was the localisation pattern in an industry matched by similar
localisation in the downstream industry? Again, the historical setting provides some
interesting variation. In the early decades of the 19th century, both wool and cotton
weaving, the downstream industry, were rurally organised, as mechanisation had not
yet been developed. There was thus symmetry in cotton and woollen weaving to
the extent that neither had switched to the new technology, however the upstream
of cotton weaving was mechanised, and highly localised, while woollen spinning was
still rurally organised. Localisation patterns in weaving mirrored the pattern in
upstream spinning, both in terms of levels, and in terms of dynamics.
Cotton weaving was highly localised as early as 1803, despite the rural structure
of the industry. 85% of employment in cotton weaving was located in 5 departments
in 1803, which is a higher level of concentration than that measured for cotton
spinning. Concentration remained remarkably stable through to 1860, when the top
five departments accounted for 86% of industry employment. The Gini coefficients
are 91% and 92% respectively. Similarly to cotton spinning, there is a decrease in
concentration during the period of the Napoleonic Blockade.
In contrast, woollen weaving was less localised in the late 18th - early 19th
century, consistent with findings in woollen spinning. The top shares in 1792 and
1810 are measured as 38% and 48%, while the Gini coefficients are 67% and 76%
respectively. These are very similar to the level of concentration found for woollen
spinning. Similarly to woollen spinning, concentration increased over time, though
the levels do not reach those of woollen spinning. In 1840, the top share was 57%
(relative to 72% in woollen spinning). It increased to 60% by 1860 (the same measure
was 67% for spinning). The pattern is identical for the Gini coefficients. This finding
is particularly interesting given that in the next section, I find that in the early 19th
century, spinning and weaving were highly coagglomerated.
Finally, I turn to examining localisation for the leather industry. In terms of both
measures, the level of localisation was far smaller for leather. It had the lowest levels
of localisation, and the increase over time was much smaller. The top share was 20%
in 1811, and it increased slightly to 29% by 1860. The Gini coefficients display a
similar pattern, increasing from 41% to 50%. In sum, switching to the modern
IRS technology is associated with increasing industry localisation. Moreover, input-
output linkages may also play a role in shaping localisation patterns.
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1.4.4 Coagglomeration
Given the patterns of localisation documented in the previous section, an interesting
question is the extent to which the various industries were concentrated in the same
departments and how this evolved over time. Table 1.11 examines inter-industry
correlations at different points in time. A number of interesting patterns emerge.
First, industries linked through input-output linkages (spinners and weaving in cot-
ton and wool) were initially located in the same departments. Around 1810, the
correlation between employment at the level of the department for spinning and
weaving was 0.83 for cottons and 0.84 for woollens. However, the strength of these
correlations decreased over time. In the case of cotton weaving, the correlation had
decreased to 0.7 by 1860, and in the case of woollens it had dropped to 0.22. It
would seem that throughout the course of the first half of the 19th century, coag-
glomeration in industries linked via input-output linkages was weaker, at least in
the case of the textile industry.
On the other hand, coagglomeration of industries using a similar production
process (cotton and wool spinners, and cotton and wool weavers) was initially low,
but in both cases increased over time. The correlation between wool and cotton
spinning was 0.17 in 1810, but by 1860 it had increased to 0.27, while for cotton
and wool weaving, co-location increased from a low of 0.05 to 0.19.
Finally, there seems to be no clearly discernible pattern in the coagglomeration of
leather tanning and any other industry. The correlations oscillate between effectively
zero and 0.2 with no pattern across industries or time.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a novel dataset which can be used to study spatial
dynamics during industrialisation. I have found that firms tended to become larger
in scale and capital intensity in mechanised spinning throughout the first half of
the 19th century. In the cross section, increased mechanisation seems to have been
associated with a higher reliance on inanimate power sources. This lends credence
to the idea that scale economies internal to the firm became increasingly important
as industries mechanised and adopted factory based production.
I have also documented some spatial patterns that seem to comove with mechani-
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sation. Localisation seems to have increased for mechanising industries, and persis-
tence was lower for industries which made larger strides in mechanisation throughout
my time period. Coagglomeration for upstream and downstream firms was initially
high and decreased over the time period, while coagglomeration seems to have be-
come stronger for horizontally linked firms (spinners and also weavers).
What does this episode teach us about how the spatial structure of the economy
is affected as an economy moves towards modern, factory based production? First,
it seems to be the case, at least for these industries in early 19th century France,
that moving towards modern manufacturing disrupted the spatial structure of the
economy along a number of dimensions. There could be a number of reasons for
this. As I have noted, transport costs fell significantly throughout the 19th century
(Bairoch, 1997), which could also predict similar patterns. Mitigating these concerns
is the fact that the observed patterns are related not to specific points in time, but
rather to the time path of sector’s own mechanisation time-line.
A different explanation may focus on changing underlying natural advantage
requirements for industries. For example, reliance on steam and water power may
lead industries to locate close to fast-flowing streams and coal. However, in my data
firms in general do not seem to be using a large amount of inanimate power. With
the exception of spinners, the median firm in other industries uses neither.
Irrespective of the cause behind the documented changes, the finding that the
spatial structure was disrupted along several dimensions during industrialisation in
France counteracts an emerging literature which documents significant persistence
in the location of economic activity over time.17
The two findings are not contradictory. In fact, in Chapter 2 and 3, I explore how
a temporary event in the early 19th century, the Napoleonic Blockade, disrupted the
existing spatial structure for mechanised cotton spinners, and led to long-run effects
both within and outside the cotton industry. In particular, Chapter 3 builds on the
patterns of coagglomeration found in this section to explore the type of causal forces
which may give rise to horizontal coagglomeration. In this way, further work could
shed light on the precise mechanisms at work in settings where persistence seems to
be more or less important.
17Davis and Weinstein, 2002 and Bleakley and Lin, 2012 are two examples of papers which
encompass the period of structural transformation in their analysis.
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1.A Tables
Table 1.1: Patent intensity by industry
Industry Number of patents
Mining 62
Glass 89
Leather 158
Pottery, bricks, stone 169
Clothing 196
Military equipment and weapons 216
Medicine 244
Agriculture 287
Paper, printing and publishing 337
Construction 400
Instruments 410
Manufacturing machinery 457
Metal manufacturing 466
Furniture 473
Shipbuilding 481
Carriages, vehicles and railways 513
Food and drink 529
Hardware 628
Chemicals 753
Textiles 1154
Engines (steam and water wheels) 1177
Notes: The table is constructed by matching the aggregate cate-
gories from the French census data as classified by Chanut et al.
(2000) to the British patent data published in Nuvolari and Tartari
(2011). The latter dataset covers all patents filed in Britain between
1617-1841. All data sources are discussed in more detail in Appendix
A.
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Table 1.2: Data coverage
Year Branches Coverage Rural/Mechanised
Cotton
1803 Spinning Firm Mechanised
1803 Weaving Department Rural
1806 Spinning Firm Mechanised
1806 Weaving Department Rural
1812 Spinning Department Mechanised
1812 Weaving Department Mechanised
1840 Spinning Firm Mechanised
1840 Weaving Firm Mechanised
1860 Spinning Arrondissement Mechanised
1860 Weaving Arrondissement Mechanised
Wool
1792 Spinning Arrondissement Rural
1792 Weaving Arrondissement Rural
1810 Spinning Department Rural
1810 Weaving Department Rural
1840 Spinning Firm Mechanised
1840 Weaving Firm Mechanised
1860 Spinning Arrondissement Mechanised
1860 Weaving Arrondissement Mechanised
Leather
1792 Tanneries Arrondissement Rural
1810 Tanneries Arrondissement Rural
1840 Leather industry Firm Rural
1860 Leather industry Arrondissement Rural
Notes: All data from 1840 and 1860 are from Chanut et al. (2000). Data
for the cotton sector for 1803 and 1806 are from Champagny’s survey of the
cotton industry from 1806. Data for the cotton and woollen sectors are from
the "Enquêtes Industrielles". Data for 1792 for the wool and leather sectors
are from two industrial surveys. Data for the leather sector from 1811 is
from an industrial survey. All data sources are discussed in more detail in
Appendix A.
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Table 1.4: Firm level summary statistics for mechanised cotton spinners, 1806 - 1840
Variable Mean Median Std Deviation Min Max Top share N
Firms 1806
Spindles 1,621 664 3,500 26 49,200 20% 389
Labour 62.34 30 99.41 1 950 14% 387
Capital intensity 27.33 23.64 18.30 1 120 – 387
Firms 1840
Spindles 6,269 4,000 7,279 300 85,000 8% 531
Labour 112.05 72 147.76 4 1,413 10% 531
Capital intensity 74.77 54.55 85.72 5.31 961.54 – 531
Steam-powered motors 0.43 0 0.58 0 4 6% 531
Water-powered motors 0.86 1 1.70 0 35 13% 531
Sales 264,478.6 182,000 332,541.8 6,250 4,060,000 10% 531
Notes: Number of spindles employed is the standard measure of physical capital in mechanised spinning. Labour
measures the number of employees reported by the firm. Capital intensity is defined as capital per worker. Two firms
in 1806 do not report labour employed, for these firms, labour is thus missing and capital per worker is undefined. Steam
and water-powered machines measure the number of motors in use by power type. Sales is the value of production as
reported by the firm. Top share is the share claimed by the top five firms relative to the total value across France of
the given variable. Data for 1806 from Champagny’s survey of the cotton industry. Data from 1840 from Chanut et
al. (2000). Further details of data construction can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 1.5: Firm level summary statistics by industry, 1840
Variable Mean Median Std Deviation Min Max Top share N
Cotton weaving firms 1840
Labour 132.49 80 177.40 2 1800 7% 730
Steam-powered motors 0.07 0 0.30 0 4 21% 730
Water-powered motors 0.13 0 0.41 0 3 15% 730
Sales 157,538 79,625 216,859 1,680 2,036,601 7% 730
Wool spinning firms, 1840
Labour 61.16 40 71.29 1 700 8% 511
Steam-powered motors 0.29 0 0.59 0 8 12% 511
Water-powered motors 0.73 1 0.95 0 14 9% 511
Sales 276,603 155,135 378,028 600 4,165,000 9% 511
Wool weaving firms, 1840
Labour 96.57 55 129.99 1 1,200 8% 592
Steam-powered motors 0.07 0 0.36 0 5 0.30 592
Water-powered motors 0.62 0 1.06 0 8 10% 592
Sales 299,363 150,000 565,675 1,200 6,000,048 14% 592
Leather industry, 1840
Labour 11.67 4 28.33 1 440 15% 809
Steam-powered motors 0.02 0 0.16 0 2 31% 809
Water-powered motors 0.31 0 1.14 0 18 25% 809
Sales 85,405 33,000 228,497 250 3,680,000 17% 809
Notes: Labour measures the number of employees reported by the firm. Steam and water-powered machines measure
the number of motors in use by power type. Sales is the value of production as reported by the firm. Top share is
the share claimed by the top five firms relative to the total value across France of the given variable. Data from
Chanut et al. (2000). Further details of data construction can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 1.11: Cross-industry correlations
Cotton spinning Cotton weaving Wool spinning Wool weaving Leather tanning
1810-12
Cotton spinning 1.00
Cotton weaving 0.83 1.00
Wool spinning 0.17 0.16 1.00
Wool weaving 0.08 0.05 0.84 1.00
Leather tanning 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.01 1.00
1840
Cotton spinning 1.00
Cotton weaving 0.81 1.00
Wool spinning 0.19 -0.03 1.00
Wool weaving 0.05 -0.03 0.58 1.00
Leather tanning 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.23 1.00
1860
Cotton spinning 1.00
Cotton weaving 0.70 1.00
Wool spinning 0.27 -0.05 1.00
Wool weaving 0.27 0.19 0.22 1.00
Leather tanning 0.14 -0.01 0.20 0.15 1.00
Notes: Each cell reports the pairwise correlation between the level of employment in a department at a given point in time
for the two sectors in question. All data sources are discussed in Appendix A.
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Chapter 2
Temporary Protection and
Technology Adoption: Evidence
from the Napoleonic Blockade
The principal advantage of the English cotton trade arises from our ma-
chines both for spinning and printing (...). It is impossible to say how
soon foreign countries may obtain these machines, but even then, the
experience we have in the use of them would give us such an advantage
that I should not fear the competition.
Joseph Smith and Robert Peel, 17861
2.1 Introduction
A long-standing debate in economics is centred on the question of whether certain
industries can benefit from temporary trade protection. The idea, widely known
as the infant industry argument, has a long tradition in the history of economic
thought.2 In recent decades, endogenous growth theory has identified a number of
market imperfections which could inhibit entrepreneurs from entering high growth
sectors at free trade prices.3 In the case of a learning-by-doing production externality
for example, an economy which begins with an initial productivity lag with respect
to the technological frontier can stay indefinitely stuck in low-growth sectors under
free-trade prices (Krugman 1987, Lucas 1998, Matsuyama 1992 and Young 1991).4
1Edwards, (1967) p. 51.
2Early proponents include US founding father Alexander Hamilton, and the 19th century
economist, Friedrich List.
3Rodríguez-Clare (1995) and Rodrik (1996) present multiple-equilibria models with coordina-
tion failures, Krugman (1987), Lucas (1988), Matsuyama (1992) and Young (1991) analyse models
in which the market imperfection is a learning-by-doing production externality. In Grossman and
Helpman (1991), the externality is in the R&D sector, while Aghion et al. (2012) have shown that
sectoral policy targeted at production in a particular sector can enhance growth and efficiency by
forcing firms to innovate vertically, instead of differentiating to escape competition.
4The mechanism works via a decreasing industry-wide cost curve which firms do not internalise.
When learning gains are external to firms, no agent internalises the fact that increasing production
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Under some conditions, temporary trade protection can foster the development of
high-growth sectors, which, over time, can become competitive, though the effect
on welfare is generally ambiguous.5
Assessing the empirical relevance of these types of mechanisms has proven dif-
ficult. The reason is that infant industry protection is generally granted by the
policy-maker at the specific request of the industry itself. This makes identification
of the economic mechanism at work challenging for two reasons. First, even if the
industry becomes competitive in the long-run, it is difficult to answer the question of
whether the industry would have become competitive anyway. The literature to date
has tackled the issue by simulating the counterfactual (Baldwin and Krugman 1986,
Head 1994, and Irwin 2000). Second, in the case of a specific policy intervention, it
is not possible to disentangle the effect of the economic mechanism (measuring the
existence and importance of the market imperfection) from the efficacy of implemen-
tation, which is determined to a large extent by the political-economy equilibrium.
To the best of my knowledge, the literature to date has not attempted to separate
the two mechanisms.
In this chapter, I present a natural experiment which replicates infant industry
protection without the direct involvement of the policy maker, making it possible to
address both identification challenges. In particular, I study the spatial pattern of
the adoption of mechanised cotton spinning technology across regions of the French
Empire during and after the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). Throughout these wars,
the French Empire was exposed to a regionally differential shock to the cost of
trading with Britain. I use variation in the size of the trade cost shock to identify
the effect of trade protection on mechanised spinning capacity during and after the
period of increased trade protection.
The setting is ideal to examine the effect of temporary trade protection on tech-
nology adoption in an infant industry. Exogenous, within country variation in trade
protection makes it possible to compare outcomes in areas in which the cost of trad-
ing with Britain increased to a larger extent, to areas in which the increase was
smaller, addressing the first empirical challenge. The fact that trade protection was
in the present will move the entire industry down along its industry cost curve. Therefore, if
one country has a slight first-mover advantage, it will be further down its cost curve and firms
in another country will not have an incentive to enter the sector even if they could become more
productive than the country which is producing at present.
5In Section 2.4, I discuss the fact that in general, trade policy is not the most efficient way of
correcting the market imperfection.
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not driven directly by policy makes it possible to disentangle the economic from
the political mechanism, tackling the second empirical challenge. Finally, large dis-
ruptions to trade usually affect both competition on the output side, and access
to imported inputs, making it difficult to disentangle the two effects.6 During the
Napoleonic Wars however, access to the imported input, raw cotton, was affected
fairly symmetrically across regions of the French Empire, as the source country
for this product was not Britain. This allows me to focus on the effect of import
competition on the output side, while holding fixed access to imported inputs.7
The industry I examine is mechanised cotton spinning, as this sector had a
number of features which make it ideal for testing the empirical importance of the
market imperfections supposedly driving infant industry mechanisms. First, by the
turn of the 19th century, Britain had gained a significant head start in the industry.
The technology, invented and developed in Britain in the late 18th century, was
not adopted on a wide scale across the Continent, which was particularly surprising
in the case of France, as it was Britain’s closest competitor. Slow adoption was
all the more puzzling, as historical evidence shows that the technology was widely
known and available to cotton (hand-) spinners in France. Consistent with a static
comparative disadvantage in cottons, by the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars,
French machine spun yarn was twice as expensive as that spun in Britain, and France
was a net importer of cotton goods. Learning-by-doing externalities, an example of
a market failure which can lead to infant industry predictions, are argued to have
been important in 19th century mechanised cotton spinning (David 1970, Mokyr
2009).
The Napoleonic Wars led to a unique historical episode whereby blockade of
Britain was imposed in an unusual way. As Napoleon did not have the naval military
power to impose a standard blockade of the British Isles whereby the French navy
would surround British ports, he instead used his direct or indirect influence over
much of Continental Europe to attempt to stop British goods from entering the
6Amiti and Konings (2007) is a rare example of a paper which disentangles the effect of trade
liberalisation on imported inputs from import competition on the output side. Using detailed firm
level data on imported inputs for a panel of Indonesian firms, they show that access to imported
inputs increases firm productivity by at least twice as much as increases in import competition on
the output side.
7A number of recent papers show that access to imported inputs is an important channel for
static and dynamic gains from trade, particularly for developing countries. See Amiti and Konings
(2007), Goldberg et al. (2010) and Halpern et al. (2009) for developing and emerging economies,
and Bøler et al. (2014) for Norwegian firms.
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mainland. Ports were closed to British trade, and the military was active in enforcing
the blockade along the coastline. In practice however, holes in the system opened up
almost immediately, and instead of achieving the original goal of stopping trade flows
between Britain and the Continent, the blockade displaced trade to more circuitous,
and hence more expensive routes.8
The key to my identification strategy is the uneven geographic success of the
blockade. The blockade was generally effective in Northern Europe with exports
from Britain falling fivefold from peak to trough. Trade intended for Northern
European markets however, was diverted to Southern Europe. British exports to
the region increased threefold, as Napoleon’s inherent military weakness and the
idiosyncratic political event of the Spanish insurgency against Napoleonic rule meant
that the blockade against British trade was unsuccessful. The geographic asymmetry
in the success of the blockade meant that trade flows to different parts of the French
Empire were disrupted to a different extent.
In the North of France, effective distance between a given region and Lon-
don increased markedly, as trade was diverted either to unreliable indirect routes
through German regions, or through Southern Europe. In the southern regions of
France, effective distance to London changed to a far smaller extent, as trade routes
stayed more or less the same. Changing trade protection from Britain during the
Napoleonic Wars was thus driven by one of the best-documented empirical regular-
ities in economics; the fact that trade diminishes dramatically with distance.9 As
distance is a barrier to trade, it plays a role similar to that of tariffs or other trade
policy instruments. Geographic distance however is constant over time, making it
generally difficult to disentangle the effect of distance from other regional character-
istics fixed over time. My empirical strategy exploits the fact that while geographic
distance between Britain and French regions did not change during the blockade, the
set of possible trading routes did, leading to changes in effective distance between
London and a given French region.10
8In its use of a historical blockade as a source of exogenous variation, the paper is related to
Hanlon (2015) who uses the shock to US supplies of raw cotton during the American Civil War
to test the theory of directed technical change (Acemoglu, 2002). The author shows that as the
British lost access to US supplies of raw cotton, they increased innovation activity in the cotton
sector in order to adapt their machines to different quality cotton supplies. Another example of
a historic blockade which has been used as a source of exogenous variation is Irwin (2005) who
examines the static welfare loss from being shut out of world trade during the Jeffersonian embargo
which took place simultaneously to the Napoleonic Blockade.
9See Head and Mayer (2013) for a recent review of the gravity literature.
10In this sense, the paper is related to recent contributions which use changes in trade routes
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To conduct the empirical analysis, I use the dataset introduced in Chapter 1.
I collected firm- and regional-level data from numerous primary sources on various
aspects of the French economy during the first half of the 19th century. Most
importantly, I have assembled a panel database of production capacity in mechanised
spinning at the departmental level using detailed, handwritten archival sources which
provide data, in some cases at the firm level, for mechanised cotton spinners. The
dataset provides a unique look at a key industry at a very early stage of industrial
development for important areas of Western-Europe which belonged to the French
Empire.11
Second, to quantify how trade routes changed during the blockade, I extracted
port level shipping data from the Lloyd’s List, one of the oldest newspapers in the
world. Using a text matching algorithm, I have built a dataset of journeys between
Britain and Continental-European ports for a twenty year time period. Together,
the two sources of data make it possible to estimate the effect of trade protection
on technology adoption in mechanised cotton spinning.
The first part of the empirical strategy employs a difference in difference (DD)
estimator with continuous treatment intensity. The strategy compares the size of
mechanised cotton spinning capacity across regions which were exposed to smaller
or larger increases in the cost of trading with Britain (trade-cost shock for short),
before and after the Napoleonic Wars. Similarly to standard DD estimators, un-
observables fixed at the departmental level over time, and aggregate shocks which
affect departments equally are controlled for. Identification relies on there being
no other shock contemporaneous to, and correlated with the trade cost shock. As
the shock itself varied smoothly across the French Empire, the main challenge for
identification is the question of whether different regions of France had the potential
to develop modern industry.
To address concerns regarding underlying characteristics which would have in-
evitably rendered some locations more favourable for modern industrial production,
I include the time-varying effect of a number of variables which have been argued to
or the introduction of trade-cost reducing technology to estimate the effect of trade on growth
in a cross-country setting. See Feyrer (2009a), Feyrer (2009b) and Pascali (2014). Keller and
Shiue (2008) use the introduction of trains and trade liberalisation within Germany to show that
trade-cost reducing technology (trains) had a larger effect on market integration than institutional
change (the abolishment of the Zollverein).
11The data covers regions which include all of present day France, Belgium, Luxembourg, parts
of the Netherlands, the left-bank of the Rhine (part of present-day Germany), a part of Switzerland
and the North-West of present-day Italy.
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be conducive to the development of modern industry, and cotton spinning in par-
ticular. These variables include locational fundamentals important for mechanised
cotton spinning such as access to fast-flowing streams and coal, the level of human
capital, the size of the downstream sector, urbanisation and population density, in-
stitutional change within the French Empire and labour supply shocks. I show that
while different regions of the Empire did have somewhat different characteristics,
regions were sufficiently similar to expect that, given the same level of protection,
modern cotton spinning could have developed.
I find that areas which received a larger trade cost shock during the Napoleonic
Wars increased production capacity in mechanised cotton spinning to a larger extent
than areas which received a smaller shock. The estimated effect is large and statis-
tically significant. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the shock leads to
a predicted increase in spinning capacity which is similar in size to mean spinning
capacity at the end of the blockade. The results remain both statistically and eco-
nomically significant when the time-varying effect of the aforementioned potential
confounders is added.
I find no similar effect in two closely related industries, woollen spinning and
leather tanning. Output in these industries was less intensively traded with Britain,
and there was no technological change in either industry, strengthening the results
in cotton spinning being driven by the trade cost shock. I also address the role
of factor prices, which has recently been put forward as an explanation for the
slow adoption of mechanised cotton spinning in France (Allen, 2009). Using data
on the number of men conscripted by Napoleon’s government, I find no evidence
to support the theory that a negative labour supply shock drove firms away from
labour-intensive hand-spinning into capital-intensive mechanised spinning during
the Napoleonic Wars. Furthermore, different vintages of machines were capital-
intensive to a different degree, meaning that even within mechanised spinning, firms
could choose the degree of capital intensity. However, in contrast to the predictions
of an uneven factor-price shock across the French Empire driving my results, I find
that the trade cost shock had no impact on capital-labour ratios across departments
in mechanised spinning.
The fact that production capacity in mechanised spinning increased in regions
which were more affected by the trade cost shock is by no means obvious, as an al-
ternative technology (hand-spinning) was also available to producers. However, if an
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infant industry type mechanism was inhibiting French entrepreneurs from switching
into the new technology on a wide scale, we would expect not only that depart-
ments scaled up in mechanised spinning capacity during the period of temporary
protection, but also that they became more productive over time. To answer this
question, in the second part of the empirical analysis I ask to what extent temporary
trade protection had long-term effects on the industry. I examine persistence in the
location of the industry within France, and ask whether regions with higher spinning
capacity after the blockade were more productive 30 years later. Both predictions
emerge from an infant industry mechanism. In general however, testing these types
of predictions is difficult, as other mechanisms, such as location fundamentals, would
predict the same outcome.
The setting of the post-blockade cotton spinning industry provides a rare op-
portunity to disentangle lock-in effects from locational fundamentals. To do so, I
exploit the fact that the post-blockade location of the cotton industry was deter-
mined to a large extent by the historical accident of the Napoleonic Wars. Using
the trade cost shock as an instrument for the post-blockade location of the cotton
industry, I find that regions with a higher level of spinning capacity at the end of
the Napoleonic Wars, also had higher capacity thirty years later. The estimated
effect is large and significant. A one standard deviation increase in the size of mech-
anised cotton spinning at the end of the Napoleonic Wars leads to a 0.75 standard
deviation predicted increase in the value of production in 1840. Furthermore, areas
with higher post-blockade production capacity had more productive firms 30 years
later. Again, the effect is large and significant. A one standard deviation increase
in spinning capacity per capita in 1812, leads to a 1.3 standard deviation predicted
increase in productivity in 1840.
As tariffs were imposed on cotton goods between Britain and France following
the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the long-term within country results show that
certain French regions had become sufficiently productive to withstand increased
competition after the Napoleonic Wars ended. It does not necessarily show however,
that (a subset of) firms had become competitive at free trade prices. For this
reason, I also examine exports of cotton goods from France. Consistent with evolving
comparative advantage in cottons, I find that exports of cotton goods increased
substantially after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Finally, I examine whether
convergence in cotton spinning was widespread across the Continent. I find that as
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late as the mid-19th century, France and Belgium, two parts of the French Empire
which had benefited from a high trade cost shock, had a larger cotton spinning
sector than other Continental countries. This fact suggests that adoption of the
new technology was far from inevitable.
In what ways, if any, do the findings from this particular historical episode in-
form the broader question of how openness to trade effects development? The most
important contribution of the chapter is to show that the types of market imper-
fections which can give rise to infant industry mechanisms appear to be empirically
important, at least in the context of early 19th century France. An interesting aspect
of this episode is the extent to which the setting seems general to the development
experience of many countries at the point in time in which a sizeable fraction of
the labour force moves out of agriculture and into unskilled labour-intensive textile
manufacturing.
Differences between Britain and France were small prior to the invention of
mechanised cotton spinning, at least relative to differences between rich and poor
countries today. Seen in this light, it would seem that the extent to which market
failures could inhibit economies from exploiting their underlying dynamic compara-
tive advantage is large.12 However, the fact that initial differences between late 18th
century Britain and France were relatively small may also suggest why I find large
effects of a short episode of extreme trade protection.
Many of the prerequisites for the development of mechanised spinning were in
place across large areas of the French Empire, meaning that once import compe-
tition was sufficiently low, mechanisation was rapidly adopted. For example, the
presence of downstream demand was important for the development of the industry.
This suggests that in cases where the underlying conditions are not in place, infant
industry protection, as implemented by the policy-maker, can turn out to be an
extremely blunt tool.
The results of this chapter contribute to several strands of the literature. First,
the main contribution is to evaluate the importance of the economic mechanism
underlying the infant industry mechanism in a well-identified setting. As noted, a
number of empirical challenges make the evaluation of infant industry promotion
policy difficult. Most studies use estimated model parameters to simulate the coun-
12Dynamic comparative advantage is a term which is often used to refer to sectors in which a
country does not have a comparative advantage at present, but in which it can develop one if the
industry is given temporary support. See Redding (1999) for a formal discussion.
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terfactual of no-protection.13 This approach implicitly evaluates both the underlying
economic mechanism – in general learning externalities – together with the efficacy
of policy. The papers generally find evidence of learning gains and productivity im-
provements, and most studies find modest (positive or negative) effects on welfare.
It should be noted however, that all studies abstract from inter-industry spillovers
- an issue which I take up in Chapter 3 - and as such they constitute a lower-bound
estimate on welfare. The chapter contributes to this literature by examining a set-
ting in which within-country variation in trade protection is driven by exogenous
events, providing a credible counterfactual for the regions which received the most
protection.
More generally, the economic theory underlying the infant industry mechanism
can be seen in the context of a large class of models which predict that industry
location is not uniquely determined by what is known in the new economic geography
(NEG) literature as locational fundamentals, and which would correspond in trade
theory to underlying (latent) comparative advantage. In particular, the chapter is
related to a growing empirical literature which examines whether temporary shocks
can permanently shift the location of economic activity (Davis and Weinstein (2002),
Redding et al (2011), Kline and Moretti (2014)). In contrast to existing papers
however, which are motivated primarily by the predictions of NEG models, the
primary focus of this study is not to evaluate whether temporary shocks can shift
the location of a given activity within a country, but rather to evaluate whether
temporary protection can lead to the wide-scale adoption of frontier technology in
an industrial follower country.
The chapter is also linked to recent work which exploits firm-level data to exam-
ine the effect of trade on technology upgrading and productivity growth. In contrast
to the findings of this paper, Lileeva and Trefler (2010), Bustos (2011) and Bloom
et al. (2014) find that increased international competition induced firms to upgrade
technology.14 Most closely related is the latter paper, which examines increased im-
13Baldwin and Krugamn (1986 and 1988), Head (1994), Luzio and Greenstein (1995), Hansen,
Jensen, and Madsen (2003) and Irwin (2008).
14Lileeva and Trefler (2010) and Bustos (2010) also find evidence of technology upgrading, albeit
for firms at different parts of the productivity distribution. Exporting firms have access to a larger
market, and for the most productive firms, this will justify paying the fixed cost of exporting as
in Melitz (2003). Paying the fixed cost of technology upgrading will only be profitable for firms
who have a large enough revenue, and these will be the exporting firms. Lileeva and Trefler (2010)
introduce heterogeneity in the benefits of technology adoption to rationalise their finding that less
productive new exporters have faster productivity growth upon entry to the export market than
more productive new entrants. Both studies share the common feature that they examine trade
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port competition in developed European countries following China’s WTO accession
in 2001. The different findings can be reconciled by the fact that European coun-
tries are arguably closer to the technological frontier than China. This implies that
first-mover advantage effects, which drive infant industry mechanisms, are plausibly
weak relative to the size of potentially counterbalancing forces. The findings of this
chapter should thus be seen as complementing the existing literature.
Finally, the chapter contributes to the question of why mechanised cotton spin-
ning was relatively slow to diffuse to Continental Europe in general, and France
in particular. A large body of research in past decades has called into question
Landes’ claim (1969) that France was a backward economy held back by the incom-
petence and economic mismanagement of the Bourbon regime (O’Brien and Keyder
1978, Crafts 1995 and Horn 2006). Recently, Allen (2009) has documented factor
price differences between Britain and France, which may have made the adoption of
capital-biased mechanised spinning in high-wage Britain profitable, while adoption
in relatively low-wage France was not profitable. In contrast to these explanations,
this chapter finds support in favour of an infant industry mechanism, and in this
way, relates to Williamson’s (2011) work on 19th century development.15
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I discuss mechanisation
of cotton spinning and its effects on France. Section 3 discusses the way in which
the Napoleonic Wars drive exogenous changes in trade protection from Britain. In
the fourth section, I present a simple theoretical framework to guide the empirical
analysis. In this model, geography is the driver of trade protection and a learning-by-
doing externality is the market imperfection behind the infant industry mechanism.
In Section 5, I turn to the short-run empirical analysis, which is followed by the long
term results in Section 6. The final section concludes.
liberalisation between countries at a similar level of development.
15Learning-by-doing externalities, tariff protection and growth have been extensively debated in
the literature in relation to the cotton industry in the 19th century, particularly for the case of the
US. On this debate see Taussig (1931), David (1970), Harley (1992), Irwin and Temin (2001) for
the US. Crouzet (1964) discusses the effect that the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
had on infant industries in Continental Europe.
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2.2 Mechanisation of cotton spinning in Britain
and its effect on France
In this section, I discuss the development of cotton spinning in Britain and France up
to the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars in 1803. I describe how the cotton industry
in the two countries was fairly similar until the invention of mechanised cotton
spinning in Britain in the late 18th century. I then examine why mechanisation
of one part of the production process – spinning – had such a large impact on the
industry. I document the rapid diffusion of the technology across Britain, and show
how despite having knowledge of, and access to the new technology, mechanisation
was not adopted on a large scale in France up to 1803. I show that by this time,
France had a marked competitive disadvantage in mechanised spinning vis-a-vis
Britain. Finally, I discuss the reasons behind the predominantly local structure of
the market, which turns out to be important for discussing the short-run results.
2.2.1 Similar initial conditions in 18th century Britain and
France
Britain’s absolute dominance of the 19th century cotton industry is a widely known
fact. It may thus be somewhat surprising that as late as the middle of the 18th
century, Britain and France both had a similarly modest sized cotton industry. It
has been estimated that about 3 million pounds of cotton yarn a year were spun in
both Britain and France, which compares modestly to Bengal’s 85 million pounds of
yearly output (Allen, 2009). The cotton industry was not only small in relation to
world output, but also relative to the size of other textiles in the domestic economy
such as wool, linen, hemp or silk.16
Why was cotton a relatively marginal sector in Continental Europe prior to
industrialisation in Britain? In contrast to other textiles, cotton was not an in-
digenous European textile.17 Asian cotton cloth was initially introduced to the
European market by merchants in the 17th century to enormous success.18 The
16For example, Chabert (1949) estimates the size of the industries in 1788 and 1812 in France
for textiles as follows (in millions of francs); 1788: Linen and hemp: 235, Wool: 225, Silk: 130.8,
Cotton: no number given. 1812: Linen and hemp: 242.8, Wool: 315.1, Silk: 107.5, Cotton: 191.6.
17Strictly speaking, silk is not indigenous to Europe either, however silk production had been
practised throughout Europe for centuries.
18Cotton’s immense popularity has been attributed to the fact that cotton printers were able
to make bright, lively coloured fabric with complex patterns, something which could not be done
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boom in the consumption of cotton cloth led to a fierce backlash from traditional
textile industries in both countries. To a certain extent, these vested interests were
initially successful, as both countries prohibited imports of Asian cloth for domestic
consumption. Furthermore, both countries banned the wearing of clothing made
from cotton.19
However, two important loopholes to the general ban on cottons served as early
catalysts in the various stages of production. First, domestic cotton manufacturing
was tolerated. O’Brien et al. (1991) argue that the ban on imported Asian cloth was
instrumental to the foundation of domestic industry as it would have been difficult
for European producers to compete with Asian cloth both in price and in quality.
As cotton cloth produced domestically could not be sold in home markets, it was
initially used to barter for African slaves (Allen, 2009).
Second, most important European port cities imported plain cotton cloth for
printing from Asia, as European spinners and weavers could not initially match the
quality of Asian cloth.20 Chapman and Chassagne (1981) document direct linkages
between involvement in cotton printing and the formation of backward linkages to
cotton spinning in both countries. Throughout the 18th century, both countries
gradually relaxed the constraints on domestic production and consumption. Thus,
not only was the size of cotton spinning similar in the two countries prior to mecha-
nisation, but government involvement in the sector had also followed a similar path.
2.2.2 Mechanisation in Britain
Based on these observations, up to the mid-eighteenth century, there was little dis-
tinction between Britain and France’s cotton industry. In both countries, the size
of the industry was marginal, and it was a sector not viewed particularly favourably
by the state. From these modest beginnings, it is hard to overstate the extent to
which the mechanisation of spinning (and later other stages of production) revolu-
tionised the cotton industry in Britain. According to Crafts’ (1985) calculations,
cotton alone accounted for an astonishing 25% of TFP growth in British industry
with indigenous European textiles such as wool, linen or silk (Chapman and Chassagne, 1981).
19O’Brien et al. (1991) discuss the political economy of the cotton industry in both countries in
the decades leading up to the beginning of the mechanisation process.
20This was true for hand-spinning, the only technology available at the time. The same was
initially true for machine spun yarn, but as a result of continuous improvements in productivity,
British machine-spun yarn outcompeted the finest Indian yarn by the end of the Napoleonic Wars
(Broadberry and Gupta, 2006).
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between 1780 - 1860, for 22% of British industrial value added, and 50% of British
merchandise exports in 1831.
To understand why the mechanisation of one stage of production – cotton spin-
ning – had such a large effect on the industry, it is useful to examine the production
process in detail. First, raw cotton was an imported good for both France and
Britain, which were supplied by their respective colonies and the Levant.21
Upon arrival to Europe, the fibre was prepared - it was cleaned, carded and
combed into rovings. The second step involved spinning the rovings into yarn.
Spinning was usually performed by women in their own homes, generally as an
additional source of income during agricultural down-time. The third step entailed
weaving the yarn into cloth. This stage of the production process was also organised
as domestic manufacture. The type of cloth woven depended on the fineness of the
the yarn (measured as its count) and whether it was mixed with other fibres. Finally,
the cloth was coloured and may have also been printed with designs. Printing,
because of its greater capital intensity, was usually organised in small workshops.
A series of inventions mechanised the spinning of cotton yarn in Britain in the
second half of the 18th century. Traditionally, spinners had spun one thread at a time
using a simple wheel. Mechanisation increased output per worker as machines were
able to spin multiple rovings simultaneously. The relevant measure of production
capacity in cotton spinning became the spindle which is the piece of equipment onto
which the roving is twisted. A picture of the original spinning jenny invented by
James Hargreaves in 1767 with sixteen spindles can be seen in Figure 2.1. This
machine was relatively simple, small and cheap.22
The water-frame and mule-jenny (the second and third generation machines),
which arrived in quick succession after the spinning jenny, were larger, more complex
and more expensive machines. They were better suited to spinning finer (higher
count) yarns, and from an early date they were powered by water (Edwards, 1967).
The literature on technology diffusion has documented a number of cases where
the diffusion of technology has been surprisingly slow.23 In the case of spinning
machinery however, adoption across Britain was remarkably fast (Allen, 2009). As
21French colonial supplies of raw cotton were abundant and of a high quality. In fact, Ed-
wards (1967) discusses the fact that as late as the 1780s, British spinners felt that their French
counterparts had an advantage in accessing good quality raw material.
22Allen (2009) puts the cost of a jenny at 70 shillings (a spinner would earn a weekly wage of
8-10 shillings).
23See Geroski (2000) or Rosenberg (1981).
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we will see below, relatively fast dispersion in Britain adds to the puzzle of why
adoption across the Channel proceeded slowly.
Mechanisation had large effects on the cotton industry for a number of reasons.
First, the machines disrupted the domestic structure of the industry. The size of
the machines, their complexity and their reliance on inanimate power rendered pro-
duction in the workers’ homes obsolete and manufacturing was soon organised in
large factories. Allen (2009) emphasises that part of the reason that cotton spinning
proved to be so revolutionary was that for the first time, production was organised
not rurally, but in large structures that required careful organisation of work-flow
and management of workers. Historical evidence points to the fact that experi-
mentation via trial and error, small improvements made by anonymous workers
and entrepreneurs, and experience acquired on the job were important sources of
productivity improvements (Mokyr, 2009).
For example, Chapman (1970) finds that most cotton mills in England had a
remarkably similar structure. Chapman quotes a contemporary, Sir William Fair-
bairn, on the reason for this striking similarity; “The machinery of the mills was
driven by four water-wheels erected by Mr Lowe of Nottingham. His work, heavy
and clumsy as it was, had in a certain way answered the purpose, and as cotton
mills were then in their infancy, he was the only person, qualified from experience,
to undertake the construction of the gearing.” (W. Pole (ed), 1877, quoted in Chap-
man (1970), my emphasis). Edwards (1967) notes that when the mule-jenny (the
third generation spinning machine) “left Crompton’s [the inventor’s] hands it was a
crude device, it had to be improved, and the spinners and weavers of muslins had to
acquire their skills.” (Edwards, 1967, p. 4). As workers were mobile between firms,
and machines and factories were initially built by a handful of men as we have seen,
small improvements in one firm could and did spill over to others.
Second, mechanisation had large effects for the productivity of spinning. The
improvements in spinning technology are reflected in the price of yarn which declined
significantly during the period as is shown in Figure 2.3. The trend is most dramatic
for finer yarns, the real price of which dropped tenfold in as many years but there
was also a decline in lower count (less fine) yarns.
The improvement in technology in spinning had disruptive effects on other parts
of the production process. As mechanisation in weaving did not occur until well into
the 19th century, an imbalance in spinning output and weaving capacity soon made
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British cotton yarn uniquely reliant on exports markets, of which Europe was by
far the most important. Crouzet (1987) estimates that around 56-76% of Britain’s
cotton output was exported either in the form of cloth or yarn.24 The largest market
for cotton yarn was Europe. 44% of cotton cloth and a full 86% percent of cotton
yarn exports were destined for the European market. In comparison, only 27% of
woollens and 8% of silks were destined for Europe. Crouzet notes that prior to the
Blockade, only France, Germany, Switzerland and Russia consumed cotton yarn.
This reliance on the export market for cottons in general, and the European market
for cotton yarn in particular, explains why maintaining trade with Europe in cottons
was so crucially important during the blockade, despite the risks and large increase
in transport costs that were involved.
2.2.3 Diffusion of technology to France
Mechanisation of cotton spinning in France proceeded very slowly relative to events
across the Channel. By the turn of the 19th century, France’s productivity gap
vis-a-vis Britain in cotton spinning was apparent. For many years, the conventional
wisdom in the literature was that slow adoption was a result of French “retardation”
and technological backwardness. The incompetence and economic mismanagement
of France in the late 18th century has received much attention, as has Arthur Young’s
often repeated travel anecdotes of desperately poor, hungry and illiterate peasants
across France (Young, 1889). In recent decades however, careful comparative anal-
ysis of the historical evidence, and systematic evaluation of the scarce statistics
available in Britain and France has given rise to a different interpretation of events.
According to this literature, differences in Britain and France were far smaller than
previously thought, and both the state and cotton entrepreneurs played an active
and helpful role in fostering economic development in France.25
This more recent literature emphasises both indigenous innovation activity in
textiles in France simultaneous to those taking place in Britain, and a widespread
effort to acquire British technology and best practice, once Britain’s lead had been
established. For example, McCloy (1952) notes that there were numerous inventions
24As a comparison, 50% of woollens and under a third of silk was exported.
25Landes’ (1969) “Unbound Prometheus” is credited with being the most prominent exponent
of French backwardness, while O’Brien and Keyder (1978), and later Crafts (1995) questioned the
validity of this view. More recently, Horn (2006) and Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2014) discuss
evidence of state and entrepreneurial efforts to modernise the French economy in ways similar to
that observed in Britain.
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in textiles in France throughout the 1700s, but predominantly in the last decades of
the century. In particular, “in the carding of cotton and wool a dozen inventions,
real or alleged, were made in the 1780’s and 1790’s”, while in spinning, “the French
anticipated the spinning jenny of James Hargreaves (1765) with two machines.” (pp.
90 - 91.). With respect to the role of the government, Horn (2006) emphasises the
importance that frequent industrial exhibitions had in fostering innovation activity
and disseminating technological knowledge. For example, in 1800, the government
invited submission for spinning machines and rewarded the best ones.
Both entrepreneurs and the French government were well aware of the momen-
tous changes taking place across the Channel in the closing decades of the 18th
century, and the need for French entrepreneurs to follow suit if they were to re-
main competitive in cottons. Importantly for my argument, the British prohibited
both the export of spinning machinery and the emmigration of engineers and skilled
workers. This put an artificial barrier on the diffusion of technology across the
Channel. It meant that while the French were able to acquire blueprints of the ma-
chines, and with the help of some English and Irish engineers, British best practice,
they didn’t have wide scale access to the tacit type of knowledge that is acquired
via learning-by-doing and that would be embedded in the export of machines or
workers.
Contrary to traditional accounts of government incompetence, Horn (2006) writes
that “the effort pivoted on acquiring English machines and spreading access to them
as widely as possible. As is well known, the French state concentrated on acquiring
Arkwright’s water frame and the mule-jenny, both of which were crucial to Eng-
land’s competitive edge. Industrial spies (...) were commissioned to acquire these
technologies. (...) British machine builders were rewarded for coming to France and
given subsidies for each set of machine they sold. The Bourbon government paid
the wages of at least 100 foreign workers in machine building and provided large
subsidies to innovative French entrepreneurs who financed the construction of ad-
vanced textile machinery. Before the adjudication of Arkwright’s second patent in
1785, no less than three mechanics were building roller-spinning machines in France.
Doggedly, if haphazardly, government action enabled hundreds of English style (if
not always functionally equivalent) carding and spinning machines to be put into
operation in nearly every major industrial district in France between 1786-1789.”
(p. 78).
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However, it was not just the state which fostered technology diffusion. Chassagne
(1991) and Horn (2006) both emphasise that French cotton spinners played an even
more important role in the transfer of technology. In Toulouse, Francois Bernard
Boyer-Fonfrede recruited 12 engineers from Britain to build a six storey, water pow-
ered spinning mill which employed over five-hundred workers. After construction
of the mill was complete, three were hired by a firm in Aix, and another by a firm
in Gironde (Chassagne, 1991, p. 244). In Amiens, another entrepreneur, Jean-
Baptiste Morgan, was similarly active in fostering technology transfer. According
to Horn, Morgan sent agents to recruit English workers. “Arriving in yearly batches
from 1788 to 1790, they provided Morgan with a detailed and precise knowledge
of English techniques, and with the mechanical expertise to construct the needed
machines and instruct workers in their use.” (Horn, 2006, p. 83). Across France,
entrepreneurs were engaged in similar forms of technology transfer.
The French Revolution and the subsequent Revolutionary Wars (1793-1802) did
not put a stop to, but rather changed the nature of technology transfer. The French
government offered English prisoners of war skilled in textile manufacturing the op-
portunity to work in France, which many took up (Chassagne, 1991). Horn (2006)
notes that English machinery continued to be acquired by such important Continen-
tal innovators as Francois Bernard Boyer-Fonfrede (Toulouse) and Lieven Bauwens
(Belgium).
What is striking about these accounts is the extent to which technology transfer
seems to have been reliant on British know-how. Furthermore, it also seems to be the
case that above and beyond the technological expertise required to build the mills
and machinery, French workers were also reliant on British training in acquiring
best-practice techniques in mechanised spinning and in training weavers to adapt to
using the new type of yarn. As we have seen above, this was not something unique
to French labour. Initially, British workers also experimented with and refined
spinning techniques in a similar way. The difference between the two countries
however, was that when French workers were experimenting and learning to spin
with the new technology, they were already facing a more experienced competitor
across the Channel.
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2.2.4 Puzzlingly slow adoption across France
The preceding discussion may give the impression that technology adoption was
rapidly advancing in France. According to all accounts, this was not the case.
Despite both state and entrepreneurial attempts to foster mechanisation of cotton
spinning, France lagged far behind Britain.26 In 1790, the number of spinning
jennies was estimated to be 900 in France, while the number in Britain has been
put at 18,000 (Aspin and Chapman, 1964). Similarly, Wadsworth and Mann (1931)
found that while in Britain, 150 firms were using the water-frame, the number in
France was four, and the mills were all significantly smaller.
The literature has put forward a number of explanations for slow adoption across
Continental-Europe and in particular France, which is widely seen as Britain’s closest
competitor at the time. French institutional backwardness has traditionally played
a prominent role in explaining Britain’s primacy in terms of the timing of indus-
trialisation. For example Landes (1979) claimed guild restrictions were particularly
harmful for entrepreneurial activity. This view is consistent with a recent literature
which explains Britain’s primacy in terms of its superior institutions (North and
Weingast, (1989), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)). Another strand of the litera-
ture has emphasised the role of differing factor prices between Britain and France.
According to this view, Britain invented (capital-intensive) mechanised spinning be-
cause labour was relatively expensive in Britain, while French entrepreneurs did not
have an incentive to switch from (labour-intensive) hand-spinning because labour
was relatively cheap (Allen, 2009).
In contrast to these explanations, mechanised spinners active in France unam-
biguously laid the finger of blame on British competition. Spinners from across the
Empire petitioned Napoleon to ban imports of all cotton cloth.27 According to their
pleas, the onslaught of competition was driving firms out of the market. French
spinners were not competitive in home markets despite the fact that throughout
most of the period in the lead-up to the Napoleonic Wars, trade between Britain
and France was inhibited by tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and as such, French
firms were not competing at international prices in home markets.
Comparing price data for machine spun yarn in Britain and France confirms the
26This was equally true for all of Continental Europe.
27AN/AFIV/1316 contains a petition from large spinners across the Empire requesting a com-
plete ban on English cloth, while AN/F12/533 contains a petition from the Chamber of Commerce
in Rhone (prefecture Lyon) requesting the same.
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competitive disadvantage of French spinners. Figure 2.4 compares Paris and London
prices for the full range of counts on the eve of the Blockade.28 The vertical axis
shows the price in francs, while the horizontal axis shows the count (finer yarns have
higher counts). The solid line shows the Paris price for different counts of French
machine-spun yarn, while the dashed line shows the London price for British spun
yarn of exactly the same count.
Two points are worth noting from Figure 2.4. First, not only were French spin-
ners out-competed in every count, but the gap becomes larger for higher counts.
Consistent with the evidence in Figure 2.3 which shows that mechanisation bene-
fited higher count yarns more, British advantage over the French was also higher in
these counts. More sophisticated, harder to imitate machinery such as Crompton’s
mule was needed to spin these finer type yarns. Second, French prices are not avail-
able for counts above 100, as at this time, the French were not able to spin yarns
of this finesse (Chassagne and Chapman, 1981). This is further suggestive evidence
of productivity gains acquired through learning-by-doing. Machine spinning finer
yarns was more difficult as with a finer thread, breakages were more likely. Better
quality (more even) machines and more skilled workers necessary.
Consistent with comparative disadvantage in cottons, France was a net importer
of cotton goods at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1802-03, trade was rel-
atively free as peace had been momentarily restored to the Continent. In these
years, imports of cotton goods to France made up 8% - 12% of total imports.29 By
way of comparison, the respective numbers for linen and hemp were .7% and .6%
respectively, while woollen textiles were not listed as an import category.
The historical evidence paints a picture consistent with Britain acquiring a com-
parative advantage in cottons as a result of first-mover advantage in a sector with
learning externalities. As the empirical analysis focuses on within country variation,
a competing explanation of adoption which relies on uneven institutional change or
factor-price shocks has to rely on time-varying, within country differences, which are
arguably smaller than cross-country differences. Nonetheless, I return to the role
that alternative explanations may play in the empirical analysis, and show that the
results are robust to controlling for the time varying effect of institutional change
and factor price shocks.
28Both prices refer to January 1807. Raw cotton prices are 6.9 and 5.4 francs in Britain and
France respectively. The source of these data is discussed in Appendix A.
29Data sources for French trade statistics are discussed in Appendix A.
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2.2.5 Market structure of the cotton industry
In this section, I turn to examining the market structure of the cotton industry. Un-
derstanding the localised nature of the production process will aid the interpretation
of short run results. First, it should be noted that at the turn of the 19th century,
cotton yarn was produced using two technologies; traditional hand-spinning and
mechanised cotton spinning. The technologies appear to have produced imperfect
substitutes, as prices were quoted separately for the two products.
The market for yarn was predominantly local during the early stages of develop-
ment. The reasons for this are the generally small firm size in mechanised spinning,
and the rural structure of both hand-spinning and downstream weaving. As the
downstream sector did not mechanise until well into the 19th century, the organisa-
tion of production remained rural.
These factors made establishing links farther away relatively expensive for most
spinning firms at this stage of development. Maintaining links with a large number
of small, downstream weavers was difficult at large distances for all but the largest
spinners. Though some firms did integrate spinning and weaving, most large firms
found it profitable to maintain the rural, putting out structure of weaving, and this
was to remain as such until well into the 19th century. These factors retained the
local structure of the market at the initial stages of development.
For example, one of the largest cotton cloth printers in the French Empire,
Christoff Philipp Oberkampf established a large cotton spinning enterprise to sup-
ply his printing works which had been cut off from traditional supplies during the
blockade. Even with both the upstream and downstream of weaving integrated in
one firm, Oberkampf decided not to integrate weaving. " (...) it proved much easier
to subcontract to rural workshop masters, consigning to them boxes of mounted
yarns and of barrelled wefts every month. The masters were required to maintain
exact accounts of the warps and wefts received and were held responsible for all the
pieces they produced that were considered too lightly or badly woven. The sup-
ply of completed goods was ensured by the mortgage of the masters’ property to
Oberkampf.” (Chapman and Chassagne, 1991 p. 168).
With the exception of some large spinners, most firms sold their output at the
local marketplace or had a stable network of rural weavers to whom they gave the
yarn. A report from Seine Inferieure (prefecture Rouen) confirms that it was only
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the small spinners who brought their goods to the market, while larger firms sold the
yarn themselves. Consistent with a predominantly local market, a report from Dyle
(prefecture Brussels) states that price differences in yarn across departments even
relatively close to each other were not exploited. The coexistence of hand-spinning
and mechanised spinning meant that increasing the supply of mechanised yarn did
not have to simultaneously lead to an increase in weaving capacity, as it could have
just substituted for hand-spun yarn.
Evidence on the market structure in the early days of mechanisation is in line
with evidence from Britain, which only began to export cotton yarn in 1794, about
two decades after the spinning jenny was invented. Edwards (1967) notes that small
spinners with limited capital often sold their yarn to larger spinning mills, which
saved them the cost of employing salesmen. Furthermore, receiving an advance in
cash, rovings or cotton ensured the continuation of production. He also documents
direct links between spinners and weavers. Employing middle-men such as yarn
dealers who dealt directly with weavers was expensive and, particularly for the
more liquidity constrained spinners, often infeasible as spinners had to wait 3 to 6
months before payment was made.
This is not to say that all demand was local. Both Oberkampf and Lenoir, two
large spinners, had weavers working for them in numerous departments. Further-
more, even during the Blockade, as the industry developed, larger firms began to
look farther away for profitable export opportunities. As early as 1808, spinners
from northern departments and the Haut-Rhin began to lobby the government to
lift the ban on exports of cotton yarn. In the south, the Chamber of Commerce in
Rhone (prefecture Lyon) worried that export markets in Russia and Germany would
be disrupted by the Blockade. For most firms however, the local market seems in
to have been the main outlet for production.
The market for raw cotton, the key input, was far more integrated by all accounts.
In Britain, dealers of raw cotton were initially not fully specialised, but rather they
dealt in many different colonial goods. As opposed to most spinners, they had
substantial capital (Edwards, 1967). Consistent with a more integrated market, the
Journal du Commerce regularly reported prices for different types of raw cotton from
markets across the French Empire together with the price for other colonial products,
while yarn was reported only sporadically and in far fewer locations. Different
varieties of cotton (Brazilian, Levantine, US and colonial) were generally available
60
in all markets. However, small and large firms differed in the way in which they
accessed raw cotton input. A report from Seine Inferieure describes how it was
predominantly small firms which were effected by the day to day movements in
prices, which were to become increasingly important in the uncertain years of the
blockade, as bigger firms secured larger consignments of cotton directly from cotton
dealers.30
Finally, given that local markets in cotton yarn were important, the location of
weaving is an important element of the analysis. As has been discussed, weaving
was to remain rural throughout our period of interest. Weavers worked mostly in
their own homes or in small workshops across the country, and mechanisation did
not take place until well into the 19th century. Panel C of Figure 2.14 shows the
geographic dispersion of weaving in 1803, where capital is measured as the number
of weaving frames per capita by department. In the empirical analysis, I control for
the time-varying effect of downstream weaving, and show that the results are not
being driven by spatially uneven downstream demand.
2.3 The Napoleonic Wars as a Source of Exoge-
nous Variation
The rupture to trade and the resulting geographic variation in the extent to which
trading routes between Britain and the French Empire were affected provides a rare
opportunity to identify the effect of protection from competition with the industrial
leader on infant industry development in follower countries. In this section, I first
document the reasons which led to the unusual implementation of the blockade. I
then examine geographic variation in the effectiveness of the blockade using both
port-level data from the Lloyd’s List and data from British trade statistics. Finally,
I describe how goods made their way from smuggling ports into the French Empire.
2.3.1 Unusual implementation of the blockade
Napoleon’s Continental Blockade (1806-1813) took place within the context of the
Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). It is within this historical setting that the motivations
30For example, Chapman and Chassagne (1991) discuss Oberkampf’s efforts in securing Pernam-
bouco (Brazilian) cotton from Lisbon merchants by way of Nantes during the blockade.
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and military constraints for both Britain and France can be understood.
Starting in 1803, a newly belligerent French Empire began its expansion on the
Continent to the increasing alarm of the British. These wars should be viewed as
a continuation of the French Revolutionary Wars which played out between France
and various coalitions led by Britain between 1793-1802. Between 1803 and 1815, as
in the previous decade, France fought Britain and its allies in a series of campaigns.
Though the threat of an actual invasion by the French never completely subsided,
following the defeat at Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon more or less gave up on his
plans of direct military invasion of Britain. He instead turned his efforts increasingly
towards defeating Britain by economic means.
The primary aim of the blockade was thus to weaken Britain economically by
denying her access to important Continental European markets. However, the stark
asymmetry of naval power between Britain and France meant that traditional block-
ade of British ports by the French navy was militarily infeasible, as Britain unam-
biguously controlled the seas.31 In contrast however, Napoleon was increasingly
successful in exerting his direct or indirect influence over most of the Continent.
In this way, though Napoleon could not blockade British ports, he could use his
land-based power to do the next best thing, which was to attempt to stop British
goods from entering the Continent.
The political map of Europe in 1812 in Figure 2.2 shows the extent of the Em-
peror’s power over the European continent. Though Napoleon’s power wasn’t quite
so all-prevailing in 1806, with the notable exception of Sweden, at one point or
another all other European powers passed laws in line with the aims of the block-
ade. By 1806, the French Empire had expanded in size to include all regions of
present-day Belgium, parts of Holland, the entire left bank of the Rhine, regions
of present-day Switzerland up to and including Geneva, and regions in the North-
West of the Italian peninsula, up to Genoa.32 In addition, Napoleon’s relatives were
on the thrones of the Kingdom of Holland, the Kingdom of Italy, the Kingdom of
Naples and the Kingdom of Spain. The Portuguese royal family had fled to Brazil
and Napoleon’s relatives were also in power in key German states (Connelly, 1990).
Historically, when Britain and France were at war, direct trade between the two
31By 1800, the British had twice the number of warships as the French did (Davis and Engerman,
2006).
32The map of the French Empire relative to France at its 1789 borders can be seen in Figure
2.15.
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countries collapsed, however the countries were able to continue trading with little
interruption by way of neutral carriers and nearby neutral ports.33 The period that
I examine here differs from other wars between Britain and France in the sense that
the entire Continent was affected. To understand the disruption to trade, it is worth
examining two periods separately; the three years leading up the imposition of the
Continental Blockade (1803-06), and the the blockade (1806-13) itself.
Disruption to trade along the North-Sea ports began in 1803 with the onset of
the Napoleonic Wars. “Neutral” ports along the North-Sea (Hamburg in particular),
together with Dutch ports had been traditionally used to continue trading with the
British in times of war. However, in a highly symbolic event, Hanover (the royal
dynasty to which monarchs of Great Britain belonged to) was occupied by the French
army. Britain retaliated by imposing a tight blockade of the entire North Sea coast
between the Weser and the Elbe, which was then expanded to include ports along the
French Channel and the North Sea in 1804 (Davis and Engerman, 2006). Crouzet
(1987) considers this period a prequel to the Blockade in the sense that trade to
Northern Europe was forced onto land routes for the first time significantly driving
up the price at which goods entered the Continent. Goods were taken from Britain
to Altona and Tonning (both North of Hamburg). They were then smuggled into
Hamburg and taken into Northern Europe via land routes.
The Continental Blockade prohibiting the entry of British goods onto the Euro-
pean Continent was declared in Berlin in late 1806 following the defeat of the Fourth
Coalition against France in Jena - Auerstadt. Prussia and Russia, two allies of the
British, were forced to implement the blockade along their coastline.34
The historical events that followed the introduction of the Berlin Decree are fairly
complex and they involve much back and forth retaliation between Britain and the
French, the details of which are not relevant for my purposes.35 The following points
are worth noting regarding the implementation of the blockade. First, the series of
laws passed by Britain and France had the effect of completely wiping out neutral
shipping on top of the evident damage they did to domestic shipping interests.
Neutral carriers such as the US found themselves in violation of one or the other
33Figure 2.6 shows that this was the case during the French Revolutionary Wars (1793-1802).
34It is generally believed that the outline of the decree had been planned well in advance of the
British Orders in the Council which the French used as a pretext on the basis of which to retaliate.
The Orders in the Council, declared earlier in 1806, had widened the blockade already in place
further west to the home of the French Navy’s Atlantic fleet in Brest.
35The interested reader can consult Davis and Engerman (2006).
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powers’ decrees which made capture by Britain or France almost inevitable. This had
the effect of severely increasing the costs and risks involved with sea-transportation
and hence diverting a large proportion of sea-borne trade onto more expensive land
based routes.
Second, the extent to which Napoleon could ensure successful implementation
of the blockade depended on his ability to keep areas outside of France under his
control. Regions not directly under Napoleonic rule generally dragged their feet
in implementation of the blockade because of the evident harm it did to merchant
interests. Though Napoleon was well aware of the hardships involved, defeating
Britain enjoyed primacy above all other considerations. Furthermore, the extent to
which Napoleon could effectively implement the blockade depended on his military
commitments. The blockade was enforced to a far greater extent during years in
which Napoleon could commit more troops to patrolling the coastline (Crouzet,
1987).
2.3.2 Geographic variation in the effectiveness of the block-
ade
Geographic variation in the effectiveness of the blockade was driven by the fact that
while the closure of ports was generally effective in Northern Europe, a number of
factors contributed to the blockade being ineffective in Southern Europe. This was
the case to such an extent that trade to this region actually increased markedly.
Figure 2.5 gives a snapshot overview of the intensity of trade with Britain at
the port level across Continental Europe in 1802, a year of relatively free trade
and 1809, a blockade year. These data are form the Lloyd’s List, and will be
described in more detail in Section 2.5. Each circle is proportionate to the number
of ships sailing between Britain and the given port. Comparison of 1802 and 1809
confirms that while the blockade dramatically disrupted trade between Britain and
the Continent, shipping did not come to a standstill, but rather trade was diverted
through a number of “smuggling ports”.
To smuggle successfully, the British needed access to stable ports from which
merchants could conduct their business. To this end, they either used ports which
they directly controlled such as Gibraltar, Malta and Helgoland, or which were
stably allied to them, such as Gothenburg in Sweden. Figure 2.5 labels these four
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smuggling centres. Napoleon’s inherent military strength in the North meant that
the British had to resort to smuggling via more difficult routes than in the South,
where they had the upper hand.
Furthermore, and perhaps most catastrophically, the Spanish insurgency against
French rule which started in 1808 meant that the entire Iberian peninsula became
open for trade with the British. Together with their control of Gibraltar and ship-
ping on the Mediterranean sea, Southern Europe became the main outlet for British
goods, and in particular cotton. French prefects in the south-western regions com-
plained that Spain was awash with British cotton goods which steadily made their
way into France through the Pyrenees. French consular reports described markets
for British yarn in Malta and Bosnia. With respect to the latter, the consul noted
that there was no domestic demand for yarn in Bosnia, instead it was purchased
exclusively by Viennese merchants for export.
Two features of the blockade are key to my empirical strategy. (1) The blockade
was for most parts well-enforced along the coast of the French Empire. (2) The
blockade was unevenly successful across Northern and Southern Europe. I now turn
to examining the reasons for these in more detail. Figure 2.6 shows time series
evidence of the uneven effects of the blockade. In each panel of Figure 2.6, the
same port level shipping data used to construct Figure 2.5 from the Lloyd’s List
has been aggregated up to the regional level in order to examine the evolution of
shipping over time.36 Each line represents a given region’s shipping with Britain
as a share of total European shipping with Britain. Panel A examines shipping to
the Northern ports of Europe excluding ports that belonged to the French Empire.
Panel B examines shipping to Southern European ports, again excluding ports which
belonged to the French Empire, while Panel C examines shipping along the coast of
the French Empire.
2.3.3 Events in Northern Europe
Turning first to Panel A, Northern Europe is divided into three regions; the Baltic,
the North Sea and Scandinavia. From the onset of the French Revolutionary Wars
in 1793 until the peace of Amiens in 1802, there was a clear upward trend along the
36I collected data for a wide time-frame starting in 1787 in order to confirm that the Napoleonic
Wars induced a rupture to trade different to previous episodes such as the French Revolutionary
Wars.
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North Sea and Baltic reflecting substitution from French ports to these regions. The
Napoleonic Blockade differed from other trade wars between Britain and France ex-
actly because of the involvement of all European powers. Without neutral shipping
to substitute for the loss of direct trade between Britain and France (as was the case
during the French Revolutionary Wars), trade costs became significantly larger.
From 1803 onwards, the North-Sea could not be used to substitute for the loss of
direct shipping between Britain and France as it had been during the Revolutionary
Wars because of the British blockade of the coastline. Instead, much shipping was
diverted further East to the Baltic. Between 1803 and 1806, as shipping along the
North-Sea declined, the share of shipping to the Baltic picked up. Discussing the
effects of the North-Sea blockade on cotton exporters, Edwards writes; “During 1804
and 1805, when the Elbe was blockaded, Germany’s share of the total cotton exports
to Europe dwindled to a mere three percent, while there was a sharp jump in the
trade to Denmark and Prussia.” (1967, p. 55).
Accessibility of both the Baltic and the North-Sea worsened with the onset of
the Continental Blockade in 1806 (denoted by the second grey line) as Prussia
and Russia both implemented the blockade. Edwards (1967) notes that between
December, 1806 and March, 1807 there was an almost complete standstill in trade
to Northern Europe, with insurance premia rising sharply. With the increasingly
difficult situation in Hamburg, some cotton merchants relocated to Tonning and
Altona. Their letters to Britain were initially positive about the sales being made,
noting that large quantities were being smuggled successfully into France.
However, the blockade became even more severe from August, 1807. It was
during this time that Gothenburg became the important smuggling centre in the
North, which can be seen by the increase in shipping to Scandinavia until around
1808. Marzagalli (1999) describes how merchants from Britain, Holland and Ham-
burg relocated their business to Gothenburg to organise smuggling routes from this
point. However, the problem with Gothenburg was the lack of land connections to
the German and French regions, which were the final destination for most of these
goods. Crouzet (1987) describes how during a number of months in 1808 when the
blockade was fully effective both along the North-Sea and the Baltic, stocks piled
up in Gothenburg as ships arriving from Sweden were continuously denied entry.
It was possibly the increasingly difficult situation in the Baltic that encouraged
merchants to begin to lobby the British government for trading licenses to Helgoland.
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This tiny island about 50 kilometres off the German coast, measuring only a couple
of square kilometres was taken by the British navy in 1807. The intent was to track
movements of the French army along the North Sea. The British government started
granting licenses to merchants to trade in Helgoland in late 1808, but smuggling
began in earnest in 1809. The increase in the share of shipping witnessed in the
North-Sea is accounted for single-handedly by this tiny island. Helgoland was more
advantageous as a smuggling centre for three reasons.
First, it was closer to the final destination of the German and French markets
reducing the land distances that goods would need to travel. Second, small fishing
boats could be used to smuggle goods onto alcoves and inlets on the North-Sea
coast during the night (Crouzet, 1987), something that had not been possible from
Gothenburg. Third, the Baltic was only accessible by military convoy. To get to the
Baltic, British ships needed to cross narrow straits controlled by the Danish, who had
become Britain’s fiercest enemies as a result of Britain’s unprovoked bombardment
of Copenhagen in December, 1806.
Despite considerable efforts on behalf of both the British government and en-
trepreneurs to find reliable routes via which to introduce their goods onto the main-
land, northern smuggling routes were extremely risky and precarious by virtue of the
fact that for both Helgoland and Gothenburg, there was no direct overland connec-
tion to Germany and France. The trade via Helgoland in particular was reliant on
diminished vigilance along the German coast during Napoleon’s campaign against
Austria. Kirkman Finlay, a Glaswegian exporter of cottons noted that in 1810 “(...)
the trade from Helgoland was also destroyed, since the French emperor whenever
peace was made with Austria again closed up entirely every means of introduction
from that island” (quoted in Edwards, 1967 p.58). On the other hand, Gothenburg
was reliant on Baltic ports granting entry to ships obviously stocked with British
cargo. Enforcement again fluctuated with military events and Russia’s and Prussia’s
shifting allegiances.
2.3.4 Events in Southern Europe
The situation in Southern Europe was completely different as is evident from Panel
B which shows the evolution of shipping for the Iberian Peninsula, the West- and
East- Mediterranean. First, it is important to highlight the Iberian peninsula’s key
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importance in determining the fate of the blockade. From the onset of the blockade
in 1806, this region’s share of shipping increased dramatically. In fact, for two
years, 60% of total European shipping with Britain was conducted via the Iberian-
Peninsula. Gibraltar carried a large proportion of this trade, as did Lisbon and
Cadiz, both of which were under British control from most of the blockade.
Even prior to the Spanish insurgency, with Gibraltar firmly in their possession,
and significant sway over much of Portugal, the British had access to a direct,
overland connection to France. Edwards notes that between 1805 and 1807 (prior
to the Spanish insurgency) cotton goods were exported in increasing quantities to
Portugal, the Straits of Gibraltar, Malta and Sicily in order to penetrate parts of
France. The increase in shipping on the West-Mediterranean was driven almost
single-handedly by Malta. Crouzet (1987) describes in detail the key importance
played by Malta, especially in the smuggling of cotton goods. At one point, 8.8% of
exports from Britain were taken into Europe via Malta.
Why was France’s military position weaker in Southern Europe? To begin with,
the French navy was in a desperate state on the Mediterranean as a result of an in-
diosyncratic political event which took place during the French Revolution (Rogder,
2006). As Jacobite power was unravelling in Paris, the city of Toulon on the Mediter-
ranean, home to the French navy’s Mediterranean fleet, declared revolt. As troops
from Paris began to encircle the town, the Toulonnais called in the British navy. As
a consequence of the fighting, a significant part of the French fleet was destroyed or
captured, an event from which the French navy could not recover during Napoleon’s
reign.
Furthermore, as a result a Napoleon’s misadventure in Egypt (interpreted in
Britain as an attempt to reach India), the British made control of the Mediterranean
a policy of strategic importance. They controlled a number of points of primary
importance in Southern Europe, such as Gibraltar and Malta, both of which became
important smuggling centres. Furthermore, they exerted significant influence on
Portugal, a historically important ally, but also Sardinia and Sicily. Finally, the
British were also directly involved militarily in the Spanish insurrection which began
in 1808. Crouzet (1987) describes how throughout the Napoleonic Wars, the British
were able to single-handedly control shipping in the Mediterranean, which he called
a “British Sea”.
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2.3.5 No direct shipping with France
Finally, Panel C shows the evolution of British shipping with the French Empire
which has been divided into three regions; ports along the French side of the Chan-
nel (including Belgian ports), ports along the coast of the Atlantic and ports along
the French Mediterranean (including Italian ports which belonged to the French
Empire). First, it is clear that from the point of view of the French Empire,
the Napoleonic Wars weren’t particularly different from traditional trade war with
Britain. The picture that emerges for the French Revolutionary Wars (1793-1801)
is basically the same as that which we see during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815).
In both cases direct trade between the two states collapsed as they went to war. As
we have seen however, the difference in the case of the Napoleonic Wars was that
cheap (water-borne) indirect trade via neutral ports was eliminated as a result of
the trade war encompassing all of Europe.
2.3.6 Evidence from British trade statistics
Consistent with evidence form the Lloyd’s List, trade statistics for British exports of
manufactured goods and other British produce confirm the stark divergence between
trade to Northern and Southern Europe as Panel A in Figure 2.7 makes clear.
Exports to the Mediterranean increased threefold from the onset of the blockade to
1811, while exports to North-Western Europe (including France) were consistently
lower. In fact, the peak-to trough decrease in exports to these markets was five-fold.
Furthermore, consistent with the British using southern trading routes in years when
northern smuggling became particularly difficult, exports to the Mediterranean were
lower when exports to North-Western Europe were higher.
I also examine evidence on cotton exports in Panel B of Figure 2.7. Absent
evidence on exports of cotton goods by region, it is nonetheless important to assess
the extent to which cotton goods remained at all traded. If exports of cotton goods
dramatically decreased, it would call into question the extent to which regional
variation in exposure to British trade was in fact taking place. Figure 2.7 shows
that in fact, both cotton yarn and cotton cloth continues to be exported.
Exports of cotton yarn were increasing prior to the onset of the Blockade, and
they initially declined to about a third of their value. In 1809 and 1810 however
(during the blockade), the value of exports was the same as in 1805. The pattern
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was similar for exports of cotton cloth, though exports of cotton cloth were actually
consistently higher than in pre-blockade years. Unfortunately, these statistics are
for total exports, so it is not possible to rule out that part of the pattern was being
driven by substitution to export markets outside of Europe. However, two factors
make this highly unlikely.
First, substitution to new markets was generally unsuccessful because of a lack
market information. Heckscher’s (1922) anecdote about ice-skates arriving in Buenos
Aires in December is one extreme example of this. Furthermore, cotton yarn was
particularly reliant on European markets by virtue of it being an intermediate good,
possibly explaining why cloth exports did not fall at all during the period, while yarn
exports did. Second, the peak export years in 1809-10 coincided with years where
enforcement of the blockade was generally lax, implying that European markets
drove the ups and downs for both cotton cloth and yarn during the blockade.
2.3.7 New trade routes into the French Empire
In the last part of this section, I examine how goods made their way from smug-
gling centres into the French Empire. To answer this question, I rely on historical
accounts on the routes which smuggled goods took. There is fairly widespread
consensus among historians of the blockade that one entry point for goods was
Strasbourg. From the North, once goods had made their way either into a Baltic
port or a point of entry along the North Sea, they were transported overland to
Strasbourg. Ellis writes “ (...) smuggling was more active along the inland than the
maritime frontiers of the Empire. One reason for this was the nature of the terrain
(...). Another was the proximity of foreign entrepots like Frankfrurt, Darmstadt,
Mannheim, Heidelberg, Rastatt, Kehl and above all Basel. Within the Empire itself
there were many smuggling bases up along the Swiss frontier and down the left-bank
of the Rhine.” (Ellis, 1981, p. 203)37
Regarding Southern smuggling, historians agree that many of the goods taken
37It may seem somewhat surprising that goods needed to be taken quite as far down south as
Strasbourg. Why weren’t they smuggled into the Empire via the Kingdom of Holland, a much
shorter route? The Kingdom of Holland proved to be far too permeable to the entry of British
goods for Napoleon’s liking. While increasing pressure was placed on his brother, Louis, the King
of Holland, to increase enforcement of the blockade, the decision was made to close the Franco -
Dutch border from 1808 effectively shutting off the potential entry of any smuggled British goods
from the north (Heckscher (1922) p. 181.) For this reason, British goods smuggled via the north
took land routes all the way to Strasbourg prior to entry into the Empire.
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by the British to smuggling centres in the Mediterranean were destined for French
and German markets. There seems to have been a number of routes that goods
took. First, Livorno (part of the French Empire) seems to have been an important
entry point for smuggled goods (Marzagalli, 1999 and Galani, 2011). However, this
likely changed with annexation to the French Empire and both authors find that
ships arriving from Malta decreased significantly after this date.38 Second, there is
also widespread consensus that another favoured route was that taken via Trieste,
consistent with the existence of markets for cotton yarn in this region (Marzagalli,
1999, Crouzet, 1987). Heckscher (1922) gives details of a smuggling route that began
from Trieste and brought goods up along the Danube into Germany and finally into
France.
Finally, goods were smuggled into France from Spain via the Pyrenees. Archival
sources contain hundreds of letters between prefects in south-western departments
and the government in Paris. Based on these reports, the smugglers were well or-
ganised, often being deserters of the army. Clashes between smugglers and the
police resulting in casualties were not infrequent and the authorities were evidently
outnumbered. Similarly to the inland border in the east, the mountainous terrain
provided smugglers with a multitude of potential routes which made detection diffi-
cult. The Canal du Midi, linking the Mediterranean to the Atlantic was supposedly
riddled with smuggling centres. All border departments reported a multitude of
routes with destinations ranging from Bordeaux, Toulouse and Paris.39
One final piece of quantitative evidence from internal trade routes within the
French Empire confirms that with the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, the direction
of trade with Britain within France changed from a North-South route to a pre-
dominantly South-North route. Figure 2.8 shows the time series for trade from
Strasbourg up and down-river along the Rhine. Coinciding with the onset of the
Blockade, down-river trade (in the south-north direction) increased dramatically,
38For this reason, in quantifying the trade cost shock, I do not incorporate Livorno as an open
trade route during the Napoleonic Wars.
39One worry is that smuggling via the Iberian peninsula is overstated if the British also used
the Iberian peninsula as a point of access to markets in Latin-America. Crouzet (1987) discusses
the trade from Britain to Spanish and Portuguese colonies in detail. He finds that in fact, because
of the weakened state of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchy, the British actually had direct
access to these markets in contrast to the period before the blockade when British goods could
only enter the markets in Latin-America indirectly via either Spain and Portugal or smuggling via
free-ports in the Caribbean. This implies that if anything, comparing shipping between Britain
and the Iberian peninsula before and during the Blockade will understate the extent to which the
peninsula was used for smuggling.
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while up-river trade (in the north-south direction) remained stable.
In summary, this section has shown that the unusual implementation of the
blockade led to geographic variation in the extent to which Northern and Southern
trading routes between Britain and Europe were affected. In Section 2.5, I describe
how the change in protection from British competition is measured using the data
and historical evidence which was described in this section. First however, I present
a simple model to guide the empirical analysis.
2.4 Theoretical Framework
This section develops a simple framework to guide the empirical analysis. In this
model, the presence of dynamic learning-by-doing externalities, combined with dif-
ferences in geographic distance to the frontier (Britain) play the key role in de-
termining whether regions are productive enough in the initial period to produce
cotton yarn domestically. Absent any shocks, initial specialisation determines how
productivity evolves over time as is standard in infant industry models. Learning-
by-doing externalities have been extensively discussed in the endogenous groth liter-
ature (Krugman 1987, Lucas 1988, Young 1991, Redding 1999, Melitz 2007). Most
closely related to the framework presented in this paper is Rodríguez-Clare (2007)
who also studies the case of a small open economy. The main difference in terms of
other papers is the focus on geographic distance as a driver of protection across oth-
erwise similar “industrial follower” economies. Furthermore, I include an imported
input necessary for the production of cotton yarn to clarify the effect that a trade
cost shock will have on the incentives for domestic production when the price of
both the imported output and imported input necessary for domestic production
increase.
2.4.1 Setup
The world consists of the frontier (Britain), F , and two follower regions i = 1, 2
(French regions).40 F is sufficiently large relative to the combined size of the follower
regions, i, such that international prices are set at the frontier as if it were a closed
40The framework can be extended to accommodate an arbitrary number of follower regions,
however as the economies are allowed to trade with each other, this complicates the analysis
significantly. Two follower regions are sufficient to illustrate how initial differences in specialisation
between the two can lead to different long-term outcomes.
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economy. Therefore, follower regions take international prices as exogenously given.
The size of the two regions, in terms of their labour force, is the same: Li = L¯.
Labour is not mobile across regions, but goods are traded across all three regions.
There are three tradeable goods; agriculture, A, cotton yarn, C, and raw cotton,
R. Consumers everywhere derive utility from the consumption of A and C, but not
R. Raw cotton, R, is needed as an input in the production process of yarn, C. All
goods are perishable and economies live in financial autarky. Consumers maximise
the following instantaneous utility function:41
U(A,C) = AαC(1−α) (2.1)
Goods around the world are produced using the following constant returns to
scale production technologies: Ai = LAi , Ri = aRi LRi and Ci = min{aCitLCi , R}. LAi ,
LRi and LCi are labour employed in agriculture, production of raw cotton and cotton
yarn respectively. A and R use labour as the only input in the production process,
while producing one unit of cotton yarn requires one unit of raw cotton and 1
aCit
units
of labour.42 The i subscript refers to the region, while t denotes time.
International prices (set at the frontier) are straightforward. Choosing A as
numeraire, equilibrium prices given perfect competition, strictly positive final goods
demand for A and C, and intersectoral labour mobility are as follows: pR = 1
aRF
,
pC = 1
aCF
+ aRF and wF = 1.
At t = 0, follower regions differ from each other only with respect to their
geographic distance to the frontier di. They differ from the frontier in two important
respects. First, they do not have the blueprint to produce R, which amounts to
assuming that aRi = 0.43 Second, they have an initial productivity disadvantage in
C. In particular, the evolution of aCit over time is given by the following equations

˙aCit
aCit
= Q(Ccit), ifaCit < aCF
˙aCit
aCit
= 0, ifaCit = aFC
(2.2)
41In general, we only need to assume a utility function in which marginal utility becomes un-
bounded as consumption of C approaches zero. I assume a specific functional form for utility to
pin down specialisation patterns if the two regions begin trading with each other at some t > 0.
42I assume a Leontieff-production function for C in R and L in order to highlight in the simplest
way possible the effect of an increase in the price of R on competitiveness of domestic production of
C. Results do not change qualitatively with positive, bounded substitutability between the inputs.
43I make this assumption so that R is an imported input for follower regions.
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where aCi0 = a¯C < aCF for i = 1, 2, Ccit ≡
∫ t
0 Cizdz, Q(Ccit) > 0.
Both follower regions start with an initial productivity lag in C relative to the
frontier.44 All follower regions have the potential to close the productivity gap via the
production externality. The learning function, Q, is strictly positive in cumulative
production but is otherwise unrestricted. I make three stark assumptions about the
nature of learning. (1) Productivity gains are fully external to the firm; no firm
internalises the effect that increasing production today will have on future labour
productivity. (2) The externality is spatially concentrated within the borders of the
region. (3) Learning-by-doing gains are bounded. At t = 0, firms at the frontier
have exhausted all productivity gains from learning-by-doing.
Follower regions take international prices as given, however, not all goods im-
ported from the frontier are available to consumers and firms at these prices. While
A is traded costlessly, both R and C face trade costs. In particular, if C is imported
to region i, there is a ti unit shipping cost, which is pure waste. The per unit trade
cost is a function of region i’s geographic distance to the frontier, ti = c(di), where
di is (geographic) distance to the frontier and c(di) is a function which is everywhere
weakly positive and increasing in distance. Shipping one unit of raw cotton, R,
incurs a unit shipping cost, τ , which does not depend on geographic distance to the
frontier. The fact that C’s shipping costs depend on distance, while R’s does not
is motivated by the fact that while Britain was the source for yarn, it was not the
source for raw cotton. Prior to the blockade both Britain and France had similar
access to raw cotton, which is why I take τ = 0 initially.45 Note however, that the
results which follow do not rely on any restriction on the size of τ relative to ti.
Finally, if follower regions trade, they face symmetric unit shipping costs on cotton
yarn, t12 = t21.
44I assume aFit = aFi ∀t, and for this reason I suppress time subscripts for the frontier. At the
frontier, the industry is no longer in its infancy as dynamic learning-by-doing gains have been fully
exploited.
45Different regions within France had somewhat different access to different types of raw cotton,
as I show in Section 2.6 because of non-negligible transport costs. This would imply that follower
regions have different transport costs of raw cotton τi, giving them a larger or smaller advantage in
domestic production of C. To the extent that differential access to raw cotton does not vary over
time, they will not affect the predictions of the model, or the empirical analysis as this effect will
be subsumed in the regional fixed-effects. For this reason, I simply take τ constant across regions.
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2.4.2 Static Equilibrium
From the point of view of region i, firms only need to make a decision about whether
it is profitable to produce yarn domestically (and import the raw cotton needed for
production) or import it from the frontier. At t = 0, when aC10 = aC20, follower firms
will not be competitive in each others’ markets, as they are equally productive in
C, but face a non-zero transport cost. Note that A will always be produced as it is
needed either to pay for imports of raw cotton or cotton yarn.46
Given international prices as faced by agents in region i, we can easily solve for
specialisation patterns and equilibrium prices in i. Production of A and intersectoral
labour mobility will imply that wi0 = 1, for i = 1, 2. Will region i produce cotton
yarn, C, or import it? This depends on whether firms can break even at prevailing
prices. Firms in region i will find it profitable to enter C at time 0 if 47
pC + ti ≥ 1
aCi0 + pR
(2.3)
Inspection of Equation 2.3 reveals that there will be a cutoff distance t¯ = a
C
F−aCi0
aCF a
C
i0
.48
Firms in regions with a trade cost ti ≥ t¯ will find it profitable to enter production
of cotton yarn, while regions with ti < t¯ will import yarn from the frontier.
Regions with ti ≥ t¯, will be incompletely specialised; they will produce agri-
cultural products and cotton yarn. They will export agricultural products in ex-
change for raw cotton needed in yarn production. Prices are as follows: pAi = 1
and pCi = 1aCi0 + p
R ≤ pC + ti. Regions with ti < t¯, will be fully specialised in the
production of A which they will export in exchange for C. Prices are pAi = 1 and
pCi = pC + ti.
2.4.3 Dynamic Equilibrium
Given the static equilibrium from the previous section, characterising the dynamic
path of follower economies is straightforward. Regions which began producing cotton
46At first, it may seem surprising that yarn cannot be exported in exchange for raw cotton.
However, given that follower regions at their most productive can produce at pC when catch up is
complete and τ = 0, they can only sell in F at pC + ti; a price that is ti higher than the prevailing
market price at the frontier. The only exception to this is if the two follower regions trade with
each other. In this case, the region with a comparative advantage in C can be fully specialised, a
possibility I explore in the next subsection.
47The equation comes from the requirement that at price pC + ti domestic producers of C must
make weakly positive profits
48The expression for the cutoff distance substitutes for pC .
75
yarn at t = 0 will increase their productivity in this sector via the production
externality further strengthening their competitive edge in the domestic market until
aCit = aCF and catch up is complete. Regions which import yarn from the frontier
at t = 0 will continue to import yarn and aCit = aCi0, meaning that productivity will
stagnate at the initial level.
The dynamic path is slightly more complicated if one region begins producing
C at t = 0, while the other does not. Productivity in the region producing C may
increase sufficiently for the follower region to become competitive in exporting C
to the follower region specialised in A. In this case, the economy with a compara-
tive advantage in producing C will supply the other with cotton yarn in exchange
for agriculture, while both are supplied with R from the frontier. Depending on
parameters, the following outcomes are therefore possible:
1. If ti < t¯, i = 1, 2, both economies will specialise in the production of A and
import C.
˙aCit
aCit
= 0,∀t and pCit = pC + ti.
2. If ti ≥ t¯, i = 1, 2, both economies will be incompletely specialised in A and C
from t = 0 onwards.
˙aCit
aCit
> 0 and
˙pCit
pCit
< 0 while aCit < aCF . Once aCit = aCF , pCit = pC ,∀t.
3. If ti ≥ t¯ but tj < t¯ and pC + tj = 1aCiT + p
R + tij, for some t = T , then i will
be incompletely specialised in producing A and C and j will be fully specialised in
producing A and importing C from the frontier while t < T . However, once t ≥ T ,
i will be competitive at exporting yarn to j. This will change the direction of trade
and potentially alter specialisation patterns. Trade between the two regions will
be as follows: j will be fully specialised in producing A, which it exports to i in
exchange for C.49
4. If ti ≥ t¯ but tj < t¯ and pC + tj < 1aCit + p
R + tij,∀t, i will be incompletely
specialised in A and C and j will be fully specialised in producing A and importing
C from the frontier. Labour productivity in C in region i will never be high enough
for firms to become competitive in market j. This implies that i and j do not trade
with each other.
A number of points are worth noting in light of this result. First, initial spe-
49Depending on parameters, i can be completely or incompletely specialised in producing C. It
exports (or re-exports) A in exchange for R from the frontier. If pRaCit ≥ 1− 2α, i is incompletely
specialised in A and C. However, for pRaCit < 1 − 2α, i is fully specialised in C. As technology
improves via the production externality, complete specialisation becomes more difficult. This is
the general equilibrium effect of C becoming cheaper. As C becomes cheaper, consumers in i and
j increase consumption of C, but this requires more imports of R, which in turn increases demand
for A. Supply of A can only be increased if i becomes incompletely specialised and this requires
the wage to fall to one, where production in A is once again profitable.
76
cialisation at t = 0 will determine whether a domestic cotton yarn production is
able to develop in a follower region i. This depends only on geographic distance
to the frontier. Second, cotton yarn production is an infant industry in all follower
regions. With sufficiently high temporary protection from trade with the frontier in
the production of yarn (ie. a sufficiently high ti), all follower economies can develop
a domestic sector which is competitive with the frontier at any distance. To see this,
observe that once catch up is complete, aCit = aCF , follower regions have the same
labour productivity as the frontier.50
It should be noted that in general the extent to which temporary protection is
welfare improving depends on the speed of learning relative to discounting. If the
industry is not competitive at initial distance to the frontier, ti, consumers are worse
off during the time period where the cotton industry is protected, because they pay
a higher price for cotton yarn than they would if they were to import yarn at pC +ti,
but once the sector is competitive they are better off, as the price of cotton yarn
decreases below that of competing imported yarn. The net effect thus depends on
whether the long-term welfare gains outweigh the short term losses.
Finally, to the extent that one follower region is developing, while the other is
not, the time paths discussed in (3) and (4) differ only to the extent that under (3)
the developing economy integrates with the stagnating economy, while in (4) it does
not. The time path discussed in (3) will prevail if productivity gains in C outweigh
the trade cost tij between i and j. In particular, at t = 0, integration between i and j
cannot take place, because i and j have the same productivity, but i incurs the trade
cost when exporting to j. As i produces C, aCit increases and higher productivity can
overcome the trade cost. The possibility of integration between the two economies
will be important for understanding the long-term effects of temporary protection.
2.4.4 Understanding the trade cost shock
I now use this framework to guide the empirical analysis. I allow for the trade cost
shock to effect both the costs of trading C and R.
50It is well known, that a tariff is not the most efficient way of fostering development of the infant
industry. In general, a production subsisdy which targets the industry with learning externalities
is more efficient than an import tariff, as it does not distort consumer prices. Melitz (2005) shows
that in settings in which a production subsidy is not feasible, an import quota may be more efficient
than a tariff. The reason for this is that if there are adjustment costs to changing the tariff, an
import quota – fixed at the long-run level of import demand for example – is less costly, as the
effective tariff it is equivalent to will decline over time as learning in the domestic sector increases.
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In particular, let ∆ti ≡ t′i− ti denote the shock to trade costs for British yarn in
region i, where ti and t
′
i denote the trade costs between Britain and region i before
and during the Napoleonic Wars respectively. Similarly, let ∆τi = τi denote the
shock to the price of raw cotton.
Domestic production of cotton yarn is profitable if the following condition holds
min{pC + t′i; pCjt + tij} ≥
1
aCit
+ pr + τi (2.4)
This expression differs from Equation 2.3, because the fact that the shock occurs
at t > 0 means that, given sufficient learning, follower regions could have been
trading with each other, making pCjt + tij the effective price at which domestic firms
become competitive in market i.
The effect of the change in trade costs depends on three forces. First, the increase
in the price of raw cotton will make all regions less competitive in yarn production
relative to the frontier. Second, a larger shock to the costs of trading in yarn makes
domestic producers more competitive. Third, if the region was previously producing
yarn, then aict > aic0, meaning the region is, all else equal, more likely to remain
competitive at producing yarn despite the shock. I now examine the conditions
under which regions switch into and out of C.
1. Switching into C: A necessary condition for an economy i which was not pro-
ducing prior to the shock to switch into C is that ∆ti > ∆τi and 1aCjt +tij <
1
aCi0
.
The first condition is trivial, domestic production will only become profitable
if the shock to output prices outweighs the shock to input prices. Second,
insomuch as economy j was producing prior to the trade cost shock, the in-
crease in productivity cannot have been large enough to outweigh the trade
costs between the two regions, otherwise j will continue to have a comparative
advantage in producing C as t12, the trade cost between the two follower re-
gions, remains unchanged. Sufficiency requires the difference between ∆ti and
∆τi to be large enough such that the inequality in equation 2.3 is reversed.
2. Switching out of C: A necessary and sufficient condition for an economy
which was previously producing C to switch to importing C from the frontier
is pC + t′j < 1aCjt + pr + τi. Furthermore, any economy i out-competed by the
frontier producer in market i will also necessarily be out-competed in j because
of the triangle inequality.
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How can this simple framework be used to guide empirical analysis? First, the
model makes clear that the price shock to raw cotton is a potential confounder.
The previous section has shown that the Napoleonic Wars led to an asymmetric
shock to trade costs for British yarn across the French Empire. The presence of an
imported input necessary for production implies that identification of the effect of
protection on development in mechanised cotton spinning relies on either observing
both trade costs in each department at all points in time, or in showing that the
trade cost shock to imported raw cotton was even across regions. In Section 2.6,
I show the latter. In particular, while the blockade against British trade had the
spillover effect of making access to raw cotton more costly, the effect of this was even
across the French Empire, implying that time fixed effects will capture the effect of
more expensive inputs in the empirical specification. In light of this, there are two
predictions I will take to the data in the following sections.
1. Short-run prediction: Changes in production of C should be positively related
to the size of the trade cost shock to British yarn.
2. Long-run prediction: Productivity increases in the level of local production.
The short-run prediction shows how time variation in geographic distance from the
technological frontier can be used to identify the immediate effect of trade protection
on infant industry development. In the interest of clarity, I have kept the framework
simple, however it should be noted that the short-run prediction should not trivially
hold in the data. One missing aspect of the analysis is the technology choice which
firms evidently faced in practice. As Saure (2007) shows in a theoretical model with
a choice of production technology, infant industry protection in developing countries
can fail to deliver on the hoped for dynamic gains if the profit-maximising technology
choice is different to that in developed economies.
In particular, the paper analyses a model in which firms face a technology choice,
with one technology featuring dynamic external returns to scale, while the other
does not. If the individually optimal technology choice for firms is the traditional
one, then protection will simply foster usage of the traditional technology without
increasing productivity. To understand the intuition in this specific framework as
simply as possible, imagine firms in follower regions have access to two technologies
at t = 0; the one analysed above with learning externalities and initial labour
productivity a¯C , and another without dynamic externalities but with marginally
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smaller initial productivity a¯C + . Faced with this choice, firms will choose the
latter technology when trade costs are sufficiently high to make domestic production
profitable and once temporary protection is lifted, they will return to importing yarn.
This simple example seems particularly relevant in this setting as French spin-
ners had access to both the traditional hand spinning technology and mechanised
spinning. As Allen (2009) argued, France had a lower wage to capital price ratio,
implying that the returns to adopting the more capital-intensive technology were
arguably smaller than for the British. Given the technology choice, observing adop-
tion of mechanised spinning systematically related to the trade cost shock is not
trivial. If mechanisation is not the profit-maximising technology choice, we would
expect to see no effect of the trade cost shock on this margin.
I take the long-run prediction of productivity increasing in the aggregate level
of local production to the data in two ways. First, I ask whether there was persis-
tence in the location of spinning activity within France, and second, I ask whether
firms located in regions with high post-blockade mechanised spinning activity were
more productive in the long-term than firms located in regions with a lower level of
activity.
The persistence prediction relies on regions which received a larger shock be-
coming sufficiently competitive to survive competition with Britain under decreased
trade costs following 1815, which depends on the speed of learning. The prediction
that firm productivity increases in the level of activity at the regional level is a
direct consequence of the learning externality. In Sections 2.6 and 2.7, I take the
short- and long-ru predictions to the data. In the following section, I describe data
collection and data sources.
2.5 Data
To answer the question of how the rupture to trade affected the development of mech-
anised spinning within the French Empire during the Napoleonic Wars, I collected
data from various primary sources. The most important of these are handwritten
prefectural reports from the Archives Nationales in France used to construct the
panel dataset of mechanised spinning capacity examined in Section 2.2, and the
Lloyd’s List, which is the source for port level shipping data presented in Section
2.3. In this section, I provide a brief overview of the most important sources and I
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describe construction of my two measures of the trade cost shock. A more detailed
description of all sources, construction of each dataset and potential limitations can
be found in Appendix A. Examples of the original data are provided in Figures A.2
and A.3 in Appendix A.
2.5.1 Data on mechanised cotton spinning
Napoleon’s government went to extraordinary efforts to collect detailed, systematic
data on many aspects of society and the economy during the Emperor’s rule. Data
from this period are of a very high quality, and they provide a unique opportunity
to examine development at an early period of structural transformation. Depart-
mental reports from the Archives Nationales provide systematic evidence on various
stages of the production process for the cotton industry. Remarkably, data for 1803
and 1806 are available at the firm level, while data for 1812 are available at the
departmental level.
Using these data, I constructed a panel of spinning capacity at the departmental
level. My preferred measure of spinning capacity is the number of mechanised spin-
dles in department i at time t (which is the relevant measure of physical capital),
however I show that the results are robust to using the number of workers employed
in mechanised spinning as the outcome variable. In the firm level dataset for 1803
and 1806, many firms only report number of machines and not number of spindles.
For these firms, I have imputed the missing observations using a predictive mean
matching model.51 Departmental spinning capacity for both 1803 and 1812 is ob-
served for 88 departments of the French Empire. These are the departments which
make up my baseline sample. I also exploit the availability of firm level data for the
initial period of the Napoleonic Wars in the empirical analysis in order to examine
baseline characteristics and the margins of initial adjustment in the 1803-06 period.
2.5.2 Data on the trade cost shock
I use the Lloyd’s List, one of the oldest newspapers in the world, to reconstruct
trade routes between Britain and the Continent before and during the Napoleonic
Wars. The Lloyd’s List was, at the time , a bi-weekly newspaper for shipping
51More details on the imputation model and robustness to imputation can be found in Appendix
A.
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news which, amongst other things, printed the destination for all ships sailing from
British ports, and similarly, the source for all ships arriving to British ports. Early
editions have been digitised by Google and are made available by the Hathi Trust. I
used an optimal character recognition (OCR) programme to convert the images into
machine-readable format. This procedure converts the images into a text-file based
on pattern recognition of images which was manually set. By manually searching
through editions, I compiled a list of European port names. I then extracted British-
Continental journeys using a text-matching code which searched for the names of the
listed European ports for all years between 1787-1814. I found that the algorithm
extracted about 70-80% of journeys depending on the quality of the image for a
given year, by checking the accuracy of the algorithm for a subsample in each year.
The number of mismatches was minimal, and omissions (where the algorithm did
not pick up a port that it should have) were not systematic. I also had an entire year
manually entered to check the accuracy of the algorithm, which yielded very similar
results. An observation is a journey between Britain and a Continental European
port i in year t. This period spans the full length of the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars in order to show that the rupture to trade during the Napoleonic
Wars was radically different to a traditional trade war between Britain and France
– an example of which is the French Revolutionary Wars (1793-1802).
The theoretical framework predicts that changes in mechanised spinning capac-
ity were driven by changes in the cost of trading with Britain. I construct two
different measures which account in different ways for changing trade costs during
the Napoleonic Wars and show that the results are similar when using both mea-
sures. The first measure is based on a shortest route algorithm which accounts for
the extent to which trade routes changed for each department. The second measure
accounts for the fact that not all smuggling routes were open at any given time dur-
ing the blockade and some smuggling ports faced more severe capacity constraints
than others. Instead of calculating a shortest route, it weighs smuggling routes by
the traffic which passes through them.
Measure 1: Shortest route algorithm
The first measure uses a shortest route algorithm to calculate the mean distance
between London and each department. I account for one of the most important
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drivers of increasing trade costs; the difference between water- and land-borne routes,
by calibrating the ratio of the two to match the fact that, during this period, sailing
from Rouen to Marseille was two-thirds of the cost of going overland when all trade
costs are accounted for (Daudin, 2010). Based on these numbers, 1 sea kilometre is
equivalent to about 0.15 kilometres on land.
To quantify the shortest route prior to the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, I allow
trade to go through any port that was in use between 1787-1814. To calculate the
shortest route between London and each department during the Napoleonic Wars,
I restrict possible routes to the ones which were in operation during the Napoleonic
Wars. These are the routes discussed in Section 2.3. In particular, Malta, Gibraltar,
Gothenburg and Helgoland are the main smuggling ports to which goods arrived
from London. To make it to France, these goods could either take the northern
overland smuggling route via Strasbourg, or a southern smuggling route via Trieste,
Bilbao or Barcelona. Trieste was a documented smuggling centre (Marzagalli, 1999
and Crouzet, 1987), while free shipping in Spain implied that water-borne routes
could be used to get goods close to the French border.52
For any department i, the algorithm then picks the least cost path. The trade
cost shock, defined as the log-change in the shortest route to London for each de-
partment, can be seen in Figure 2.9, where darker shading shows a larger shock. As
expected, departments along the Channel have the highest trade cost shock. How-
ever, the shock worked in a more complicated way than simply increasing in size from
southern to northern France. For example, departments along the Rhine witnessed
almost no increase in their effective distance to London by virtue of their proxim-
ity to Strasbourg, the route via which goods entered the department. The routes
that goods took prior to the Napoleonic Wars were almost identical to the routes
which they took during the period 1803-1812. In contrast, the Atlantic seaboard
witnessed a much larger increase in trade costs, as these departments were initially
easily accessible via sea-routes which were not available during the blockade.
To what extent does this measure accurately capture the increase in trading costs
between Britain and a given department in France? One worry is that by exclud-
52Direct shipping between London and a number of ports in northern Spain also increased fairly
significantly suggesting that, at least for some years, routes cheaper than the London-Gibraltar-
northern Spain-France route were in operation. This implies that assuming goods came to the
south-western border of the French Empire via Malta or Gibraltar (from London) is a conservative
estimate.
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ing any form of direct smuggling between Britain and France, we are introducing
measurement error. While it is certainly true that some direct smuggling between
Britain and France took place during the Napoleonic Wars, historians seem to agree
that this was far riskier than the indirect smuggling routes which I use to construct
the measure of the trade cost shock (Heckscher, 1922). The fact that third-country
ports were used is indicative of the fact that either direct smuggling was quantita-
tively unimportant as the blockade was mostly effective along the coastline of the
French Empire, or that the risks associated with it were sufficiently high that tak-
ing more circuitous routes was also profitable. In either case, this implies that my
measure should do a relatively good job of capturing the change in trade costs.
The second concern has to do with the fact that not all smuggling routes were
open at any given time. Furthermore, some ports (such as Helgoland) were more
obviously subject to capacity constraints than others (such as Malta). For this
reason, I construct another measure of the change in trading costs which relies on
quantifying the extent to which various ports were used for smuggling.
Measure 2: Weighted distance
An important source of measurement error when using the shortest route algorithm
to quantify the change in trade costs stems from the fact that it does not account
for capacity constraints and periods where smuggling centres were not open. As I
have shown, military events played a role in determining which areas of the Euro-
pean Continent were more or less were open to trade and this variation had a time
dimension to it. For example, in years where the blockade in the north was almost
perfectly enforced, goods made their way into Continental Europe exclusively via
the south. The second measure therefore focuses on capturing the intensity of use
of any smuggling centre between 1803-12 instead of the shortest route approach.
To capture the intensity of port-usage, I use the Lloyd’s List to identify ports
which were intensively used during the Napoleonic Wars. I experimented with var-
ious definitions to quantify smuggling at the port level, but the concentration of
trade through a small number of ports implies that the same ports played by far
the most dominant role in maintaining trade between Britain and Continent during
the Napoleonic wars for any sensibly defined measure. These are Cadiz, Gibral-
tar, Gothenburg, Helgoland, Lisbon, Malta, and Tonningen.53 Given the pattern
53Recall Tonningen played a crucial role in maintaining trade between Britain and the Continent
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in Figure 2.5, it should not be surprising that these ports played by far the most
important role in smuggling British goods onto the Continent. Depending on the
precise method used for quantification, a number of different ports enter the list,
however their weight is always very small and as such, should not influence the
results in an important way.
The measure I use defines a smuggling centre as a port where the number of
ships sailing to or from Britain and the given port in any of the war years between
1803-1812 was greater than the amount of ships in any of the years before the onset
of the wars for which we have data (1787-1802). I use this condition in order to avoid
mis-classifying ports which happen to be open to trade with Britain but are not used
as smuggling centres. To focus on the quantitatively important smuggling centres,
I further refine this measure by using only the ports where the maximum yearly
shipment in a blockade year exceeds 80. The threshold is not particularly strict, as
large and important smuggling centres such as Malta have above 300 shipments in
peak years.
Based on these conditions the following ports are classified as smuggling centres;
Cadiz, Corunna, Gothenburg, Gibraltar, Helgoland, Lisbon, Malta and Tonningen.54
The final step is to quantify the relative importance of each centre. I take total
shipments between 1803-1812, the years of the Napoleonic wars, and subtract total
shipments between 1793-1802. The difference between the two is a crude measure
of smuggling. Weights are calculated based on a port’s share of total smuggling.
According to this measure, shipments to the southern smuggling ports accounted
for roughly 70% of total smuggling, which is similar to what differently defined
measures give.
I proxy for the trade cost between London and a department prior to the
Napoleonic Wars by using Euclidean distance to London, while distance during
the wars is given as a weighted average of the Euclidean distance to each smuggling
centre. Note that by calculating distance in this way, I am being conservative in the
sense that while there is evidence for trade flowing in the south-north direction, (eg.
from Malta to the northern parts of Europe) there is no historical account of trade
flowing in the north - south direction (eg. from Helgoland to Southern Europe).
This makes sense, seeing as the binding supply constraint was in the North and not
during the North-Sea blockade between 1803-1805.
54Corunna’s share in smuggling is below 2%.
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in the South. In this way, the measure is probably overestimating the south’s shock
relative to the north, stacking the cards against finding an effect of trade protection
on capacity.
2.5.3 Other data sources
To conduct robustness checks, data was collected from a variety of sources which are
discussed in more detail in Appendix A. Data on raw cotton prices were collected
from editions of the most important commercial newspaper of the time in France,
the “Journal du Commerce” and they were supplemented with London prices from
Tooke and Newmarch (1848). To conduct falsification tests, I also collected data
from handwritten departmental reports on leather tanning and woollen spinning. To
test robustness to a number of potential confounders, I collected data from a variety
of primary and secondary sources. Data on access to coal is from Fernihough and
O’Rourke (2014), data on mean stream flows for rivers across the French Empire is
from the European Water Archive, the historical location of the cotton industry is
from Daudin (2010), literacy rates are from Furet and Ozouf (1982), conscription
rates are from Hagenvilliers (1937), departmental population is from Chabert (1951),
urban population is from Bairoch et al. (1988), and population density is calculated
by geo-coding a historical map of the French-Empire in order to measure the area of
each department. The long-term effects of the trade cost shock discussed in Section
2.7 are estimated using data on cotton spinning firms from the first French industrial
census (1839-47) which was collected by Chanut et al. (2000).
2.6 Short-term Empirical Strategy and Results
The theoretical framework presented in Section 2.4 predicts that a sufficiently large
increase in the distance to the technological frontier will result in departments
switching into domestic production in mechanised spinning. The exogenous vari-
ation in effective distance to London provides us with a setting which we can use
to take theory to the data. To the extent that the mechanism is at work, we would
expect increases in spinning capacity during the period of the Napoleonic Wars to
be systematically related to the size of the trade cost shock. In this section, I first
describe the evolution of mechanised cotton spinning during the Napoleonic Wars
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and then turn to estimating the short-run effect of trade protection.
2.6.1 Mechanised spinning during the Napoleonic Wars
Figure 2.11 shows the variation in spinning capacity which will be used to estimate
the effect of trade protection on increases in domestic production capacity. Panel
A shows the spatial distribution of spinning capacity across the French Empire in
1803, prior to the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, while Panel B shows the same for
1812, towards the end of the Blockade.
Between 1803 and 1812, spinning capacity in the French Empire increased by
about 370%, from 380,000 to around 1.4 million spindles.55 As a comparison, it has
been estimated that Britain had around 6.8 million water and mule spindles in 1811
(Chapman, 1970). This should be taken as a lower bound estimate on total number
of spindles as it does not include older type machines such as spinning-jennies.
A look at Figure 2.11 reveals the differential impact of the Napoleonic Wars on
mechanisation of cotton spinning across the French Empire. Particularly striking is
the increase in spinning capacity along the English Channel. By 1812, the two largest
spinning departments in the French Empire were Seine-Inferieure (prefecture Rouen)
and Nord (prefecture Lille), both along the English Channel. The enormous increase
in spinning capacity in the Nord from an almost irrelevant 2,700 spindles (contrast
to Rhone with more than 70,000 in 1803) to over 200,000 spindles is particularly
impressive.
In general, the more Southern regions of the Empire stagnated during this time
period. The Rhone and Loire, two of the departments with the largest spinning
capacity in this region prior to 1803 showed varied performance. Spinning capacity in
the Loire decreased significantly (from 47,000 to 37,000 spindles), while the capacity
in the Rhone increased (from 72,000 to 96,000 spindles). However it is difficult to
know what to make of these latter numbers as spinners in the Rhone moved out
from Lyon and back into the surrounding countryside (which is where rural spinning
was traditionally located), which is the opposite of what we see in Seine-Inferieure
and Nord where firms tended to concentrate increasingly in Rouen and Lille. The
South-West of the Empire along the border with Spain saw outright decline in all
departments. Modern firms in these areas went bankrupt and firms reverted back
55This figure is calculated using the 88 departments for which data is available in both 1803 and
1812.
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to hand-spinning.
The prefectural reports from various departments paint a picture consistent with
the numbers. Southern departments unanimously complained about a collapse in
demand. The prefect of Tarn (prefecture Albi) in the south-west described how the
spinning machines that were used in the department had not been in use for years
and the demand for all forms of cloth had collapsed. The prefect of Rhone (prefecture
Lyon) was even clearer in blaming foreign yarn for the collapse in demand.
The situation in the more Northern departments could not have been more dif-
ferent. A report from the Nord (prefecture Lille) stated that there was not much
change in activity in linens, woollens and hemp. In contrast, he stated, trends in
mechanised cotton spinning were completely different. In this branch of the textile
sector, despite the high price of raw cotton, activity had picked up considerably,
particularly during 1809 and 1810. Consistent with learning gains, the prefect also
described how there had been significant progress made since 1806 in the fineness
of the yarn that they were able to spin, claiming that they were now able to spin
yarn as fine as 200 counts, which, if true, was on par with the British.
It is worth bearing in mind, that the large increase in spinning came at a time
when the economic environment was highly uncertain and a number of factors spe-
cific to the cotton industry made any form of development surprising. At the turn
of the 19th century, France had already been at war for the best part of a decade
and was continuously at war during the period of interest. The country had recently
emerged from severe hyperinflation and general economic uncertainty was, and con-
tinued to be pervasive. With respect to the cotton industry, in 1810, high import
tariffs were placed on raw cotton, the price of which was already much higher than in
Britain. Finally, cotton did not enjoy particularly favourable government support.
The army used exclusively woollen textiles (Grab, 2003) and Napoleon remained
highly ambivalent of developments in the cotton industry because of its reliance on
imported inputs.
It is particularly interesting to note that cotton was the only textile to flourish
in the French Empire during the Napoleonic Wars, despite it being the only textile
singularly reliant on an imported input traded via sea-routes. For silks, woollens,
linen and hemp there was ample domestic supply of raw material and neighbouring
countries also produced significant quantities. This was not the case for cotton wool,
and it also explains why Napoleon was never fully supportive of the increase in the
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spinning capacity in cotton spinning. Heckscher (1922, p. 272) notes “ (...) there
was no point where the two opposing tendencies of the Continental System were so
much in conflict with one another as here; and the reason was, of course, that the
industry was based on a raw material which was for the most part unobtainable
by other means than by the forbidden route across the seas.” On the one hand,
increasing domestic production in cotton meant a weakening of Britain’s economic
advantage, however, the fact that the industry was reliant on an imported input
meant that the industry would always remain reliant on sea-borne trade.
This point should be taken into consideration when thinking both about the im-
portance of state support for the cotton industry. Heckscher recounts that Napoleon
was constantly trying to find substitutes for cotton. As early as 1809, he declared
that “it would be better to use only wool, flax and silk, the products of our own
soil, and to proscribe cotton forever on the Continent” (Heckscher, 1922 p. 277).
In 1810, he offered a prize of one million francs for the invention of a flax-spinning
machine. Even later, in 1811, when the cotton industry faced a severe crisis as a
result of the high tariffs put in place in 1810, he banished all cotton goods from the
imperial palaces.
2.6.2 The short-run effect of trade protection
My empirical strategy is based on the well-documented fact that trade diminishes
dramatically with distance, implying that geographic distance plays a role similar to
that of artificial barriers to trade such as tariffs.56 Geographic distance however is
constant over time, making it generally difficult to disentangle the effect of distance
from other regional characteristics fixed over time. My empirical strategy exploits
the fact that while geographic distance between Britain and French regions did
not change during the blockade, the set of possible trading routes did, leading to
changes in effective distance between London and a given French region. In this
setting, the change in the direction of trade between Britain and France changed
effective distance between a given department and London by changing the length
of the journey which goods needed to take to reach their final destination. The
varying size of the shock to effective distance to London measures the size of trade
costs, which drives the variation that can be exploited to estimate the effect of trade
56See Head and Mayer (2013) for a recent discussion on the gravity literature.
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protection on mechanisation in spinning. This leads to the following specification,
similar in spirit to a standard difference-in-difference (DD) estimator;
Sit = αi + δt + γlnDit + it (2.5)
Sit is a measure of mechanised spinning capacity in region i at time t, lnDit
is a measure of effective distance to Britain in department i at time t, αi controls
for time-invariant fixed effects at the regional level, and δt controls for the effect of
aggregate shocks over time. γ is the parameter of interest, which we expect to be
positive if effective distance to Britain is an important driver of mechanisation.
The unit of observation in the main analysis is the department, which I observe
in 1803, prior to the Napoleonic Wars, and in 1812, towards the end of the block-
ade. There are 88 departments in the sample. Spinning capacity is measured as
the number of spindles per thousand inhabitants. Spindles is the standard measure
of physical capital in mechanised cotton spinning. The relationship is estimated
in levels because of the large number of zeros in the data. In Table 2.6, I show
however that the results are robust to using either a log-specification, or the Pois-
son conditional fixed effects estimator. Spindles are normalised by departmental
population to account for the fact that larger departments may increase spinning
capacity more in response to the same shock simply because of their size. Effective
distance to London in 1803 and 1812 is quantified using the two different measures
described in Section 2.5. Standard errors are clustered at the department across all
specifications to account for serial correlation. I also estimated Conley’s (1999) spa-
tially clustered standard errors. As these were generally smaller, suggesting negative
spatial correlation, I report the clustered standard errors across all tables.
The estimation strategy compares outcomes in regions of the French Empire
which received a large trade cost shock to regions which received a smaller shock
before and after the disruption to trade. Differently to a standard DD strategy,
treatment intensity is continuous. Furthermore, the nature of the trade cost shock
is such that all units are affected to some extent by the disruption to trade. The
latter is not problematic for identification to the extent that the effect of interest
is trade protection and not the effect of the blockade itself. Put differently, we are
interested in comparing outcomes in mechanised cotton spinning across otherwise
similar regions which received higher and lower levels of trade protection. The
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period of the Napoleonic Wars provides a source of exogenous variation in trading
costs which allows us to identify the effect of trade protection on mechanisation.
The fact that the effective level of protection from trade with Britain may not be
the same as it was prior to the wars anywhere would be a problem only if the effect
we wanted to estimate was that of the blockade.
Similarly to a standard DD strategy, identification relies on there being no shocks
contemporaneous to and correlated with the trade cost shock. The main concern
for identification is that some areas of the French Empire may simply have been
more conducive to the new technology. If these variables were correlated with the
trade cost shock, and they exerted a time-varying effect on spinning capacity, my
identification strategy would be undermined. For this reason, before discussing the
estimation results, I begin by examining the extent to which “pre-treatment” firm
and departmental level variables differed across areas receiving a lower or higher
cost-distance shock. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 divide firms and departments respectively
into two groups depending on whether they are above or below the median of the
trade-cost shock (defined as the log change in effective distance to London - measure
1). Figures 2.14 and 2.15 also show the spatial variation for a number of these
departmental level variables across the Empire.
Reassuringly, for the majority of variables, there is no statistically significant
difference in means between the two groups. This is a stronger statement than what
is needed for identification in the DD setting, as – conditional on parallel trends
– differences in levels do not undermine identification. It does however give us an
idea of the extent to which we can think of different regions of the Empire being
comparable in terms of their capacity to develop modern industry.
Conscription rates were higher for low trade cost shock departments (at 5%),
and population density was higher in high trade cost shock departments (at 5%). In
terms of the former, significantly higher conscription rates in low trade-cost shock
departments are reassuring for our empirical strategy, as conscription rates are used
to control for the effect of a potentially uneven labour supply shock driving mech-
anisation. The fact that it was the low-trade cost shock departments which had a
higher negative labour supply shock works against a factor price confounder driving
the results. Population density has been argued to be important for demand side
explanations of industrialisation, however, in the empirical analysis, I will control
for the time-varying effect of population density and show that results are robust to
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accounting for these differences.
Turning to firm-level differences, the only statistically significant difference be-
tween high and low trade cost shock firms seems to be their age. In particular,
high-trade cost shock firms are significantly younger. I return to this issue when
examining pre-treatment trends and show that the difference is driven entirely by
the time-varying effect of population density, which we have seen is significantly
different across the two sub-samples.
Based on the point estimates, firms in low trade cost shock areas seem to have
been initially larger, both in term of capital and labour employed, but these differ-
ences are not significant. To the extent that low-trade cost shock firms were initially
bigger, they seem to have been at an advantage both in terms of better access to raw
cotton during the volatile years of the Napoleonic Wars, and in terms of access to a
larger market for their output as a result of their size, which works against finding
a positive effect on the trade cost coefficient.57 Taken together, it seems that prior
to the Napoleonic Wars, different regions of the Empire were sufficiently similar to
make a comparison between them meaningful.
Table 2.3 contains the results from estimating equation 2.5 using both measures
of the trade cost. In both cases, the estimated effect of protection is large and
statistically significant. The point estimate of 33.11 in column (1), which uses
measure 1 based on the shortest route algorithm, implies that moving from the 25th
to the 75th percentile of the trade cost shock leads to a predicted increase in spinning
capacity per capita that is about the same size as mean spinning capacity in 1812
across departments.
To understand the source of identifying variation, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the
results from estimating a standard difference in difference specification using the
median trade cost shock to define the“large” and “small” trade cost shock groups
for both measures of the shock. “Large” and “small” in this setting, corresponds to
the the treated and untreated groups in a standard binary DD. For both measures
of the trade cost, spinning capacity increases in both groups between 1803 and 1812,
but to a significantly larger extent in the case of the high-trade cost shock group.
Part of the variation is thus coming from a crude North-South comparison.
Is there variation at a finer level in line with continuous treatment intensity?
Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) in Table 2.3 show that indeed, treatment has a continu-
57See Section 2.2 for a discussion.
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ous effect, and there is sizeable variation even within the North and South of France.
Columns (2) and (5) estimate the effect using only the sub-sample of above median
latitude departments using the two measures of the trade cost shock, while columns
(3) and (6) do the same for the sub-sample of below median latitude departments.
In three of the four columns, the estimated effect is positive within the Northern
and Southern subsample, and for the Northern departments, both estimates are also
statistically significant.
Taking these results together, the variation used to identify the effect of protec-
tion on spinning capacity in columns (1) and (4) comes both from large differences
in the extent to which Northern and Southern departments scaled up production
capacity, but also from variation at a finer level of disaggregation. This strengthens
the evidence in favour of differential protection driving the results.
2.6.3 No similar effect on placebo industries
One concern may be that the results are driven by a contemporaneous shock which
effected different areas of the Empire differentially, such as a spatially uneven de-
mand shock. To strengthen evidence in favour of the trade cost shock driving the
results, Table 2.7 shows that the effect which I find for cotton spinning is not present
for two other industries, wool yarn (a direct substitute) and leather. Both products
were less intensively traded with Britain, and there was no technological change in
either industry. For these reasons, the shock should not have had a significant effect
on the spatial distribution of activity.
At the turn of the 19th century, both industries were still very much organ-
ised as rural, domestic manufacturing in contrast to mechanised cotton spinning.
Mechanisation had not been introduced in the woollen industry because of inherent
differences in the fibre which made mechanisation of wool spinning more difficult
(Landes, 1969). For this reason, in woollen spinning, the dependent variable is
labour employed. As argued previously, wool was not an intensively traded good
with the British, and the raw material was also predominantly domestically sup-
plied. Finally, it was an entrenched industry which enjoyed a high level of state
support. For example, the army used exclusively woollen products (Bonin and Lan-
glois, 1997). The caveat with using wool spinning is that there may be spillovers
from the cotton industry. It is conceivable that in the areas where cotton spinning
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became widespread, wool spinning was squeezed out.
For this reason, I also collected data on the leather industry. Leather was sim-
ilarly rurally organised, with some military demand during the period and no sig-
nificant technological improvement. More than either woollens or cotton, it mostly
served local markets and used local supply. Access to water was the one locational
constraint making it an ideal industry with which to contrast cotton spinning (Bonin
et Langlois, 1997).58
Table 2.7 contains the results from estimating the effect of the trade cost shock
on capacity in tanning (number of pits), employment in woollen spinning, and, for
comparability with the latter, employment in mechanised cotton spinning. The es-
timated effects of the trade cost shock are not statistically different from zero for
tanning and woollen spinning, but are large and statistically significant for employ-
ment in mechanised cotton spinning.
In the case of capacity in tanning, the positive point estimate is in fact non-
negligible. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the shock leads to a
predicted increase in tanning capacity that is equal to about 40% of the mean
tanning capacity at the end of the blockade. However, inspection of the scatterplot
in Figure 2.12 shows that two departments (Var and Ardennes) are extreme outliers.
Dropping these leads to a decrease in the point estimate from 0.28 (se 0.21 ) to 0.03
(se 0.11), which is basically a zero effect.
Consistent with a negative spillover from cotton to woollen spinning, the point
estimates in Columns (3) and (4) are negative, albeit not significant. Moving from
the 25th to the 75th percentile of the shock leads to a decrease in spinning em-
ployment that is about 20% of mean employment in woollen spinning at the end of
the blockade. The point estimate is also less sensitive to outliers. Repeating the
same exercise of dropping the two largest outliers, the estimated coefficient decreases
marginally in absolute value from -2.23 (se 2.92) to -2.07 (se 2.01).
The estimated effect on mechanised cotton spinning is large and significant con-
sistent with previous results, though not quite as large as the effect estimated for
capital. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the shock leads to an increase
58There are three further considerations which should be taken into account when interpreting
the results. First, in the case of both industries, the pre-blockade data point comes from industrial
surveys carried out directly after the French Revolution in 1789. Second, in both cases, data
from the pre-Napoleonic period are generally worse quality simply because the questionnaires were
more qualitative in nature. Third, because in this case the first datapoint is from the 1790s (before
France’s territorial expansion), the sample is restricted to the territory of “ancien regime” France.
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in predicted spinning capacity which is equal to about 75% of the mean employment
in mechanised spinning at the end of the blockade. The finding that the effect on
employment is smaller than the effect on capital (at least in terms of the point es-
timates) is plausible, as capital should expand to a greater extent than labour at a
time when increasingly capital-intensive machines were being developed.59
2.6.4 Robustness to potential confounders
I now turn to addressing a number of important potential confounders. One im-
portant concern is that of a potentially asymmetric shock to raw cotton prices on
the input side. Differently to cotton yarn, the source of raw cotton was not Britain,
but other countries.60 For this reason, imports of raw cotton were not resisted, and
the French attempted to secure access to raw cotton using the same trading routes
as before the blockade. The general difficulty of sea transportation meant however,
that the trading routes became more risky and hence more costly. This drove up
the price of raw cotton, but in a symmetric fashion across the Empire.
Figure 2.13 shows that for all four varieties of raw cotton in use across the French
Empire, prices increased markedly during the Napoleonic Wars, but the shock was
symmetric in the North and the South. In the case of Brazilian cotton, where one
specific variety (Pernambuco) can consistently be matched to London prices, it is
also clear that French prices increased to a greater extent than the British. All else
equal, this negatively affected French competitiveness, and explains why exports of
cotton goods did not increase until after the end of the Napoleonic Wars – a point
to which I return in the next section.
Departmental fixed effects capture all unobservables constant over time. In Table
2.8, I show that the results are robust to controlling for the time-varying effect
of a number of variables which may plausibly effect the adoption of mechanised
technology. Across all columns, the coefficient of interest remains highly significant
and relatively stable in size.
In Columns (2) and (3), I examine the time varying effect of location funda-
mentals such as access to fast-flowing streams and coal deposits. The literature has
argued that both these variables were important determinants of the location of
59If the two largest outliers are dropped, the estimated coefficient remains large and statistically
significant. The point estimate decreases from 0.93 (se 0.39) to 0.65 (se 0.29).
60In particular, the French used raw cotton from four sources; the Levant, Brazil (by way of
Portugal), the US and cotton from colonial sources.
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the cotton industry. Recently, Crafts and Wolf (2012) have found that in Britain,
access to fast flowing streams was a particularly important factor in Lancashire’s
dominance of the British cotton industry. In this setting, neither have a statistically
significant effect, more importantly the point estimate for effective distance is left
virtually unchanged. In the case of coal, the result is not particularly surprising, as
steam-power only began to play a more important role in cotton in later decades of
the 19th century. Figure 2.14 shows that access to water power was available across
various parts of France, and as such, it may not have been a particularly important
determinant for where the industry would locate.
Column (4) controls for the time-varying effect of downstream weaving. Given
the importance of local markets at the early stages of development discussed in
Section 2.2, one worry is that mechanisation is simply being driven by demand from
downstream weaving. For this reason, I add weaving capacity in 1803 (normalised
by population) interacted with the time dummy, to control for the demand side of
the market. As expected, the coefficient is positive and significant, implying that for
the same trade cost shock, higher weaving capacity led to a larger predicted increase
in mechanised spinning capacity. The effect of the trade cost shock remains large
and statistically significant, though the point estimate decreases somewhat in size.
How should we think about the downstream result? It is clear from column
(4) that weaving mattered somewhat, but the results are not driven simply by the
demand side. This did not imply that increases in mechanised spinning had to lead
to a proportionate increase in downstream weaving. Recall that hand-spinning was
still sizeable in France at the time, and thus expansion in mechanisation did not
have to lead to a simultaneous expansion in weaving. This was the case even if all
demand was local, as smaller weaving centres which received a larger shock could
have increased capacity in mechanised spinning by replacing hand-spinning.
Column (5) uses a slightly different measure of downstream demand, which en-
compasses all aspects of the production process for cotton cloth as of 1789. As
such, it is only available for France at its pre-revolutionary borders. This measure
contains the size of the hand-spinning of cotton yarn, and thus captures the extent
to which prior experience in hand-spinning was important for mechanisation. The
estimated coefficient on the time varying effect of the historical location of cotton
spinning is positive and significant, but the size and significance of the effect of the
trade cost is unchanged.
96
Columns (6) and (7) control for the time varying effects of population density
and urbanisation. Both measure the strength of agglomeration based explanations
in determining the location of mechanised spinning. Population density is indis-
tinguishable statistically from zero, while urbanisation enters with a positive and
significant coefficient. In both cases, the estimated effect of the trade cost shock
remains large and significant.
Column (8) explores robustness to adding a measure for human capital across
departments interacted with the time dummy. Human capital is measured as the
proportion of men able to sign their wedding certificates by department as reported
in Furet and Ozouf (1982). The estimated coefficient is large and highly significant,
which is somewhat surprising as other studies have struggled to find an important
role for human capital measured in this way, at the onset of industrialisation (Squic-
ciarini and Voigtländer, 2014). The coefficient of interest remains highly significant
and the point estimate increases somewhat in size.
In Column (9), I address a particularly important confounder - the role of factor
price shocks. In Section 2.2, I discussed the factor price hypothesis as one of two
prominent alternative explanations for the slow diffusion of spinning technology
across France. According to this hypothesis, labour was relatively expensive in
Britain and cheap in France rendering capital biased technological change profitable
in the former, and adoption of the new technology unprofitable in the latter (Allen,
2009).
Given this argument, an uneven factor price shock across the French Empire
may have rendered adoption of the new technology relatively more profitable in
some regions rather than others. During the Napoleonic Wars, conscription was
consistently high, and somewhat uneven across departments (Forrest, 1989). This
is precisely the type of negative labour supply shock which could drive up wages
and push cotton spinners into substituting expensive labour for cheaper capital. For
this reason, I collected statistics on conscription by department from Hargenvilliers
(1937), and in Column (9), I add a control for the time-varying effect of conscription
rates in 1804-05. The point estimate for the trade cost shock is virtually unchanged.
The effect of conscription, while statistically indistinguishable from zero, has the
the expected positive sign.
As a further robustness check for factor price shocks, in Figure 2.19, I show that
the shock does not differentially effect capital-labour ratios across departments in
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a systematic way. More sophisticated machines with a larger number of spindles
substituted for relatively more labour, and thus an uneven factor price shock across
the French Empire should alter the capital-labour ratio at the departmental level
even within mechanised cotton spinning. Figure 2.19 shows that this is not the
case. The estimated elasticity is small, it has the wrong sign, and is not statistically
significant (point estimate -0.09, se 0.24).
In Column (10), I control for the time varying varying effect of institutional
change using the approach developed by Acemoglu et al. (2011). In their study, the
authors show that regions of Germany which received the institutional reforms of
the French either through annexation or conquest, grew faster throughout the 19th
century. In my setting, conquest by France meant annexation, and thus complete
adoption of French institutions. For this reason, I use the date of annexation for
each department, interacted with the time indicator, to control for the effects of in-
stitutional change. Departments belonging to France at the time of its 1789 borders
are coded as receiving institutional change in that year. The point estimate on the
effect of the trade cost is left virtually unchanged and remains highly significant,
while institutional change enters with the expected negative sign,61 but is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero. Finally, the most demanding test for robustness
of the effect of the trade cost is the simultaneous inclusion of all time-varying con-
trols. Column (11) shows that the estimated effect remains similar in size when all
controls are added.62
2.6.5 Adjustment on the extensive margin
If learning externalities are indeed important, we would expect a substantial pro-
portion of the expansion in spinning capacity to occur at the extensive margin. A
large intensive margin raises the issue that perhaps the results are being driven by
effects internal to the firm. Furthermore, if a couple of large firms are expanding in
effected departments, it is harder to argue that firms don’t internalise a substantial
proportion of learning gains. Exploiting the fact that firm level data is available for
61Being annexed to France at a later date, at least according to this view, is bad for mechanisa-
tion. It should also be noted that the effect of institutional change cannot separately be identified
from the effect of incorporation into a larger internal market.
62In Column (11), I drop institutional change which is highly correlated with the time indicator.
The small sample size makes separate estimation of the two infeasible once other explanatory
variables are added. Results are robust to dropping the time indicator instead of the institutional
variable.
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the initial period of the Napoleonic Wars, in particular during the North Sea block-
ade (1803-1806), I examine the extent to which adjustment to the shock occurred at
the intensive and extensive margin. In Table 2.9, I begin by estimating the effect of
the trade cost shock at the departmental level for the period 1803 - 1806 (Columns
(1) and (4)). The effect is large and statistically significant (point estimate: 7.96,
se 2.24 - contrast this to point estimate 33.11, se 9.78, estimated for 1803-12).
I take spinning capacity at the departmental level in 1806, and divide it into an
intensive and extensive margin by using firm level information on spinning capacity
at both points in time. I then estimate the effect of the trade cost shock on the
extensive and intensive margin separately. I find that the extensive margin is highly
significant and the attributed effect accounts for almost the entire combined effect
(point estimate 6.84, se 1.81). In contrast, the effect on the intensive margin is
small and statistically indistinguishable from zero (point estimate 1.119, se 0.822).
To the extent that this pattern is representative for the full period, the evidence is
strongly suggestive of the fact that the driving force behind increasing capacity in
mechanisation was not driven by characteristics internal to firms alive in high-trade
cost shock areas in 1803.
2.6.6 No differential investment in machine type
In Table 2.11, I use information on the type of machines in use in each department
to estimate whether the trade cost shock differentially affected the type of machines
firms used. The data allows me to differentiate between two types of machines
“filatures continus” and “mull-jennys”. The former were less modern machines, with
fewer spindles on average per machine, and they were mainly used for spinning less
fine yarn. To the extent that larger investments in the North during the Napoleonic
Wars also entailed upgrading into more modern and capital-intensive machinery, the
long term results which I find in the following section could be driven by investment
decisions made within the firm. To the contrary, I find that the trade cost shock had
no differential effect on the proportion of newer type machines in a given department.
2.6.7 No pre-treatment trends
Finally, I turn to addressing the question of differential pre-treatment trends. In
the absence of similar data for this period, I have constructed an approximation
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to spindles in 1794 using firm level data from 1806. I take spinning capacity in
1803 for firms alive in 1794 as an approximation to actual spinning capacity at the
departmental level in 1794, which I don’t observe. Of course, this assumes that
all growth in spinning capacity took place on the extensive margin and that firms
didn’t go bankrupt, neither of which are likely to hold. However, to the extent that
results from the period 1803-06 are representative more generally, we should expect
the extensive margin to be the main channel of adjustment.
Table 2.10 contains the estimation results for the period 1794-1803, which I
contrast to the main results for 1803-12. The estimated coefficient for the period
1794-1803 without controls is small, positive and marginally significant at 10% (es-
timated coefficient: 5.53, se: 3.054). The confidence intervals for 1794-1803 are
non-overlapping. More importantly, adding the same time-varying controls as in
the previous section changes the sign of the estimated coefficient, and it is no longer
significant at conventional levels. Population density seems to be the omitted vari-
able which is driving the result in column (1). As was shown earlier, population
density was significantly higher in high trade cost shock departments. Once the
time-varying effect of population density is controlled for, the trade cost has no sta-
tistically significant effect in the pre-treatment period, while the effect is large and
statistically significant for the period of the Napoleonic Wars.
2.6.8 Discussion
Taking all results together, though different regions of the French Empire were not
identical prior to the Napoleonic Wars, they seem to have been sufficiently similar
to expect that all else equal, a number of different regions could have developed
mechanised cotton spinning on a large scale given sufficient protection from British
competition. The finding that increased trade protection led producers to scale up
in the new technology is by no means obvious. While it is true that a standard
Ricardian-model without market imperfections would also predict that short-run
protection increases production in the import-competing sector, the fact that two
technologies were available for spinning cotton yarn makes the short-run result in-
teresting in its own right. To the extent that it was factor price differences which
rendered the adoption of mechanisation unprofitable in France, all else equal, the
trade cost shock should have had no effect on mechanisation. The fact that it did, is
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the first piece of important evidence underpinning an infant industry mechanism at
work. In the next section, I examine the extent to which temporary trade protection
increased productivity in line with the prediction of an infant industry mechanism.
2.7 Long-term Empirical Strategy and Results
The previous section established that the trade cost shock had a positive impact
on mechanised cotton spinning across the French Empire during the Napoleonic
Wars. An infant industry mechanism would predict that, given sufficient temporary
protection, the industry should survive competition at free trade prices once pro-
tection is removed. When the blockade ended in 1813, the traditional North-South
direction of trade between Britain and Continental Europe was restored. Trade be-
tween Britain and France however was inhibited by high tariffs, making testing the
competitiveness of cotton spinning slightly more complicated.
On the one hand, imports of British cotton yarn had been prohibited prior to the
Napoleonic Wars, but as we saw in previous sections, the policy was highly ineffective
until the Napoleonic Wars drove up trade costs between the two countries. In
this regard, examining whether French spinners could survive competition at levels
similar to pre-Napoleonic War years would be evidence of productivity gains, but it
would not show that the industry had become competitive at free trade prices. For
this reason, I also examine exports of French cotton goods, as this tests competition
between Britain and France at international prices.
It is worth bearing in mind that aside from returning to pre-blockade levels of
competition across France, the post-war years were generally difficult for the cotton
industry. The dissolution of the French Empire proved tumultuous with fighting
taking place within the borders of France. Many spinning mills reported having to
stop production as a result of the invasion by foreign troops. The peace settlement
restored the borders of France to their 1789 levels, contracting the size of the internal
market for producers who remained within France.
2.7.1 Within country persistence and productivity outcomes
In this section, I examine long-term within country outcomes along two dimensions.
An infant industry mechanism would predict that productivity increases as a result
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of temporary trade protection. If that is the case, then there should be persistence
in the location of activity. Furthermore, firm productivity should increase in post-
blockade spinning capacity.
Examining persistence in the location of spinning activity tests two somewhat
distinct forces. First, for a sufficient increase in productivity, follower regions should
survive increased competition from the frontier. In this setting, this translates into
asking whether Northern regions which scaled up capacity during the wars were able
to survive increased competition from Britain after the blockade ended. Second, as
was shown in the theoretical framework, for a sufficient increase in productivity,
follower regions can integrate. If firms in Southern regions along the border with
France went bankrupt as a result of increased competition during the blockade,
activity may not return to pre-blockade levels of production once the blockade ends,
if Northern regions become sufficiently productive to compete in these markets. A
return to pre-blockade levels of production would weaken persistence.
Taking the two forces together, finding persistence according to this mechanism is
reliant on sufficient productivity increases. From an empirical point of view however,
the fact that other mechanisms also generate persistence and higher productivity
in areas with a larger concentration of activity makes identification a challenge in
most settings. In particular, firms tend to locate in areas which are conducive to
a particular type of activity. As locational fundamentals such as geography change
slowly, if at all over time, disentangling lock-in effects from these types of locational
fundamentals is an important empirical challenge.
The setting of the post-blockade cotton spinning industry provides a rare op-
portunity to disentangle the two effects. My identification strategy relies on the
results established in the previous section showing that the post-blockade location
of mechanised cotton spinning was determined to a large extent by the historical ac-
cident of the Napoleonic Wars. This provides a source of exogenous variation in the
location of cotton spinning which makes it possible to identify persistence resulting
from lock-in effects and productivity as a function of the scale of the industry.
To examine the effect of the post-blockade location and size of mechanised cotton
spinning on persistence and productivity, I estimate the following equation
Yi(j)t = α + βSi(t−1) + γ
′
x+ ηi(j)t (2.6)
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where Yi(j)t is the departmental (i) or firm level (ij) outcome in 1840, Si(t−1) is a
measure of the size of mechanised cotton spinning at the departmental level in 1812
and x is a vector of controls. We are interested in understanding whether the size
of cotton spinning activity at the departmental level and the productivity of firms
in a given department are affected by the post-blockade size of the industry. The
worry is that Sj(t−1) is correlated with unobservable that make some locations more
attractive than others. Instrumenting the size of the post-blockade cotton spinning
sector with the trade cost shock defined in the previous section solves the endogeneity
problem as it only uses variation in the size of spinning activity determined by the
historical accident of the Napoleonic Wars. Validity of the instrument relies on the
trade cost shock being uncorrelated with unobservables which affect the location of
mechanised spinning and firm productivity.
To take these predictions to the data, I use firm level observations on cotton
spinning firms from the first industrial census of French firms which was conducted
in 1840.63 I measure the productivity of the firm as the log of the value of output
per employee. The size of cotton spinning activity at the departmental level is
measured by aggregating the firm level value of output up to the departmental
level. The size of mechanised cotton spinning at the departmental level after the
blockade is measured as the number of spindles in the department in 1812. Both
measures of the size of the industry are normalised by departmental population to
account for differences in the size of departments.
Table 2.12 contains the results from estimating the persistence in the location of
cotton spinning. Both the OLS and 2SLS results point to a strong, positive effect
of the post-blockade size of cotton spinning activity on the size of cotton spinning
30 years later. Columns (1) and (3) estimate the OLS and 2SLS effects using the
specification in equation 2.6 without controls, while columns (2) and (4) add a
number of controls measured at the departmental level. The estimated effects are
large; a one standard deviation increase in the size of mechanised cotton spinning in
1812 leads to a 0.75 standard deviation predicted increase in the value of production
in 1840.
Columns (2) and (4) add controls for a number of other drivers of persistence. In
particular, I control for two potentially important sources of location fundamentals
for cotton spinning; access to coal and fast flowing streams, and agglomeration
63Appendix A discusses this source in more detail.
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effects measured using log-population density and urbanisation rates, each defined
at the departmental level. I also add a measure of human capital. All controls are
measured at their pre-blockade level as contemporaneous values would arguably be
bad controls. Measurement error will attenuate the OLS estimates towards zero,
while positive omitted variable bias from the endogeneity of locational choice will
tend to bias the OLS estimates upwards. The 2SLS estimate is smaller than the
OLS estimate in the specification estimated without departmental controls, while
the opposite is true when controls are added. This is accounted for by the effect of
one observation (Haut-Rhin) which, when dropped, gives 2SLS estimates which are
consistently larger than the corresponding OLS estimates.
Table 2.13 contains the results from estimating the effects of the size of spin-
ning capacity at the end of the blockade on firm productivity in mechanised cotton
spinning 30 years later. Both the OLS and 2SLS results show that firms with
larger spinning capacity in 1812 have more productive firms 30 years down the line.
Columns (1) and (3) of Panel A contain the OLS and 2SLS estimates respectively
using only firm level controls, while Columns (2) and (4) add departmental controls.
The estimated effect is large and statistically significant, with the 2SLS estimates
being larger in size than the OLS estimates. The coefficient in column (4) implies
that a one standard deviation increase in spinning capacity per capita in 1812, leads
to a 1.3 standard deviation predicted increase in productivity in 1840.
The firm level controls are the size of the firm (proxied using the log of primary
materials used), the share of women and children in total labour employed and binary
indicators for whether the firm uses coal or water power. Departmental controls
include controls for urbanisation, log-population density and human capital.
Together, these results show that the trade cost shock had long term effects
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework that worked through the
increase in the size of spinning capacity. Despite having relatively similar conditions
prior to the Napoleonic Wars, regions of France diverged dramatically even after
peace was restored to the Continent. Consistent with learning externalities leading
to location lock-in, spinning activity in the South of France remained low despite the
fact that between 40% and 70% of French exports of cotton goods was destined for
Mediterranean markets after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Proximity to export
markets arguably gave firms an incentive to locate in these regions, but it seems the
forces of an established industry in the North outweighed these benefits.
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Given the tariffs in place on imports of cotton goods, one may wonder whether
the industry simply became sufficiently competitive to survive increased competition
on internal markets, but not necessarily competition at international prices. In the
next section I examine competitiveness at international prices using export data.
2.7.2 Competitiveness in export markets
In order to investigate whether some firms had become sufficiently productive to
compete at international prices, Figure 2.16 examines outcomes at international
prices. Panel A charts the evolution of the value of exports of cotton goods from
France at constant prices. The data are somewhat imperfect, as French trade statis-
tics did not differentiate between exports and re-exports until the mid-1820s and
the classification of goods often changes from one year to the next.
In Panel A, data is constructed conservatively with respect to the positive slope
of exports over time. Until the 1820s, French trade statistics did not differentiate
between exports and re-exports. Most exports prior to 1803 were likely to have
been re-exports, as France was a net importer of cotton goods at this time and not
competitive in yarn. This will understate the increase in exports after the Napoleonic
Wars, as I do not include re-exports in my measure once they have been separated.
Furthermore, I omit exports to French colonies, as these regions were a protected
market for French goods.
Exports of cotton goods increased sharply after the blockade ended in 1813, and
the upward trend continued well into the 1820s when my data ends. By 1828, 7.5%
of France’s exports were in cotton goods showing the increasing importance of the
sector in the French economy. As was the case at the end of the 18th century in
Britain, as the industry developed, cotton yarn itself began to be exported. For the
French, cotton yarn entered export statistics as a distinct category in 1822.64 Six
years later, the quantity exported had almost tripled.
It may be somewhat surprising that exports did not increase during the Napoleonic
wars as producers in the French Empire were scaling up production. There seem
to be two reasons for this. First, exports of cotton yarn were prohibited initially
as result of lobbying from the downstream sector. Second, high raw cotton prices
64The British first stated exporting yarn in 1794, by which time 8% of British exports were
made up of cotton goods. The French thus seem to have entered export markets in yarn when
their cotton industry was at a similar level of development.
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within the French Empire – a result of high trade costs and high import tariffs on
the raw cotton – rendered producers uncompetitive in export markets. Prefectural
reports claim that producers would be competitive in export markets if they had
access to raw cotton at the same price as the British. It seems that this was indeed
the case, as exports increased as soon as the blockade drew to a close in 1813 and
raw cotton prices returned to levels similar to those in Britain. The almost immedi-
ate increase in exports is all the more striking as the period coincided with invasion
by foreign troops and the dissolution of the Empire. The first disrupted production,
while the second led to prominent cotton spinning regions, such as the Belgian de-
partments, leaving the French Empire. Both factors would tend to decrease export
potential, while the decrease in trade costs as the blockade ended would tend to
promote exports to the extent that producers are competitive at free trade prices.
Panel A thus shows that some firms had become competitive at international
prices during the years of the Napoleonic Wars. Panel B examines whether the
dramatic lowering of tariffs later in the century affected exports of cotton goods.
Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) argue that trade protection should have an
asymmetric effect on exports when infant industry mechanisms are at work. In
particular, while the imposition of tariffs should increase exports, the removal of
tariffs should have no similar effect on exports if the firms are competitive at free
trade prices. Panel B shows that this is indeed the case. The Cobden-Chevalier
treaty, signed in 1860 by Britain and France, dramatically decreased tariffs on all
French imports, but this had no discernible effect on French exports of cotton goods.
2.7.3 Cross-country comparison
Was the adoption of mechanised cotton spinning and the emergence of a competitive
cotton sector simply a matter of time for Continental countries? Figure 2.17 shows
evidence to the contrary. As late as 1851, there were two countries, France and
Belgium – both part of the French Empire up to 1815 – that had a higher level
of cotton spinning activity than other countries. Figure 2.17 follows the evolution
of raw cotton usage per capita for various Continental European countries between
1830-50. Raw cotton measures the size of the industry as it is a raw input used
solely in the production of cotton yarn spinning.
The size of the industry across Europe in 1850, over 30 years after the end of
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the blockade was much smaller in all other countries. Note in particular Sweden,
Britain’s most consistent ally throughout the Napoleonic Wars and a key smuggling
centre for British products, which had no cotton spinning to speak of, even in
1850. Note also the time series for the Dutch, as well placed by their proximity
to Britain as Belgium and Northern-France to benefit from technology flows, but
less well protected during the Napoleonic Wars. The Dutch and Belgian regions
were in fact one country between 1815-1830 giving them an even closer source of
technology after 1815. With institutions that rivalled Britain’s, they are as close
to an ideal counterfactual as one could hope. The fact that they have a very small
cotton industry according to the data and in line with other historical evidence
(Mokyr, 1976), is strong evidence against the claim that technological catch-up was
inevitable.
Perhaps however France and Belgium were different to other Continental coun-
tries in the sense that they had an underlying latent comparative advantage in
cotton spinning, while other countries specialised in other sectors. Evidence com-
paring early and late industrialisers in Figure 2.18 suggests that in fact, developing
a sizeable cotton spinning sector was an event closely related to the timing of in-
dustrialisation in general. Panel A reproduces Figure 2.17 for two early and two
late industrialisers in Continental Europe; Belgium and France, and Germany and
the Netherlands. As can be seen, up to 1850, Belgium and France had larger cot-
ton spinning sectors than the other two countries. At this time, industrialisation in
the former was well under way, while it had not really started in the latter group.
By the end of the 19th century, when both Germany and the Netherlands were in-
dustrialising, their cotton spinning sectors had overtaken that of France and in the
case of Germany, also that of Belgium. What this suggests is that cotton spinning
was an industry in which most countries specialised at an early stage of structural
transformation in much the same way as 20th century developing countries initially
specialised in unskilled labour intensive textile manufacturing before moving into
more sophisticated goods. The takeaway is not that cotton caused industrialisation
in different countries, but rather that cotton spinning was common to the process
of industrialisation across Western Europe. What this means is that it was not the
case that France specialised in cotton and Germany specialised in another equally
important textile rendering the cross-country comparison in raw-cotton usage mean-
ingful.
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2.8 Conclusion
This chapter has documented a sequence of events which suggests that in some
settings, temporary trade protection can foster growth in some industries. The pre-
ceding analysis has shown that starting from a comparative disadvantage in cotton
yarn spinning vis-vis Britain, regions of the French Empire which became better
protected from trade with Britain during the Napoleonic Wars increased capacity in
mechanised cotton spinning to a larger extent than regions which received a smaller
trade cost shock. Consistent with infant industry models, the location of spinning
activity showed strong persistence over time, and regions which had higher post-
blockade capacity in spinning had more productive firms 30 years later. In line with
competitiveness at international prices, exports of cotton goods increased substan-
tially, and by 1830, 7.5% of France’s exports were in cotton goods. The results
from this chapter show that the infant-industry mechanism highlighted by a class of
models in endogenous growth theory (Krugman 1987, Lucas 1998, Matsuyama 1992
and Young 1991) can be empirically important.
What do the findings from this episode teach us about the effect of trade on
development more generally? An appealing aspect of this episode is the extent
to which it is general to the setting of structural transformation. For many of
today’s developed countries, unskilled-labour intensive textile manufacturing was
the first industry into which labour flowed from agriculture at the early stages of
industrialisation. The findings of this chapter suggest that market imperfections
which drive infant industry mechanisms may be at work in these types of settings.
This does not imply that trade policy will necessarily be an effective or desirable
tool when implemented by a policy-maker targeting specific sectors. One reason
why temporary protection may have had a large effect in France is that cotton yarn
spinning was a well-established industry with a sizeable downstream sector spread
widely across the Empire. Furthermore, many of the initial conditions which seem
to be important for modern manufacturing seem to have been in place across large
parts of the country prior to the Napoleonic Wars.
In the absence of these initial conditions, infant industry protection can turn out
to be a blunt tool. Recent evidence suggests that instead of “hard” interventions
(Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010) which distort prices to deal with market im-
perfections such as trade policy, “soft” industrial policies which deal directly with
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the market imperfection, while maintaining or increasing competition within a sector
can increase productivity (Aghion et al, 2012). However, this reasoning implicitly
assumes that policy-making is free from political capture, which, unfortunately, is
not always the case.
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2.A Tables
Table 2.1: Pre-treatment comparison of firm level variables
Low trade cost shock High trade cost shock Difference N
Spindles 2444.24 1007.65 -1436.59 304
(1051.13) (280.37) (1087.87)
Employees 75.96 47.54 -28.42 296
(15.40) (14.65) (21.25)
Capital labour ratio 25.11 30.52 5.41 294
(4.50) (3.82) (5.90)
Age 9.04 4.71 -4.34** 303
(1.86) (0.63) (1.96)
Quality yarn 39.37 45.66 6.30 208
(4.18) (3.67) (5.56)
Proportion mule jenny 0.38 0.40 0.02 304
(0.13) (0.13) (0.18)
Notes: Low and high trade cost shock are defined at the departmental level. A department is assigned to
one or the other group depending on whether their trade cost shock is above or below the median. Spindles
and employees is the number of spindles and workers employed at the firm level, the capital to labour ratio
is calculated (in levels) as the ratio of the two former variables, quality of yarn spun gives the maximum
count yarn spun by the firm (quality and fineness of yarn increases in its count). The capital labour ratio
has less observations than both spindles and employees because two firms report zero workers, and for
these, the variable is undefined. The observations for quality of yarn is low, because Belgian departments
report their quality numbers according to a different scale and these are dropped. The proportion of mule
jennys gives the proportion of mule jennys (high quality) to other types of machines (lower quality). Robust
standard errors clustered at the department in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
110
Table 2.2: Pre-treatment comparison of departmental level variables
Low trade cost shock High trade cost shock Difference N
Spindles 11.67 9.95 -1.72 88
(5.87) (2.82) (6.51)
Weaving 1.43 4.07 2.64 88
(0.68) (1.81) (1.93)
Historical cotton 0.023 0.031 0.008 70
(0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
Access to coal 5.25 5.53 0.28 88
(0.15) (0.24) (0.28)
Access to streams 1.24 1.88 0.64 88
(0.19) (0.49) (0.53)
Literacy 0.42 0.47 0.05 63
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Conscription rate 1.51 1.33 -0.18** 86
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Institutional change 1790.89 1790.43 -0.45 88
(0.71) (0.41) (0.82)
Urbanisation rate 0.07 0.08 0.01 66
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Population density 52.61 69.25 16.64** 88
(3.83) (5.94) (7.07)
Notes: Low and high trade cost shock are defined at the departmental level. A de-
partment is assigned to one or the other group depending on whether their trade cost
shock is above or below the median. Departmental variables: Spindles and Weaving
are the number of spindles and weaving frames per thousand inhabitants; Historical
cotton is a measure of historical cotton spinning at the departmental level. It is the
number of districts supplied by the given department per thousand inhabitants in 1789.
Access to coal is defined as the log transformation of the inverse distance to the nearest
coalfield; Access to fast-flowing streams is defined as the (log) departmental average of
mean water-flow rates; Literacy rate is defined as the proportion of men able to sign
their wedding certificate in 1786-90; Conscription rate is the number of conscripts per
thousand inhabitants in 1804-05; Institutional change is measured as the date of in-
corporation into the French Empire; Urbanisation is the share of population living in
cities with more than 5000 inhabitants; Population density is defined as inhabitants per
square km. Further details on variables and their definition can be found in Appendix
A. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.4: Binary DD using the median trade cost
shock as a cutoff (measure 1)
Depvar Spindles Pre-war Post-war Difference
Large shock 9.95 51.73 41.78***
(2.82) (12.15) (10.42)
Small shock 11.67 18.92 7.25*
(5.87) (7.31) (3.62)
Difference -1.72 32.81** 34.53***
(6.51) (14.18) (11.00)
Notes: Dependent variable is spindles per thousand inhabi-
tants. The sample is split in two at the median trade cost
shock and this gives the definition for large and small trade
cost shock. Robust standard errors clustered at the depart-
mental level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.5: DD using the median trade cost shock as
a cutoff (measure 2)
Depvar Spindles Pre-war Post-war Difference
Large shock 10.39 52.53 42.13***
(2.80) ( 12.17) (10.40)
Small shock 11.22 18.12 6.90*
(5.88) (7.35) ( 3.57)
Difference -0.83 34.40** 35.23***
(6.51) (14.14) (10.97)
Notes: Dependent variable is spindles per thousand inhabi-
tants. The sample is split in two at the median trade cost
shock and this gives the definition for large and small trade
cost shock. Robust standard errors clustered at the depart-
mental level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: Poisson fixed effects and OLS with log-specification
Trade cost measure 1 Trade cost measure 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DepVar Spindles Poisson OLS Poisson OLS
Trade cost (meas. 1) 0.495** 0.557***
(0.214) (0.189)
Trade cost (meas. 2) 1.039*** 1.220***
(0.319) (0.259)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.254 0.323
Number of departments 88 88 88 88
Notes: Dependent variable in the Poisson fixed effects specification (Columns (1) and
(3)) is spindles per thousand inhabitants. In the log specification it is ln(1+spindles
per thousand inhabitants). Columns (1) - (2) use the shortest route algorithm to
measure trade costs between London and the department (measure 1), Columns (3)-(4)
use weighted distance to measure the same. Robust standard errors clustered at the
department in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.7: Falsification test using wool and leather
Tannery Wool spinning Mechanised cotton spinning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar Pits Pits Labour Labour Labour Labour
Trade cost (meas 1) 0.279 -2.228 0.930**
(0.215) (2.919) (0.390)
Trade cost (meas 2) 0.592 -4.85 1.880***
(0.420) (5.334) (0.608)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 122 122 152 152 176 176
R-squared 0.056 0.019 0.194 0.200 0.112 0.153
Number of dept 61 61 83 83 88 88
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) - (2) is pits per thousand inhabitants employed in leather
tanning (measure of capital), in columns (3)-(4) it is workers employed in woollen spinning and in columns
(5)-(6) it is workers employed in mechanised cotton spinning. Column (1), (3) and (5) use the shortest
route algorithm to measure trade costs between London and the department (measure 1), Columns (2), (4)
and (6) use weighted distance to measure the same. Robust standard errors clustered at the department
in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.9: Extensive vs intensive margin of firm level adjustment 1803-06
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spindles per thousand inhabs total ext int total ext int
Trade cost (measure 1) 7.962*** 6.843*** 1.119
(2.243) (1.815) (0.822)
Trade cost (measure 2) 14.08*** 11.87*** 2.207*
(3.398) (2.785) (1.286)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
R-squared 0.321 0.313 0.072 0.369 0.356 0.087
Number of dept 102 102 102 102 102 102
Notes: Dependent variable is spindles per thousand inhabitants. Columns (1)-(3) use the shortest route algo-
rithm to measure trade costs between London and the department (measure 1), Columns (4)-(6) use weighted
distance to measure the same. Columns (1) and (3) estimate the full effect of the trade cost shock shock for the
period 1803-06. Columns (2) and (4) use only the extensive margin of firm adjustment, while columns (3) and
(6) use only the intensive margin. Robust standard errors clustered at the departmental level in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.10: Pre-treatment trends on the extensive margin
Pre-treatment: 1794-1803 Napoleonic Wars: 1803-1812
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar Spindles
Trade cost 5.539* -0.372 -3.491 33.11*** 27.12*** 28.74***
(3.054) (3.625) (5.116) (9.775) (9.355) (8.654)
Streams -0.124 0.222 0.0379 -0.141
(0.436) (0.470) (0.0356) (0.146)
Coal -1.107 -1.829* -6.252 2.677
(1.131) (1.076) (3.905) (4.502)
Pop. density 17.96*** 18.20* 24.22 11.98
(5.786) (10.50) (14.70) (20.60)
Urbanisation -9.049 125.5
(21.35) (129.3)
Human cap. -2.028 55.92**
(6.055) (22.61)
Hist. cott. 64.29 499.9***
(47.46) (167.3)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176 176 118 176 176 118
R-squared 0.181 0.328 0.270 0.337 0.374 0.641
Number of dept 88 88 59 88 88 59
Notes: Dependent variable in all columns is the number of spindles per thousand inhabitants.
The trade cost shock is measured as the log change in the shortest route between London and
each department (measure 1). Controls are defined as follows (all controls interacted with the
post-treatment time indicator); Streams: log of the mean stream-flow of rivers in the department
(m3/s). Coal: log-proximity to coal. Histcott: a measure of the size of the cotton industry in the
department in 1789. Pop density: log of inhabitants per square kilometre. Urbanisation: the share
of population living in cities with above 5000 inhabitants. Human capital: the proportion of men
who are able to sign their wedding certificate. For data sources see Appendix A. Robust standard
errors clustered at the departmental level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.11: No differential effect on type of machine used by firms
(1) (2)
DepVar: Proportion MJ
Trade cost (measure 1) 0.0381
(0.0858)
Trade cost (measure 2) 0.0655
(0.133)
Time FE Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes
Observations 112 112
R-squared 0.083 0.084
Number of dept 56 56
Dependent variable is the proportion of mule jennies
used in the department as a ratio of all types of ma-
chines in use. Mule jennys spun finer, higher quality
yarn. Where the total number of machines in 1803
or 1812 was zero, and thus proportion is undefined,
the mean proportion of mule jennys in 1803 is used.
Column (1) uses the shortest route algorithm to mea-
sure trade costs between London and the department
(measure 1), Column (2) uses weighted distance to
measure the same Robust standard errors clustered at
the departmental level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.12: Persistence in the location of spinning activity, 1840
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depvar Output 1840 Output 1840 Output 1840 Output 1840
Spindles 1812 113.6*** 92.46*** 96.68** 134.2***
(24.45) (26.89) (40.16) (41.98)
Departmental controls X X
Observations 74 68 74 68
R-squared 0.464 0.663
First Stage Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depvar Spind 1812 Spind 1812 Output 1840 Output 1840
Trade cost shock 0.0436*** 0.0284*** 4.212 3.805***
(0.0146) (0.0101) (2.600) (1.408)
Departmental Controls X X
Observations 74 68 74 68
KP F-stat 3.74 5.57
R-squared 0.220 0.379 0.074 0.348
Notes: Output 1840 is defined as the value of output in cotton spinning (in francs) in the department
per thousand inhabitants at the time of the first industrial census in France (1839-47). Spindles
1812 is defined as the number of spindles per thousand inhabitants in 1812. Departmental controls:
Access to fast flowing streams, access to coal, literacy, urbanisation and log population density. The
instrument is the trade cost shock, measured as the log-change in effective distance to London during
the Napoleonic Wars (measure 1). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Productivity outcomes at the firm level, 1840
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depvar Prod. 1840 Prod. 1840 Prod. 1840 Prod. 1840
Spindles 1812 0.580*** 0.425* 1.811** 3.847**
(0.204) (0.213) (0.746) (1.629)
Firm controls X X X X
Departmental controls X X
Observations 492 439 492 439
Number of departments 37 34 37 34
R-squared 0.190 0.288
First Stage Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depvar Spind 1812 Spind 1812 Prod 1840 Prod 1840
Trade cost shock 0.0850* 0.0589** 0.154*** 0.227***
(0.0440) (0.0249) (0.0320) (0.0552)
Firm controls X X X X
Departmental controls X X
Number of departments 37 34 37 34
Observations 492 439 492 439
KP F-stat 8.85 7.86
R-squared 0.266 0.686 0.234 0.320
Notes: Prod. 1840 is defined as the log of the value of production per employee. The top
and bottom 1% of the productivity distribution has been trimmed. Spindles 1812 is defined as
the number of spindles in 1812 per thousand inhabitants at the departmental level. Firm level
controls: share of women and children employed in the firm (separately), binary indicators for
whether the firm uses steam or water-power, firm size proxied by the log of the value of primary
materials. Departmental controls: literacy, urbanisation rate and log population density. The
instrument is the trade cost shock, measured as the log-change in effective distance to London
during the Napoleonic Wars (measure 1). Robust standard errors clustered at the departmental
level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.14: Robustness to multiple imputation
(1) (2)
Spindles per thous inhabs m = 5 imputations m = 50 imputations
Trade cost shock 33.09*** 33.24***
(9.780) (9.758)
Time FE Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes
Observations 176 176
Number of dept 88 88
Notes: The table examines robustness to multiple imputation. Depvar is spindles
per thousand inhabitants across all columns, Column (1) estimates the baseline
specification for m = 5 imputations, Column (2) replicates the regressions for
m = 50 imputations. Robust standard errors clustered at the departmental level in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.B Figures
Figure 2.1: An early spinning jenny
Source: Engraving by T. E. Nicholson (1835)
Figure 2.2: Political map of Europe, 1812
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Figure 2.3: Real price of yarn in Britain, Harley (1998)
Real price of cotton yarn in Britain. Mechanisation decreased price of finer (higher count) yarns
disproportionately. For data sources see Harley (1998).
Figure 2.4: Price of different count cotton yarn in Paris and London, 1806-07
Price of machine-spun cotton yarn in Britain and France in francs by count. Finer yarn has higher
count. See Appendix A for details on sources.
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(a) Port usage, 1802
(b) Port usage, 1809
Figure 2.5: Intensity of port use in trade with the British, Lloyd’s List
Each circle is proportionate in size to the number of ships sailing between Britain and the given port
in the years 1802 and 1809. The former is the last year of peace and relatively free trade between
Britain and the Continent, 1809 is a year during the Continental Blockade. Panel B shows the name
of the main ports which the British used as smuggling centres during the Blockade: Gothenburg,
, Gibraltar and Malta. Data are from the Lloyds List.
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(a) British shipping with Northern Eu-
rope
(b) British shipping with Southern Eu-
rope
(c) British shipping with France
Figure 2.6: British shipping with European regions as share of total, 1787-1814
(Lloyd’s List)
Figure 2.6 shows time series evidence on shipping between Britain and a given region as a share of
total European shipping with Britain in order to understand regional variation in the effectiveness
of the Blockade. For each year, the shares across the three subfigures add up to 1. The first grey
line denotes the onset of the Napoleonic Wars in 1803, the second grey line indicates the onset of
the Napoleonic Blockade in 1806 and the third grey line indicates the end of the Napoleonic Wars
in 1813. Data from Lloyd’s List.
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(a) Exports of British merchandise and other produce
(b) Exports of British cotton cloth and cotton yarn
Figure 2.7: British exports, thousands of pounds
Panel A gives total value of exports (ex-cluding re-exports) to North-Western and Southern mar-
kets. The former comprises of Russia, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, Prussia, Germany (including
), Holland, Belgium and France, the latter comprises Portugal, Madeira and Azores, Spain, The
Canary Islands and Baleares, Gibrlatar, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Malta and the Turkish Empire.
Panel B gives total value of cotton cloth and cotton yarn exports. Data source: Crouzet (1987).
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Figure 2.8: Traffic up-river and down-river from Strasbourg
Quantity transported up- and down-river along the Rhine from Strasbourg. Consistent with South-
North smuggling, down-river transportation along the Rhine increased during the Napoleonic
Blockade. Down-river transport was constant. Data source: Ellis (1981).
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(a) Shortest route algorithm (Measure 1)
(b) Weighted distance (Measure 2)
Figure 2.9: Two measures of the trade cost shock
Measure 1 uses a shortest route algorithm to calculate the trade cost shock for each department.
Measure 2 calculates the trade cost shock in the following way. Pre-war distance is simple Euclidean
distance to London. Distance to Britain during the wars is calculated as the weighted Euclidean
distance between each department and smuggling centres. Smuggling centres are identified as ports
to which shipping increased during the wars and where shipping exceeded 80 yearly shipments. The
weights are the share of a given smuggling centre in total smuggling. The log-difference between
the two gives the shock. See text for details.
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(a) Size of cotton industry pc, 1789 (b) Capital pc in mechanised spinning, 1803
(c) Capital pc in mechanised spinning, 1812 (d) Output pc in mechanised spinning, 1840
Figure 2.10: Evolution of the location of cotton spinning within the borders of ancien
regime France, 1789-1840
The figure tracks the spatial distribution of the cotton spinning industry over time. Circles are
proportionate within, but not across panels. The first row follows the evolution of cotton spinning
up to the start of the Napoleonic Wars. In Panel A, each circle is proportionate to the size of the
cotton industry at the departmental level, normalised by population. The data are from Daudin
(2010). The localised nature of the production process implies that this is a good measure of where
traditional cotton handspinning was located. Panel B depicts spindles per capita in 1803, before
the Napoleonic Wars, Panel C shows the same for 1812, towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars.
Data source: See appendix A. Panel D shows the value of output per capita in cotton spinning in
1840 in francs. Data source: Chanut et al. (2000)
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(a) Number of spindles per capita by department, 1803
(b) Number of spindles per capita by department, 1812
Figure 2.11: Variation used: short-run regressions
Each circle gives the number of spindles per thousand inhabitants by department at the beginning
(1803) and towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1812) for the French Empire. Data sources
are discussed in Appendix A.
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(a) Mechanised cotton spinning
(b) Woollen spinning
(c) Leather tanning
Figure 2.12: Change in production capacity vs trade cost shock
Each scatterplot depicts change in production capacity per thousand inhabitants vs. the log trade
cost shock measured as the change in effective distance between the department and London
(measure 1). Mechanised cotton spinning production capacity measured as spindles per thousand
inhabitants. Woollen spinning production capacity measured as labour employed in woollen spin-
ning per thousand inhabitants. Leather tanning production capacity measured as tanning pits per
thousand inhabitants. For data sources, see Appendix A.
131
(a) Levantine cotton (b) Brazilian cotton
(c) Colonial cotton (d) US cotton
Figure 2.13: Price of raw cotton in northern and southern regions of the French
Empire
Prices are from “Journal du Commerce”. Prices are given in francs per kilogramme for a given day
in a given city for a given variety. Within each category of cotton, the exact variety of cotton was
matched for a southern and northern location within a short interval of time (within a few days
to within a month) for the best comparability possible. Northern cities are: Anvers, Lille, Rouen,
Paris, Havre or Gand. Southern cities are Bordeaux, Marseille, Toulouse, Lyon and Bayonne. For
Levantine cotton, it was possible to match Marseille to a northern city for each year. See Appendix
A for a more detailed description of the data.
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(a) Proximity to coal (b) Access to fast-flowing streams
(c) Weaving frames per capita (d) Population density
Figure 2.14: Spatial distribution of potential confounders
Access to coal uses the Fernihough-O’Rourke (2014) dataset. To calculate the departmental dat-
apoint I use the minimum distance to any of Europe’s major coalfields from the capital of each
department. Where data for the capital is not available, I use the closest city from the dataset.
This distance is transformed into a proximity measure using the authors’ measure. The mean flow
rates across the French Empire are calculated using the average monthly flow-rate (m3/s) for each
station across the historical boundaries of the French Empire. The mean for each department is
then calculated, and the natural log of this mean gives the mean-flow rate for each department.
Results are robust to assigning zeros for the mean flow rates in departments with no observations,
or assigning a missing value. Weaving frames measure the size of the downstream sector at its 1803
level (pre-Napoleonic Wars). Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometre
according to departmental population in 1811. See Appendix A for details.
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(a) Date of annexation to French Empire (b) Literacy rate, 1789
Figure 2.15: Spatial distribution of potential confounders
Panel A shows the spatial distribution of annexation to the French Empire, which is used to
measure institutional change. For departments of ancien regime France, the date is taken to be
1789. Literacy data is only available for departments of ancien regime France. It is measured as
the proportion of males able to sign their wedding certificate. See Appendix A for details and data
sources.
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(a) French exports of cotton goods, 1798-1828
(b) French exports of cotton goods, 1850-1880
Figure 2.16: French exports of cotton goods, millions of 1820 francs
Panel A displays the time series of French exports of cotton goods in millions of 1820 francs for
the period 1800-1828. Panel B displays the same for the period 1850-1880. The grey line in Panel
B indicates the signing of the Cobden-Chevalier treaty which dramatically reduced tariffs between
Britain and France. Note that the source for the tade statistics in the two periods are not the
same. Wholesale price deflator from Mitchell (2007). See Appendix A for data sources and variable
definitions.
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Figure 2.17: Raw cotton usage per capita
Imports of raw cotton per capita for the period 1830-1850. Imports of raw cotton measure the size
of the domestic cotton spinning industry as this is the key input used in the production. There is
no other use for raw cotton besides as an input in cotton spinning. Data source: Mitchell (2007).
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(a) Raw cotton usage per capita, 1830-1850
(b) Raw cotton usage per capita, 1890-1910
Figure 2.18: Importance of cotton for early and late industrialisers in Europe
The two panels compare the size of the cotton industry in four countries at different points in time
during the 19th century. France and Belgium were early industrialisers, while the Netherlands and
Germany were late industrialisers. Data source: Mitchell (2007).
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Figure 2.19: Change in log capital-labour ratio in mechanised spinning vs trade cost
shock
Change in capital-labour ratio is the log change in the ratio of spindles to workers between 1803-
12. The trade cost shock is calculated based on the shortest route algorithm (measure 1). The
estimated elasticity is -0.09, (se: 0.24).
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Chapter 3
Inter-Industry Linkages: The
Indirect Effects of the Napoleonic
Blockade
3.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the idea that specialisation patterns
across countries display some level of indeterminacy. In an influential paper, Haus-
mann et al. (2007) have shown that countries that have a revealed comparative
advantage in goods which closely resemble the mix of goods that rich countries tend
to export grow faster than countries which are similar in terms of observables, but
happen to produce more typical "poor country goods". The authors claim that this
finding, to the extent that it is not driven by unobservable fundamentals, is consis-
tent with a world in which indeterminacy in specialisation is empirically important.
Theoretically, a variety of models deliver predictions in which fundamentals do
not uniquely pin down specialisation patterns across space.1 In the case of inter-
industry knowledge spillovers for example, specialising in a given product will, all
else equal, increase productivity in technologically similar products. In this way, a
region which specialises in a specific industry will become a more attractive location
for other industries which are technologically similar. The scope for large effects on
specialisation crucially depends on the existence of strong inter-industry linkages.2
These linkages are generally hard to estimate, as a host of confounding factors makes
1The indeterminacy can be driven by production externalities as in Lucas (1988), Matsuyama
(1992), Krugman (1987) and Young (1991), coordination failures as in Rodrik (1996) or Rodríguez-
Clare (1995) or new-economic geography mechanisms discussed in Fujita, Krugman and Venables
(2001).
2As Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) point out, inter-industry linkages are an example of
a case in which a country need not have a latent comparative advantage for policy intervention to
potentially be welfare improving.
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disentangling the different forces at work notoriously difficult.
The previous chapter established that regions which received a larger shock to
their costs of trading with Britain increased capacity in mechanised cotton spinning
to a much larger extent than regions which remained more exposed to trade. I also
found that the trade cost shock affected where mechanised cotton spinning located
in the long-run. In this chapter, I exploit exogenous variation in the location of the
first modern sector in France, mechanised cotton spinning, to assess the strength
and importance of inter-industry linkages.
I examine the importance of horizontal linkages, that is linkages between firms
producing similar products. In particular, I examine the co-location of firms which
produced yarn using different types of fibres (wool, linen cotton and silk). I find
that spinning sectors which were technologically more proximate to cotton spinning
(flax and wool) co-located with cotton, while the same does not hold for sectors
which were technologically more distant (silk).
In the empirical analysis, I examine the extent to which the post-blockade loca-
tion of mechanised cotton spinning (in 1812) had an effect on where other spinning
industries located in 1840 and 1860. I address endogeneity in the location of mecha-
nised cotton spinning, by using only variation caused by the trade cost shock during
the Napoleonic Blockade. This will identify the effect of horizontal linkages to the
extent that the trade cost shock is uncorrelated with other, unobserved determinants
of spinners’ location decisions.
Marshall (1920) argued that firms may choose to coagglomerate for a variety of
reasons. In particular, there could be gains from thick labour markets, input-output
linkages, or technology spillovers. In my setting, I find that co-location does not
seem to be driven by input-output linkages. I find no effect on machine builders,
who supply firms with inputs, and no effect on downstream weaving either. Despite
the fact that I measure proximity based on technological distance, it does not seem
to be possible, based on this evidence alone, to differentiate between labour market
pooling and technology spillovers.
Similarly to the development experience of other countries, textiles played a
dominant role in the initial stages of France’s structural transformation. During the
period I examine in this chapter, textiles accounted for up to 60% of France’s manu-
facturing employment. Besides the importance of the sector to France’s economy at
the time, a number of factors make this setting ideal for testing horizontal linkages.
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First, the location of mechanised cotton spinning was determined to a large
extent by the historical accident of the Napoleonic Blockade. In the previous chap-
ter, I showed that as a consequence of the blockade against British trade, regions
of France were differentially affected by the increased costs of trading with Britain.
Regions which received a larger shock to their costs of trading with Britain increased
capacity in the new technology, mechanised cotton spinning, to a larger extent than
regions which remained more exposed to trade with the British. The differential
shock to trade costs thus drives the plausibly exogenous variation in the location of
mechanised cotton spinning activity.
Second, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) coincided
with the start of the Industrial Revolution in Britain. While changes in the British
economy were not limited to cotton spinning at the time, other industries, particu-
larly in textiles, developed mechanised production methods with a significant time
lag. In fact, mechanisation of different parts of the textile industry took the best
part of a century. My identification strategy relies on the fact that while the trade
cost shock affected the location of mechanised cotton spinning, it did not have a
similar effect on other textiles, nor the upstream and downstream sectors, simply
because the technology was not available at the time.
In fact, mechanisation of production methods in the horizontal sectors (wool,
flax and “waste-silk” spinning) lagged developments in cotton spinning by decades
for reasons inherent to the nature of the different fibres. Mechanising downstream
weaving took even longer. This aspect of the setting gives credibility to my iden-
tifying assumption, which requires all effects of the trade cost shock relevant to
mechanisation in textiles to be channelled through mechanised cotton spinning.
Third, I am able to use cross-industry variation in the extent to which different
fibres were amenable to mechanisation as an additional source of exogenous vari-
ation. I focus on four fibres; cotton, wool, flax and silk, which accounted for the
vast majority of textiles employment at the time in France. Cotton is a flexible and
versatile fibre, meaning that it was the easiest to mechanise both for the spinning
of yarn and the weaving of cotton. Once production in cotton spinning had been
mechanised, efforts were under way to adapt the spinning machinery for use with
other fibres. However, both wool and flax are less flexible. For this reason, early
generation machines were more likely to break the fibres, moreover, a number of
bottlenecks in the preparation of the fibre needed to be overcome for mechanisation
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in spinning to be more efficient than hand-spinning. Silk is a very different textile.
It is not spun, rather it is thrown using machinery which is completely specific to
silk. For this reason, technological developments in silk followed a different path.
Only “waste-silk”, that is silk that cannot be thrown, is spun using a technology
similar to that of cotton spinning.
To quantify the technological proximity of these different industries, I construct
a novel measure based on the co-citation of patents from Britain. To this end, I
collected data on the 385 patents that were filed for inventions in textile spinning
between 1617-1852 from Woodcroft (1854). Consistent with the historical evidence,
this measure of technological proximity also confirms that wool and flax were tech-
nologically more proximate to cotton spinning than silk. This pattern also manifests
itself in the French data that I work with, as cotton, wool and flax spinning were
more reliant on inanimate sources of power than silk-spinning.
Fourth, the fact that mechanisation of the textile industry was developed almost
exclusively in Britain implies that the timing of innovations was more or less exoge-
nous to events in the French economy. French firms adopted new inventions, for the
most part, from Britain. Finally, different parts of the production process, notably
spinning and weaving were not integrated within a firm for the vast majority of firms
in my dataset. The same is true for the different fibres, meaning that I am able to
examine inter-industry linkages outside the boundaries of the firm. Moreover, I can
separately examine effects on spinning and downstream weaving.
Data on density in mechanised cotton spinning at the end of the blockade, mea-
sured as the number of mechanised spindles per capita across French departments,
comes from handwritten prefectural reports on the cotton spinning industry intro-
duced in previous chapters. My outcome variables of interest are measures of the
size of economic activity in different textile sectors as measured in industrial cen-
suses in 1840 and 1860. These data were collected and compiled by Chanut et al.
(2000). Finally, the instrument, the size of the trade cost shock, is measured as the
log-change in effective distance to London before and during the blockade.
I find strong support for sizeable inter-industry linkages in the case of wool and
flax spinning, two technologically proximate sectors, while the same is not observed
in the case of silk, where shared technology was significantly lower. Interestingly,
the OLS and 2SLS estimates yield very different results. While the OLS results
show a small, positive (negative) and generally statistically insignificant effect of
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mechanised cotton spinning at the end of the blockade on the value of departmental
output per capita in wool and flax (silk) spinning, the 2SLS results are markedly
different. Higher mechanised cotton spinning capacity leads to significantly higher
output in wool and flax spinning both in 1840 and 1860.
The effects are sizeable and statistically significant across specifications; a one
standard deviation increase in mechanised cotton spinning in 1812 increases the
value of output per capita in 1840 in woollen spinning by about 0.6 standard devia-
tions, while for flax spinning the increase is about a standard deviation. The point
estimates are stable across time for a given industry. The estimated effect on silk is
negative, though it is generally not significant at conventional levels.
I subject the baseline results to a number of robustness checks. In particular, the
estimated effects are robust to the addition of potential confounders such as access
to fast-flowing streams and coal deposits, the level of urbanisation and a measure of
human capital. In the case of woollens, I conduct a placebo test and find no effect
on the location of employment in woollen hand-spinning in 1792 and 1810.
I next turn to examining what may be the driver of coagglomeration. The
results would be consistent with wool and flax spinners co-locating with cotton, if
they were able to share inputs (machines). It could also be driven by mechanisms
working through the downstream industry. Spinners may co-locate simply because
their respective downstream sectors have coagglomerated. By looking at outcomes
in downstream weaving and upstream machine building, I explore the possibility
that horizontal co-location in spinning is driven indirectly by these forces. I find
support for neither of these mechanisms. Two mechanisms which are consistent with
my findings are technology spillovers in spinning or thick labour market effects.
The chapter has several links to the existing literature. The chapter is most
closely linked to Ellison et al. (2010) who examine the three Marshallian forces of
coagglomeration in a contemporary setting. The authors find evidence in support of
all three forces, though input-output linkages seem to be the strongest of the three.
This contrasts with my findings. However, this may well be because of the historical
contingencies specific to this setting. As mentioned, textiles was a hugely dominant
sector at the time in France. Moreover, weaving mechanised after spinning. It
is entirely possible, that the spinning industries co-located, and the input-output
linkage was weakened because of general equilibrium congestion forces. The findings
should therefore be interpreted as providing a setting in which technology spillovers
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or labour market effects can be relatively cleanly estimated, and not as evidence
that input-output linkages were not important.
The chapter is also related to a growing literature which examines the effect
of temporary shocks on the long-term spatial structure of the economy (Davis and
Weinstein, 2002 and 2008, Miguel and Roland, 2011, Redding et al. 2011, Bleakely
and Lin, 2012, Kline and Moretti, 2013 and Hanlon, 2014). Most papers in this lit-
erature generally take the city as their unit of analysis and examine how temporary,
large scale shocks affect the longer term growth trajectory of cities. As such, they
have relatively little to say about the importance of inter-industry linkages relative
to the importance of other agglomeration forces, which is the focus of this chapter.3
The chapter is structured as follows. In the following section, I present and
discuss the timing of various innovations in the textile industry throughout the
course of the 19th century. I discuss why adaptation of cotton spinning machines
took time and illustrate the type of bottlenecks which needed to be overcome. I
also introduce the measure of technological proximity used to quantify one potential
source of inter-industry linkages. I discuss data used in Section 3, while Section
4 introduces my empirical strategy and discusses the estimation results. The final
section concludes.
3.2 The textile industry
In this section, I examine the time-path of innovations in the textile industry. While
a number of key innovations dramatically changed production methods in cotton
spinning starting from around the 1760s, mechanisation in other parts of the pro-
duction process and in other textiles, took the best part of a century. For techno-
logical reasons, adapting the machines invented for cotton spinning to the spinning
of other fibres such as wool, linen and waste-silk, took a considerable amount of
time and effort. Moreover, there was substantial variation in the extent to which
the adapted technology was suitable for other fibres. The time-lag in mechanisation,
together with the inherent differences in the adaptability of different fibres forms
the basis of my identification strategy. Substantial time-lags in the mechanisation
3One exception in this respect is Kline and Moretti, 2013, who study the spatial effects of
a large scale infrastructure investment project from the mid-20th century US. Here the authors
differentiate between effects on manufacturing and agriculture, though by design, the paper does
not look at inter-industry linkages.
144
of downstream weaving - relative to upstream spinning - will allow me to separate
some input sharing reasons for coagglomeration from inter-industry linkages. In
what follows, I discuss each of these facts in turn.
3.2.1 Mechanisation in the textile industries
Cotton proved to be very amenable to mechanisation because of certain properties of
the fibre itself, most importantly its flexibility. Despite the technological similarities
in the production process for other fibres, inherent differences in the properties of
the fibre meant, first, that a number of adaptations needed to be made before the
machines could be used for producing the other textiles, and second, mechanisation
did not have such dramatic impacts on productivity in the other sectors.
Taken together, these two effects meant that mechanisation and the spread of
factory based production lagged the developments in cotton by decades. I focus on
innovation in the spinning of four fibres which accounted for the vast majority of
textile production at the time; cotton, wool, flax and silk. In all four industries the
main steps in production entail (1) preparing the fibre, (2) twisting the fibre into
yarn (called spinning for cotton, flax and wool and throwing for silk), (3) weaving
the yarn into cloth, and (4) finishing (dyeing or printing).
The breakthroughs in mechanising various parts of the production process first
took place in cotton. Starting in the 1760s, a number of macro-inventions mecha-
nised the spinning of cotton yarn in Britain. For centuries, spinners had imparted
twist to the fibre using a simple wheel. The spinning of a single thread required one
worker. With the advent of the first machine, Hargreave’s spinning jenny, spindles
now imparted the twist to the fibre, and a single machine could simultaneously spin
multiple threads. The productivity gain was large.4
The new machines radically transformed production methods in the industry.
Allen (2009) argues that mechanisation in cotton spinning had such a large impact
on the economy partly because it changed how manufacturing was organised. In
Britain, within a generation, factory based production replaced rural manufacturing
in cotton spinning. Rural industry had predominantly relied on the merchant to
organise the flow of work. Workers worked in their own home, mostly in agricultural
down-time for a piece-rate (Mokyr, 2009). As second- and third-generation machines
4Allen (2009) estimates that the very first spinning jenny reduced the cost of spinning from 7
to 2.33 shillings.
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were reliant on inanimate sources of power (water and steam), production needed
to be organised centrally, in factories.
In many respects, cotton was the least likely candidate for an industry destined
for a major technological breakthrough. Britain, and Europe in general was a relative
newcomer to this industry (Riello, 2013). Production, both in terms of total world
production of cotton cloth, and relative to the size of other textiles in Europe, was
small (Allen, 2009). Prior to mechanisation, manufacturers could not match Indian
cloth either in terms of quality or price. Moreover, Europe was completely reliant
on imports of raw cotton. The reason cotton mechanised first seems to have more
to do with properties of the fibre itself, namely that cotton led itself most easily to
mechanisation because of the relative flexibility and versatility of the fibre (Mokyr,
1994).
Following the enormous success of mechanisation in cotton, efforts were made to
mechanise production in the spinning of other fibres. Despite the apparent similarity
of the production processes, a number of problems needed to be overcome before
machine spinning became more cost-effective than handspinning for other fibres.
In general, the spinning machines themselves needed only slight modifications.
However it took time for inventors to establish precisely how the machines needed
to be tweaked. Machine-spinning good quality yarn required that the fibre be well-
prepared. Both flax and waste silk needed to be extensively prepared before machine
spinning. Until innovations improved productivity in these parts of the process,
mechanised spinning was unable to compete with hand-spinning. The other bottle-
neck which needed to be overcome thus related to the preparation of the fibre (called
carding for cottons and woollens, and heckling for flax). While seemingly trivial, in
the case of flax and waste silk, the fibre was sufficiently different to cotton that this
turned out to be a major obstacle which was not satisfactorily resolved for decades.
The challenges were first overcome in woollen spinning, where the necessary
changes were minimal. Short wool was carded in the same way as cotton, and the
longer wool was combed. Rollers for woollen spinning were placed further apart
(Mann, 1954). Jenkins (2003) estimates that mechanised woollen spinning fully
replaced hand-spinning in Britain in the 1820s, and the process was also complete
in Continental Europe by the 1840s.
The adaptations necessary to machine spin flax were more complicated. To begin
with, flax fibre consists of short filaments held together by a gummy substance which
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must be loosened before yarn can be spun. Second, to machine spin the finer yarns,
it turned out to be necessary to moisten the fibres both before and during spinning.
The innovations in wet-spinning and preparation were perfected during the 1830s
and mechanised spinning became more widespread on the Continent from about the
1840s (Solar, 2003).
Solar (2003) notes that mechanisation never had such a dramatic impact on
productivity in the linen industry because even once the machines had been adapted
to spinning flax, the productivity improvement vis-a-vis traditional hand-spinning
were not so large. The machines could not be run as fast as in cotton, because flax
broke more easily, moreover, the fibre needed much more preparation before it could
be machine-spun.
For silk, the manufacturing process is different to other fibres. The silk is first
unwound from the cocoon (reeling). The stage which corresponds most closely to
spinning in the sense that this is where the twist is imparted to the fibre is called
throwing. The spindles used for throwing silk are completely specific to the fibre
(Federico, 2009) and thus innovation followed a different trajectory. Richard (1954,
p. 311) quotes a contemporary who claimed that up to the 1820s, “no machinery in
Great Britain was so barbarous as that in the throwing trade.”
Some silk, however, is unreelable. These are the damaged cocoons which will not
unwind continuously, or the remains of cocoons. This material, known as “waste
silk” can be spun in a way similar to that of other fibres. Adaptation of machinery
to spinning waste silk, which needed modifications similar to that of flax, took the
longest amount of time and was not perfected until the end of the 19th century
(Richard, 1954).
3.2.2 Technological proximity to cotton spinning
The previous section described how machine spinning was adapted from cotton
spinning to first wool, then flax, and finally silk. The historical evidence, together
with the differences in timing suggest that different fibres were technologically more
or less proximate to cotton. In this section, I use Bennet Woodcroft’s (1857) patent
data on all patents filed in Britain between 1617-1852 and compiled by industry in
order to construct a measure of technological proximity.
The title of each patent gives a short description of the invention. For textile
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spinning, one detail that is often mentioned is the fibre or fibres that the invention
is suitable for. Similar to co-citation of patents in modern patent data, it is then
possible to construct a measure of technological proximity by looking at how often
a given fibre is cited together with cotton.
I use a narrow definition of co-citation in the sense that I only count patents
where cotton was cited with another fibre, and that fibre only. I do this in order to
avoid counting patents where the owner attempts to inflate the value of the patent
by claiming it to be suitable for spinning many different kinds of fibres. This is
relatively common in the data; about a third of patents filed claimed to be suitable
for spinning three or more fibres.5 By not including these in the co-citation count, I
narrow the focus to inventions where the focus is more tailored the specific properties
of a given fibre.
I define technological proximity as the total number of quality adjusted co-cited
patents relative to the sum of quality adjusted single-cited patents. I normalise by
the count of single-cited patents, that is patents where only a given fibre is cited,
to account for the fact that some textiles may be more patent intensive. I adjust
both the numerator and the denominator by a measure of patent quality using the
measure constructed and discussed by Nuvolari and Tartari (2011). The authors
utilise Bennet’s (1864) patent compilations which examine the number of times a
patent was cited in contemporaneous engineering literature and legal disputes. The
authors argue that these citations measure patent quality, as engineering literature
would discuss important innovations more frequently, while litigation should be more
intensive for economically more valuable patents. They also show that their measure
of patent quality is correlated with other, less complete, measures of the quality of
inventions.
Table 3.1 shows the results from examining data on the 385 patents that were
filed for spinning machines.6 A number of patterns emerge from examining the table.
First, it is apparent from the table that patenting was far more intensive for cotton
than other fibres, in line with cotton’s supremacy as technological leader among
other textiles. For each single-cited wool, flax or silk patent, there were roughly five
patents for cotton.
Second, the proximity measure is by far the highest for wool, followed by flax and
5Often, the patent will claim the machine is suitable for spinning all and any fibre.
6I use Woodcroft Bennet’s (1854) industry classification.
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silk. This is also consistent with the historical evidence discussed in the previous
section. Looking at the various components of the proximity measure also reveals
that both patent quantity and quality drive these results. Patent quality is by far
the lowest for the silk-cotton co-cited patents in line with the historical evidence that
machinery was relatively difficult to adapt to waste silk. The average quality in the
other groups was consistently higher. In terms of the raw quantities, co-citations
were highest for wool, followed by flax and finally silk, consistent with the proximity
measure.
In sum, given both the evidence from the historical literature together with the
evidence from patent co-citations, wool seems to be technologically most proximate
to cotton, followed by flax and waste silk. In the patent data it is not possible to
distinguish between technology for spinning waste silk as opposed to silk throwing, so
in this case, I rely solely on the qualitative evidence which argues that silk throwing
followed a completely different path.
3.2.3 Mechanising downstream weaving
The large productivity gains in spinning were not initially matched by similar im-
provements in weaving. Despite continuous efforts to mechanise weaving, the power
loom, which was also invented and improved upon in Britain, did not outperform the
traditional handloom until the 1830s, half a century after the first spinning jennies
appeared (Farnie, 2003). Similarly to spinning, the power loom was first successful
in mechanising weaving cottons, and it was then adapted to weaving wool, flax and
silk.
As with spinning, the flexibility of cotton made this fibre the most amenable to
mechanisation. For woollens, the fragility of the yarn meant that the shuttle could
not move faster than with the hand-loom. Hence the power loom only began to
replace the handloom in Britain in the 1840s. In flax, the inelasticity of the fibre
meant the thread would simply break in cases where cotton or wool would give. This
problem only started being tackled in the 1850s, meaning that there were relatively
few power looms in operation in linen prior to the 1850s (Mann, 1954).
Silk weaving followed a different path. The Jacquard-loom, invented in Lyon,
was one of the last major inventions to be made to the handloom (Mann, 1954).
Developed in France in 1801, it became possible to automate the weaving of elaborate
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designs using punch-cards. Though used for other fibres, it was designed for weaving
silk. It is estimated that in 1812, there were 11,000 in use in France. Use of the
power-loom was adapted from the cotton weaving technology with a lag similar to
that of wool and flax.
3.3 Data
In this section, I describe the data used to conduct the empirical analysis. I begin
with the outcome variables, which measure the density of various types of textile
manufacturing activity at the level of the département. I then describe the explana-
tory variable of interest, mechanised cotton spinning capacity at the end of the
Napoleonic Blockade, and the instrument which is the size of the trade cost shock
across French départements. I also summarise additional control variables used in
the empirical analysis.
3.3.1 Size of textile spinning across France
To measure the density of a particular manufacturing activity in a department, I
turn to data from two large industrial surveys conducted by the French government
in the 1840s and 1860s. These data, collected at the level of the firm, contain data
on, amongst other things, the value of output, employment and the type of power
used. They were compiled by Chanut et al. (2000) who have also rendered the
industrial classification consistent between the two surveys.
Table 3.2 reports employment levels and shares broken down both by production
process and type of fibre. Almost 60% of manufacturing employment is accounted
for by textiles in 1840 confirming the importance of this sector at the early stage
of France’s structural transformation. Textile manufacturing moderately expands
in levels between 1840 and 1860, however its share drops to 42% as manufacturing
outside of textiles expands far more rapidly. In terms of the different stages of the
production process, spinning and weaving account for the vast majority of employ-
ment. While spinning continues to expand in terms of employment levels between
the two points in time, weaving employment falls quite significantly. This could be
explained by the fact that mechanisation of weaving gathers momentum during the
middle of the 19th century according to historical accounts. Finally, one advantage
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of this dataset is that different parts of the production process, notably spinning
and weaving were generally not integrated within the firm which makes it possibly
to separately to identify effects on different parts of the value chain.
The bottom panel of Table 3.2 examines textiles manufacturing by type of fibre.
At both points in time, cotton accounted for the largest fraction of employment,
followed by wool and silk, which were of a similar size, and linen, which was signif-
icantly smaller. It should be emphasised that this marks a dramatic change from
the end of the 18th century. Chabert (1949) estimates production in 1788 as being
dominated by linen and wool, followed by silk, while cotton was a marginal industry
relative to the others. 7
Within textiles, the authors classified firms according to 16 activities which
broadly correspond to different parts of the production process and the fibre(s)
used. The sectors, their levels of employment and their usage of water and steam-
power across France in 1860 are reported in 3.3. Sectors are ordered from smallest
to largest according to their reliance on steam-power. Power intensity is defined
relative to the amount of labour employed.8
The energy intensity of these branches is one way of assessing the extent of mech-
anisation in 1860. Consistent with the historical and patent evidence reported in
Section 3.2, silk spinning appears to have lagged other textiles in terms of mech-
anisation. Silk spinning and reeling was far less steam-intensive than wool, linen
or cotton spinning. Wool spinning was more reliant on steam-power by a factor
of six, while in cotton and linen the differences grew to a factor of nine and ten
respectively. This finding is in line with Federico’s (2009) findings for Italy in the
early 20th century, who also finds mechanisation in silk to lag behind other textiles
using a similar measure of reliance on inanimate sources of power.9
A similar pattern is confirmed when looking at the reliance on water-power.
Cotton and woollen spinning are about three times as water-power intensive as silk
spinning. Linen spinning also seemed less reliant on water-power, it was only slightly
more water-power intensive than silk in 1860.10
7Chabert (1949) estimates the size of the industries in 1788 in France for textiles as follows (in
millions of francs); 1788: Linen and hemp: 235, Wool: 225, Silk: 130.8, Cotton: no number given.
8The pattern is similar for 1840.
9It should be noted that silk spinning is reported together with reeling. However, reeling is a
steam-power intensive process as steam is used when unwinding the silk from the cocoons. Federico
(2009) shows that when steam-intensity is calculated separately for reeling and spinning, spinning
becomes even less power-intensive.
10The fact that linen is far more reliant on steam than water-power may have to do with the
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One advantage of the dataset is that both in 1840 and in 1860, almost all firms
are engaged in one part of the production process for one particular fibre. It can be
readily seen from Table 3.2, that the vast majority of firms either spin, or weave,
only a small subset integrate the two within the firm. Similarly, Table 3.3 reveals
that most firms focus on one particular fibre, very few make different types of yarn or
cloth.11 This aspect of mid-19th century France allows me to exploit inter-industry
linkages in spinning outside of the firm. This feature of the dataset was also exploited
by Chanut et al. (2000), when they compiled the dataset. Beyond the 16 categories
reported within textiles, the authors also defined a finer, non-nested disaggregation
of textiles manufacturing activities. For spinning and weaving of different fibres,
they classified a subset of firms to be “pure” in the sense that they were engaged
in one activity for one fibre. As the interest of this chapter is in measuring inter-
industry linkages outside of the boundaries of the firm, I use this subset of the data
in my empirical analysis.12
The outcome variable of interest is the total value of output, yijt in department i
employing fibre j at time t. To account for the fact that departements vary in size,
I normalise by departmental population in 1811 using data from Chabert (1954). I
estimate the specification in levels because of the large number of zeros in the data.
For robustness checks, I use data defined in a similar way for weaving activity at the
departmental level. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the spatial variation in the location of
both spinning and weaving across France in 1840 and 1860 respectively, by fibre.
Across fibre types, spinning and weaving seem to have located in roughly similar
locations, despite the fact that most firms did not integrate the two activities. This
suggests that any inter-industry linkage in spinning may in fact be driven by the co-
location of downstream demand, an issue to which I return in the next section. Both
cotton spinning and weaving are concentrated across the North-Eastern departments
of the French Empire. This pattern is matched by woollens, though in this case, there
is also a smaller concentration of spinning activity in the Southern departments.
Linen spinning and weaving is concentrated in fewer departments in the North,
particularly along the Channel and near the Atlantic seaboard. By 1860, only
specifics of the production process. Recall that the fibre is soaked in hot alkaline solution both
before and during spinning, increasing its steam-power requirement all else equal.
11For cases in which firms spin or weave multiple fibres, the reason is that they are making a
blend.
12The only exception to this is for linens, where I use linen spinnig and weaving as classified by
Chanut et al. (2000), but not defined as pure.
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the northern linen spinners were active. Finally, silk spinning and weaving were
practised in only a few locations, almost exclusively in the South.
3.3.2 Density of cotton spinning in 1812
The question we are interested in is whether having higher density in mechanised
cotton spinning leads to higher density in other mechanised textile spinning activi-
ties. To this end, I use data on production capacity from 1812. In particular, I use
the number of mechanised spindles in 1812, normalised by departmental population
similarly to the way the outcome variables are defined. I use spinning capacity as
measured in 1812, as this was the time when cotton spinning had begun to mechanise
is France, while other textiles were still organised almost completely rurally.13
3.3.3 Trade cost shock
In the next section, I use the trade cost shock defined in the previous chapter as
an instrument for the density of cotton spinning in 1812. As I discuss in the next
section, there are a number of reasons to believe that the density of cotton spinning
will be endogenous to the determinants of mechanised textile spinning in other
industries. The trade cost shock is defined as the log-change in effective distance to
London at the level of the department during the Napoleonic Blockade, as discussed
in the previous chapter.
3.3.4 Other variables
To conduct robustness checks, I also use data on human capital as proxied by literacy
in 1787 from Furet and Ouzof (1982), access to coal from Fernihough and O’Rourke
(2014) data on access to fast-flowing streams from the European Water Archive,
and urbanisation artes from Bairoch et al. (1988). For woollens, it is also possible
to examine the location of hand-spinning in the late 18th and early 19th century,
which I do using industrial censuses from 1791 and 1812.
13This measure is introduced and extensively discussed in the previous chapter.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
The previous sections have used historical evidence, a technological proximity mea-
sure derived from British patent data, and observed differences in the use of inan-
imate power sources across French textile spinners to argue that 1) There were
important similarities in the technology necessary to mechanise production in tex-
tiles spinning, and 2) The extent to which adaptation of cotton spinning machinery
for different fibres was feasible and successful showed significant variation. In this
section, I turn to estimating the extent to which technological proximity led to
co-location.
My identification strategy relies on the significant time lag between the invention
and adoption of mechanised cotton spinning across France, and the adaptation and
adoption of similar machinery in other branches of textile spinning. The previous
section has shown that the time-lag was driven by a number of bottlenecks which
needed to be overcome before the technology became profitable for other fibres.
The overwhelming majority of these micro-inventions were developed in Britain and
adopted in France, implying that the timing of these developments was more or less
exogenous to internal conditions in the French economy.
I estimate the following equation to test for the strength of interindustry-linkages
across different branches of textile-spinning firms.
yijt = α+βsi+
∑
j
βjsidj+φsidt+
∑
j
φjsidtdj+δtdt+
∑
j
αjdj+
∑
j
γjdtdj+ijt (3.1)
yijt denotes the value of output per capita in department i in industry j at time t.
The sample is comprised of 75 departments, and I use data on the wool, linen and silk
spinning industry. I observe the data in 1840 and 1860. si denotes my measure of the
density of mechanised cotton spinning in 1812, which is the number of spindles per
capita. I estimate the effect of density in cotton spinning flexibly across industries
and time, meaning that there will be a separate coefficient for each industry-year
pair. dt and dj denote time and industry dummies. Equation 3.1 includes all main
effects and all double interactions. Absent additional controls which do not vary
at the industry-year level, this specification is equivalent to estimating each year-
industry coefficient separately.
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There are six parameters of interest corresponding to the six separate year-sector
effects we are interested in. Silk is the excluded sector in the regressions, so β will
capture the extent to which higher mechanised cotton spinning capacity in a given
department in 1812 increased density in silk spinning in the same department in
1840. All other coefficients of interest are sums of the effect on silk and corresponding
interaction terms. To simplify the interpretation, I also present the coefficients of
interest (each of the sums) in the regression tables along with the p-values from
the F-test that the sum of coefficients is indistinguishable from zero. The effects of
interest are standardised to aid the interpretation.
There are a number of reasons to believe that mechanised cotton spinning capac-
ity will be endogenous to where other textile industries are located. To the extent
that the different industries share the same locational fundamentals, we would expect
the coefficients estimated using OLS to be biased upwards. Similarly, to the extent
that there is regional specialisation in different spinning industries, we would expect
there to be negative omitted variable bias. Recall from Chapter 1, Table 1.11 that
in the early 19th century there was basically no coagglomeration between wool and
cotton spinning. Moreover, textiles accounts for between 40%-60% of manufacturing
employment, implying that general equilibrium dispersion forces may plausibly be
present, biasing the coefficient downwards.
In the previous chapter, I showed that the disruption to trade during the Napoleonic
Blockade against Britain meant that different regions of the French Empire received
a smaller or larger shock to their costs of trading with Britain. This trade-cost shock
had a sizeable, statistically significant effect on where mechanised cotton spinning
technology was adopted within the French Empire. I exploit this finding to argue
that the trade cost shock is a valid instrument for mechanised cotton spinning in
Equation 3.1.14 The identifying assumption requires that the trade cost shock be
uncorrelated with the error term in Equation 3.1. There are two channels via which
the identifying assumption may be violated in this context.
First, validity of the instrument assumes that the trade cost shock during the
Napoleonic Blockade had no other differential effect on the economy which then
affected the location of mechanisation in other textiles. In the previous chapter, I
demonstrated the plausibility of this assumption, by showing that the trade cost
14In fact, all interactions with the measure of cotton spinning capacity will be endogenous. I
instrument each interaction term with the trade cost shock’s interaction with the industry-time
dummy.
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shock had no statistically significant effect on employment in woollen hand-spinning
and capital in leather tanning. Both industries were less intensively traded with the
British, implying that, apart from general equilibrium effects of the trade cost shock
(working through factor prices for example), we should not expect to see regionally
differential effects for these industries. As the historical section demonstrated, tem-
porary protection could not have had similar, direct effects on technology adoption
in the spinning of other fibres, as these technologies were not available at the time.
The second channel via which validity of the instrument could be violated is
through unobservables correlated with the trade cost shock which affect adoption
of mechanisation differentially across France after the period of the Napoleonic
Blockade. For this reason, I will show that the results are robust to the addition of
various departmental controls which may be important for mechanisation. However,
one unobservable mechanism which could be problematic relates to the diffusion of
technology from Britain to France. As can be readily seen from Figure 3.1, the trade
cost shock decreased in intensity from the North-West to the South-East of France.
If technology diffusion follows a gravity equation (Keller, 2004), the trade cost shock
may simply be picking up the fact that northern parts of France had better access
to the new technologies being developed in Britain following the period after the
Napoleonic Blockade. This effect is less problematic in the context of 19th century
France as Britain went to extensive efforts to protect its intellectual property. Both
exports of machinery for textile spinning and the emigration of machine-makers
was banned, significantly dampening the importance that direct technology-import
could play.
3.4.1 Baseline Results
Table 3.4 contains the results from estimating Equation 3.1. I estimate increasingly
flexible specifications using both OLS and 2SLS. All specifications are estimated in
levels. To enable comparisons of the coefficients across different textiles, the bottom
half of the table reports the standardised coefficients for all the partial effects of
interest. I estimate robust standard errors clustered at the level of the department.
In columns (1) - (2), I estimate the average effect of density in mechanised cotton
spinning in 1812, on density in wool, flax and silk-spinning in 1840 and 1860. In
Columns (3) - (4), I allow the effect to differ across industries, while in Columns (5)
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- (6), I estimate a separate coefficient by industry - year. Silk in 1840 is the omitted
category.
A number of patterns emerge from examining Table 3.4. First, estimation using
OLS and 2SLS lead to fairly different results. The coefficients estimated using OLS
are consistently smaller in absolute value than the corresponding 2SLS estimates.
Moreover, almost no OLS coefficient is statistically significant at conventional levels
of significance, while the estimated 2SLS coefficients are large and generally statis-
tically significant. The most straightforward explanation for the difference between
OLS and 2SLS results is that endogeneity is driven mostly by attenuation bias in the
OLS results resulting from classical measurement error. Both negative and positive
coefficients shrink towards zero in the OLS estimates. However, the results could
also be driven by omitted variable bias. 15
In general, based on the 2SLS results, density in mechanised cotton spinning
seems to have a sizeable effect on where other mechanising textile industries located.
Moreover, the effect varies by fibre type. The average effect of mechanisation in
cotton spinning on subsequent mechanisation in other textiles is moderately large
and marginally significant at 10%. Given the variation in technological proximity
to cotton spinning across different fibres, it is interesting to see how the results
vary when we no longer restrict the effect to be the same across fibres. Based on
these results, the density of mechanisation in cotton in the early 19th century had
a large and statistically significant effect on the density of mechanisation in wool
and linen spinning (Columns (4) and (6)). A one standard deviation increase in
mechanised cotton spinning per-capita in 1812 increased output in woollen spinning
in the mid-19th century by 0.6 standard deviations, while in the case of linens, the
increase is slightly above one standard deviation. Estimating a separate coefficient
by industry-time does not change the significance or magnitude of the coefficients
much. The effect on woollen and flax spinning is of the same magnitude in both the
1840 and 1860 period.
The effect on silk-spinning is negative, though the estimated coefficient is not
generally significant. It should be noted however, that there are only a few silk
spinning departments, meaning that the coefficients are noisily estimated. The pat-
tern observed across industries is consistent with wool and flax being technologically
15If the main driver of endogeneity in the OLS regressions is OVB, the sign of the bias must be
industry specific as the estimated coefficients are negative for silk and positive for the other two
textiles.
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proximate to cotton, while waste-silk spinning was far less so. It should also be noted
that in the data, silk spinning is observed together with silk reeling and there is no
differentiation in the data between waste-silk spinning, which shared some technol-
ogy with cotton spinning and silk-throwing, the technology of which was completely
sector specific. It is not clear whether theory would predict a zero or negative effect
on industries with lower technological proximity. A negative effect is possible to
the extent that dispersion forces such as higher land rents, or higher wages make
regions with relatively high cotton spinning density relatively less attractive for silk
spinning firms. It may be somewhat surprising that the effect on flax is estimated
to be bigger than that on wool given that the latter fibre led itself more quickly
and more easily to mechanisation, though it is not possible to reject the hypothesis
that the two coefficients are equal. Nevertheless, to the extent that wool was indeed
more proximate to cotton, it could still be possible to get larger effects on the late-
comer industry (flax). If flax mechanised once wool had already mechanised, then
the effect captured by the density of mechanised cotton spinning could be working
through both the direct channel (cotton) and indirectly, through wool.
3.4.2 Robustness
Table 3.5 explores the robustness of the results to the addition of a number of
departmental controls. I examine the effect of the rate of urbanisation, measured
as the number of inhabitants in a department living in cities with more than 5,000
inhabitants in 1750 relative to departmental population. This measure controls for
potentially confounding agglomeration forces which may induce firms to locate close
to markets where the demand for final goods is large. Two important measures
of locational fundamentals are access to fast flowing streams and coalfields, which
serve as the main sources of power in the mid-19th century. Finally, I measure
human capital as the number of men able to sign their wedding certificates in 1786.
All controls are measured at their levels prior to the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) to
avoid the bad controls problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As these variables do
not vary by industry or time, but only at the level of the department, they only
affect the coefficient common to all industry-years, denoted as β in Equation 3.1.
Examining table 3.5 reveals that the point estimate of β changes only marginally
across specifications, moreover none of the aforementioned potential confounders is
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close to statistical significance.
Another potential confounder may be the historical location of spinning for a
given fibre. If regions which were specialised in woollens initially were more likely
to adopt the new technology, the results in Table 3.4 may simply be picking up this
effect, to the extent that historical location is correlated with the trade cost shock.
Fortunately, for the case of woollens, departmental level data from 1789 and 1812 are
available on the size of hand-spinning. Table 3.6 conducts a placebo test by asking
whether the location of mechanised cotton spinning in 1812 had a significant effect
on where employment in woollen hand-spinning was located in 1789 and 1812. The
estimated effect is generally small and always statistically indistinguishable from
zero across specifications.16
3.4.3 Understanding the mechanisms
A number of different mechanisms could drive the observed co-location of cotton,
wool and flax spinning. It is possible for example, that industries co-locate because
of up- and/or downstream linkages. Mechanisation in cotton spinning could have
attracted machine builders to co-locate, and this could then drive the location deci-
sions of other spinning sectors. Similarly, if downstream weaving firms used different
varieties of yarn or there are technology spillovers in downstream weaving, mech-
anising spinning firms may co-locate with cotton in order to be close to their own
downstream weaving.
To understand the potential importance of these mechanisms, Table 3.7 and 3.8
estimates the effect of density in mechanised cotton spinning in 1812 on the value of
per capita output in the different weaving sectors and the machine-building industry
respectively. Similarly to the spinning firms, I restrict the sample to firms which are
specialised in weaving one particular fibre in order to estimate the effects by fibre
type.17 Neither the OLS, nor the 2SLS coefficients are statistically distinguishable
from zero across specifications. The estimated coefficients are generally small, par-
ticularly for wool suggesting that the effect found for spinning is not being driven
16An alternative robustness check is to add the location of woollen spinning before mechanisation
in either year as a control when estimating the baseline effect on woollens. These robustness
checks yield very similar results in the sense that neither the significance, nor the magnitude of
the coefficient of interest is affected.
17Firms in which spinning and weaving are integrated made up only 1-2% of total employment
in this period, while firms specialised in only one fibre accounted for over 70% of all weaving firms.
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by the downstream sector locating close to cotton spinning.18
This may seem surprising given the relatively large transport costs at the time.
Recall however that, in general, mechanisation in weaving lagged that of spinning.
In the middle of the 19th century, mechanisation in weaving was far less advanced
than in spinning, meaning that most of the industry was still rurally organised.
Consistent with this explanation, for both wool and flax, the point estimate for the
later, 1860s period when mechanisation was more advanced, is somewhat larger. To
the extent that the post-blockade location of mechanised cotton spinning was having
some effect on weaving by 1860, the cleanest estimates of the direct, horizontal
linkage across spinning firms would be the ones from 1840.
The effects on the machine building industry show a similar pattern. As I am
not able to observe machine builders for spinning machines separately, I estimate
the effect on all machine builders. Recall however, that the vast majority of manu-
facturing employment is accounted for by textile manufacturing implying that the
sector overall will make up a large part of demand for machines. Examining the
results in Table 3.8, reveals that the value of output in machine building in 1840
and 1860 is positively correlated with the location of mechanised cotton spinning
activity in 1812. However, this relationship appears to be spurious, as the 2SLS
estimates are generally insignificant statistically, moreover the point estimates are
consistently very small across specifications. As Columns (5) and (6) show, part of
the upward bias in the OLS results is driven by urbanisation patterns. Urbanisa-
tion has a positive and significant effect on the size of machine building in both the
OLS and the 2SLS specifications. Moreover the point estimate on the size of cotton
spinning also reduces in size.
Taking these results together, it seems that the baseline effect of horizontal
linkages for wool and flax spinning are not being driven indirectly through mecha-
nised cotton spinning’s affect on upstream machine building or downstream weav-
ing. Given that the linkages between cotton, wool and flax are, according to the
evidence, horizontal, what can be said about the driving forces? There are at least
two mechanisms which would be consistent with these results. First, if there are
knowledge spillovers across firms in technologically more proximate industries, wool
and flax-spinning firms would have an incentive to co-locate close to mechanised
18For flax, the point estimates are somewhat larger, and they are also closer to statistical sig-
nificance. This suggests another reason why the estimated coefficient for flax-spinning is relatively
large as part of the effect may be coming through a small effect on weaving.
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cotton spinners in order to benefit from these externalities. Second, the effect could
work through the labour market. Wool and flax-spinners may choose to locate
close to cotton spinners to take advantage of a thicker labour market. With search
and matching frictions, a thicker labour market could provide better matches, or it
could insure against idiosyncratic shocks on both the demand and supply side. Both
knowledge spillovers and labour market pooling are mechanisms consistent with the
findings presented in this section.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the importance of inter-industry linkages by exploiting
a unique historical episode from 19th century France. I use plausibly exogenous
spatial variation in the location of the first modern industry in France, mechanised
cotton spinning, to examine the importance of inter-industry linkages in the textile
industry. My empirical strategy builds not only on the fact that the trade cost shock
resulting from the Napoleonic Blockade determined to a large extent the location of
France’s first modern industry, but also on the significant time lag between inventions
in mechanised cotton spinning and other textile industries. Together, these two facts
make up the main building blocks of my research design.
Using the trade cost shock as an instrument for the density of mechanised cotton
spinning in post-blockade France, I find support for the importance of inter-industry
linkages in technologically proximate sectors. In particular, I estimate the density
of mechanised cotton spinning to have a positive and significant effect on the value
of output per capita in technologically proximate woollen and flax spinning, but not
on silk-spinning which shared less technology with cotton. I show that these effects
are robust to the inclusion of potential confounders such as access to fast-flowing
streams and coal deposits, urbanisation and a measure of human capital. In the
case of wool, I also find no similar effect when I examine employment levels across
departments in hand-spinning in periods prior to mechanisation.
The other main contribution of the chapter is to disentangle the effect of a
number of potential mechanisms. In particular, input-sharing of machines and co-
location of downstream weaving do not seem to play an important role in driving the
co-agglomeration of wool, flax and cotton. The findings thus support mechanisms
where horizontal knowledge spillovers across firms, or labour market pooling led to
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wool and flax spinning firms locating close to cotton spinners.
It seems, at least in the context of 19th century France, that horizontal inter-
industry linkages played a role in shaping the distribution of textile activity across
space. While the setting described in this chapter is general to the process of struc-
tural transformation, the 19th century world economy is in many ways a different
environment to the one in which developing countries find themselves today. To
what extent would these results inform our understanding about the importance of
similar linkages in contemporary settings? It is important to note that French spin-
ning mechanised in a setting where rural hand-spinning was still practised. What
this meant was that mechanised wool and flax spinning were adopted in an economy
in which both upstream material supply was organised, and in which there was a
domestic downstream industry. Of course, in an open economy, the lack of domes-
tic supply and demand need not hinder the industry. Nonetheless, the extent to
which these results would hold in settings where industries are more isolated from
their upstream and downstream suppliers and markets is an interesting question for
future research.
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3.A Tables
Table 3.1: Technological proximity
Total Co-cited Total Single Avg. Quality Co-cited Avg. Quality Single Proximity
Wool 17 19 3.07 3.08 0.9
Flax 12 26 2.5 2.75 0.42
Silk 9 19 1.75 2.5 0.33
Cotton 94 2.74
Notes: Total Co-cited is the count of patent titles filed in Britain for textile spinning machines in which the name
of the given fibre appears together with cotton, and cotton only for the period 1617-1852, Total Single is the count
of titles in which the name of the given fibre appears without reference to other fibres. Avg. Quality Co-cited and
Avg. Quality Single reports the average quality of co-cited patents, and single-cited patents respectively. Proximity
is defined as the quality adjusted co-cited patents relative to the quality-adjusted single-cited patents. Patent titles
are from Woodcroft (1857), where I follow his classification of patents into industries. Patent quality is measured as
the number of citations in technical or engineering journals or legal proceedings as compiled by Woodcroft (1855)
and collected and discussed by Nuvolari and Tartari (2011). Note that the time coverage of Nuvolari and Tartari’s
data ends 10 years before Woodcroft’s patent titles, so data coverage between patent data and quality is not fully
consistent.
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Table 3.2: Textile employment shares in manufacturing 1840 - 1860
Employment Employment share
1840 1860 1840 1860
By production stage
Preparation 9310 6573 0.79 0.39
Spinning 156,246 214,274 13.21 12.57
Weaving 440,112 384,871 37.2 22.58
Spinning and Weaving 25,720 13,354 2.17 0.78
Finishing 51,982 77,143 4.39 4.53
Other 9,179 16,229 0.78 0.95
Total textiles 692,549 712,444 58.53 41.80
By type of fibre
Linen 49,938 44,656 4.22 2.62
Silk 166,573 96,033 14.09 5.63
Wool 124,258 137,945 10.50 8.09
Cotton 211,113 251,152 17.84 14.74
Mixed, Other or Unspecified 140,487 182,658 11.87 10.72
Total textiles 692,549 712,444 58.53 41.80
Notes: Employment columns report the level of employment in the different parts
of the production process and in different textiles for the years 1840 and 1860. Em-
ployment shares report the same relative to total employment in manufacturing.
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Table 3.3: Water and steam-power intensity in the textile industry, 1860
Employment Water-power intensity Steam-power intensity
Embroidery and Lace 27,826 0 0.05
Hosiery 37,812 0.02 0.53
Silk weaving 33,171 1.09 0.96
Linen weaving 18,712 0.52 1.34
Passementerie 15,102 0.24 1.50
Silk spinning and reeling 62,862 4.26 2.02
Wool weaving 75,937 4.40 2.70
Textiles other 4,143 4.25 3.50
Mixed or unspecified weaving 43,346 0.35 3.93
Cotton and cotton blend weaving 175,893 2.99 4.23
Wool spinning and weaving 9,046 14.21 5.16
Hemp 12,086 3.86 7.36
Mixed spinning 8,128 6.99 9.65
Wool spinning 46,389 13.13 12.93
Printing 18,273 0.60 13.39
Bleaching, dyeing and finishing 15,942 4.19 17.47
Spinning and weaving cotton 4,308 28.11 17.90
Carding, Fulling, Combing Wool 6,573 39.68 18.59
Cotton spinning 70,951 13.94 18.75
Linen spinning 25,944 5.29 22.82
Total 712,444
Notes: Sectoral breakdown as defined in Chanut et al. (2000) for the textile sector. Employment reports the level of
employment by sector in 1860. Water-power reports horse-power relative to one-hundred employees, steam-power is
similarly defined.
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Table 3.4: Baseline Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar Output_pc OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Spindles 25.94 68.84* -7.870 -70.13 -3.456* -28.37*
(23.69) (40.89) (5.776) (46.12) (1.882) (16.77)
Spindles x Wool 55.81 253.9** 18.54 143.9**
(43.51) (115.1) (23.03) (70.77)
Spindles x Linen 45.62 163.0** 20.61 73.01**
(29.04) (73.03) (12.47) (30.49)
Spindles X Time -8.828 -83.53
(8.275) (62.69)
Spindles x Wool x Time 74.53* 220.1**
(43.04) (112.3)
Spindles x Linen x Time 50.03 179.9**
(33.82) (88.81)
Industry FE X X X X
Time FE X X
Industry x Time FE X X
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450
Number of departments 75 75 75 75 75 75
min AP F-stat 7.13 7.07 6.98
R-squared 0.053 0.054 0.076
Partial effects - standardised coefficients
β 0.12 0.31* -0.06 -0.52 -0.09* -0.75*
(0.28) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) (0.07) (0.09)
β + φ -0.07 -0.61
(0.21) (0.14)
β + βwool 0.14 0.73** 0.08 0.63*
(0.27) (0.04) (0.51) (0.06)
β + φ+ βwool + φwool 0.19 0.58**
(0.22) (0.05)
β + βlinen 0.37 1.53** (0.43) 1.13**
(0.19) (0.04) (0.16) (0.02)
β + φ+ βlinen + φlinen 0.41 1.03**
(0.21) (0.05)
Notes: OLS and corresponding 2SLS estimates for increasingly flexible equations reported in the
top half of the table. Columns (1) - (2) estimate the cross industry linkage restricting the effect
to be the same across industries and years. Columns (3) - (4) allow the coefficient to differ across
industries, but not years. Columns (5) - (6) estimate separate industry-year coefficients. The bottom
half of the panel reports the standardised coefficients for each of the parameters corresponding to
Equation 3.1. The top half of the column reports standard errors clustered at the departmental
level in brackets, while the bottom half reports the p-values from the F-test for the null hypothesis
of the sum of coefficients being statistically indistinguishable from zero. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 3.5: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar Output_pc 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Spindles -28.37* -27.97 -27.99* -27.52 -40.45* -38.99
(16.77) (17.57) (16.75) (18.02) (23.89) (25.34)
Spindles x Wool 143.9** 143.9** 143.9** 143.9** 135.3** 135.3**
(70.77) (70.77) (70.77) (70.77) (65.08) (65.08)
Spindles x Linen 73.01** 73.01** 73.01** 73.01** 70.68** 70.68**
(30.49) (30.49) (30.49) (30.49) (28.79) (28.79)
Spindles x Time -83.53 -83.53 -83.53 -83.53 -85.45 -85.45
(62.69) (62.69) (62.69) (62.69) (62.48) (62.48)
Spindles x Linen x Time 179.9** 179.9** 179.9** 179.9** 176.7** 176.7**
(88.81) (88.81) (88.81) (88.81) (85.73) (85.73)
Spindles x Wool x Time 220.1** 220.1** 220.1** 220.1** 212.8** 212.8**
(112.3) (112.3) (112.3) (112.3) (107.0) (107.0)
Urbanisation -4.587 2.576
(15.41) (16.26)
Streams -0.180 -0.291
(0.447) (0.357)
Coal 0.207 0.631
(1.024) (0.908)
Literacy 6.061 7.003
(5.088) (5.208)
Industry FE X X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X X
Industry x Time FE X X X X X X
Observations 450 450 450 450 414 414
Number of departments 75 75 75 75 69 69
min AP F-stat 6.98 6.96 6.72 6.96 6.82 7.66
Notes: Columns (1) - (5) estimate Equation 3.1 and add potential confounders one at a time. Column
(6) includes all controls. Control variables are defines as follows. Streams: log of the mean stream-flow
of rivers in the department (m3/s). Coal: log-proximity to coal. Urbanisation: share of population
living in cities with above 5000 inhabitants. Literacy: proportion of men who are able to sign their
wedding certificate in 1786. Data availability constraints on this measure restrict the sample size to 69
departments. Standard errors clustered at the departmental level in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: Placebo for non-mechanised woollen spinning 1789-1810
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DepVar Employment_pc OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Spindles -0.0274 -0.00552 -0.0452 -0.0627
(0.0328) (0.0953) (0.0410) (0.121)
Spindles x Time 0.0170 -0.0261 0.0177 -0.0131
(0.0224) (0.0700) (0.0232) (0.0684)
Departmental controls X X
Time FE X X X X
Observations 141 141 125 125
Number of departments 75 75 66 66
min AP F-stat 6.86 7.55
R-squared 0.048 0.090
Partial effects - standardised coefficients
β -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 -0.16
(0.41) (0.95) (0.27) (0.61)
β + φ -0.06 -0.17 -0.15 -0.41
(0.44) (0.49) (0.24) (0.32)
Notes: Columns (1) - (4) estimate the effect of mechanised cotton spinning on the
density of employment in woollen hand-spinning for 1789 and 1810. Columns (1)
and (2) estimate Equation 3.1 for the case of a single industry using OLS and 2SLS
respectively. Columns (3) -(4) add urbanisation, literacy and access ot coal and fast
flowing streams as controls. The bottom half of the panel reports the standardised
coefficients for the effect of mechanised spinning capacity on employment in wool-
spinning in 1789 (β) and 1810 (β + φ) . The top half of the column reports robust
standard errors clustered at the departmental level in brackets, while the bottom half
reports the p-values from the F-test for the null hypothesis of the sum of coefficients
being statistically indistinguishable from zero. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.7: Effects on weaving
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DepVar Output_pc OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Spindles 347.5 -190.8 342.8 -214.3
(317.8) (196.3) (318.7) (204.2)
Spindles x Wool -363.4 221.4 -374.9 219.0
(320.9) (218.3) (331.7) (220.3)
Spindles x Linen -344.7 224.5 -354.2 228.7
(318.9) (205.3) (329.5) (209.8)
Spindles x Time -311.0 117.4 -319.6 121.2
(301.1) (176.1) (311.1) (181.6)
Spindles x Linen x Time 328.7 -111.8 338.1 -116.0
(299.5) (178.5) (309.4) (183.7)
Spindles x Wool x Time 370.8 -50.62 381.5 -60.55
(284.1) (188.9) (293.0) (193.6)
Literacy 2.658 11.42
(6.349) (7.470)
Streams 0.110 -0.0746
(0.763) (0.624)
Coal 2.593 3.054
(2.120) (2.641)
Urbanisation 23.81 55.90
(23.86) (56.75)
Industry FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Industry x Time FE X X X X
Observations 450 450 414 414
Number of departments 75 75 69 69
min AP F-stat 6.98 7.66
R-squared 0.141 0.158
Partial effects - standardised coefficients
β 0.45 -0.25 0.45 -0.28
(0.28) (0.33) (0.29) (0.29)
β + φ 0.21 -0.43 0.13 -0.54
(0.23) (0.17) (0.44) (0.15)
β + βwool -0.05 0.09 -0.10 0.01
(0.46) (0.66) (0.30) (0.95)
β + φ+ βwool + φwool 0.15 0.33 0.10 0.22
(0.35) (0.22) (0.60) (0.48)
β + βlinen 0.05 0.63 -0.21 0.27
(0.67) (0.12) (0.50) (0.75)
β + φ+ βlinen + φlinen 0.36 0.69 0.12 0.34
(0.25) (0.13) (0.77) (0.67)
Notes: The top half of the panel reports the OLS and corresponding 2SLS coef-
ficients for the effect of the emergence of mechanised cotton spinning on weaving
density across departments. Columns (1) - (2) estimate Equation 3.1 using OLS
and 2SLS respectively. Columns (3) - (4) add departmental controls. The bot-
tom half of the panel reports the standardised coefficients for each of the effects
of interest. The parameters correspond to those used in Equation 3.1. The top
half of the column reports standard errors clustered at the departmental level in
brackets, while the bottom half reports the p-values from the F-test for the null
hypothesis of the sum of coefficients being statistically indistinguishable from zero.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.B Figures
Figure 3.1: Trade cost shock
Measure 1 uses a shortest route algorithm to calculate the trade cost shock for each department.
The shock is defined as the log-change in effective distance to London before and during the
Napoleonic Blockade from each department. Pre-blockade distances are calculated using the un-
restricted shortest route, while routes are restricted to those open to trade with the British during
the blockade. Sea to land transportation is calibrated to match contemporary accounts of the
relative cost of sailing between Rouen and Marseille or taking an overland route. According to this
measure, one sea kilometre is approximately 0.15 land kilometres.
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(a) Cotton spinning, 1840 (b) Cotton weaving, 1840
(c) Wool spinning, 1840 (d) Wool weaving, 1840
(e) Linen spinning, 1840 (f) Linen weaving, 1840
(g) Silk spinning, 1840 (h) Silk weaving, 1840
Figure 3.2: Value of output per capita in 1840 by department, spinning and weaving
Data compiled by Chanut et al. (2000).
172
(a) Cotton spinning, 1860 (b) Cotton weaving, 1860
(c) Wool spinning, 1860 (d) Wool weaving, 1860
(e) Linen spinning, 1860 (f) Linen weaving, 1860
(g) Silk spinning, 1860 (h) Silk weaving, 1860
Figure 3.3: Value of output per capita in 1860 by department, spinning and weaving
Data compiled by Chanut et al. (2000).
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(a) 1789 (b) 1810
(c) 1840 (d) 1860
Figure 3.4: Employment shares for 1789-1860 by department, woollen spinning
Employment numbers for 1789 and 1810 from prefectural reports pertaining to number of workers
employed in hand-spinning. Employment numbers for 1840 and 1860 are from Chanut et al. (2000),
and these numbers report workers employed in mechanised woollen spinning firms.
(a) 1840 (b) 1860
Figure 3.5: Value of output per capita for 1840-1860 by department, machine build-
ing
Data compiled by Chanut et al. (2000).
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Appendix A
Data Description
A.A Variable definitions and sources
This section defines the variables used in the empirical analysis throughout the thesis
and provides the source from which they are constructed.
Shipping between Britain and Continental Europe
Data source: Lloyds List, 1787-1814, digitised by Google, made available by the
Hathi Trust
Each observation is a journey which took place between a port in Britain and a port
in Europe (excluding Ireland and Greenland).
Data on the cotton industry during the Napoleonic period
Data source: Champagny’s survey: AN/F12/1562-1564, “Enquetes industrielles”
1810-1818: AN/F12/1570-1590, AN/F12/1602
• Spinning capacity
The baseline measure of spinning capacity is the number of spindles, which
is the standard measure of physical capital in mechanised spinning. In all
regressions, I normalise by the departmental population. Data available for
1803, 1806 and 1812.
• Labour employed in mechanised spinning:
Labour employed in mechanised spinning in 1803, 1806 and 1812. In all regres-
sions, I normalise by the departmental population. In the empirical analysis,
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spindles is the preferred measure of production capacity as mechanisation sub-
stituted for labour. Using labour will therefore underestimate growth in the
sector. It is also more sensitive to measurement error from misclassified hand-
spinning.
• Type of machine used
Data in 1803, 1806 and 1812 differentiate between two types of machine used
for spinning; "mul-jennys" and "filatures continus". One has, on average, more
spindles than the other, and they were used for spinning either weft or warp.
Table 2.11 contains results on differential changes in the type of machine used
within a department.
• Weaving capacity
Weaving capacity is measured using the number of weaving frames by depart-
ment (per thousand inhabitants) in 1803, 1806 and 1812.
• Weaving employment
Labour employed in hand-loom weaving for 1803,1806 and 1812.
Data on the wool industry during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
period
Data source: 1792: AN/F12/1344-1348, 1810: AN/F12/1602
• Labour employed in spinning:
Labour employed in hand-spinning in 1792 and 1810. In all regressions, I
normalise by the departmental population. The absence of mechanisation
makes this the relevant measure of woollen spinning activity.
• Labour employed in weaving:
Labour employed in hand-loom weaving for 1792 and 1810.
• Weaving capacity
Weaving capacity is measured using the number of weaving frames per depart-
ment in 1792 and 1811.
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Data on leather tanning during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
period
Data source: 1792: AN/F12/1467-1472, 1811: AN/F12/1590-1600
• Tanning capacity
Capacity in tanning is measured as the number of pits in 1792 and 1811. In
the regressions, I normalise by departmental population.
• Employment
Labour employed in leather tanning for 1811.
Literacy rates
Data source: Furet and Ozouf (1982)
Literacy rates are calculated from departmental statistics which give the percentage
of males who could sign their marriage certificate between 1786-1790. The variable
takes on values between 0 and 1.
Conscription rates
Data source: Hargenvilliers (1937)
Departmental conscription rates are defined as the number of men conscripted dur-
ing the year 13 according to the French republican calendar (September 1, 1804 -
August 30, 1805) divided by total departmental population in 1811. This is the
last year for which detailed departmental statistics are available. Conscription was
supposed to be proportionate to the size of the population across departments. In
reality however, conscription rates differed somewhat. According to Forrest (1989),
conscription rates had significant persistence over time. Departments in which ful-
filling previous quotas had been easier were pushed harder in the following years.
By 1813, this was something that even the “Directeur general de la Conscription”
admitted, when he informed the prefect in Foix that the ability of an area to produce
soldiers and past records of recruitment were being used (Forrest, 1987 p. 41). For
this reason, conscription prior to our period of interest should be a reasonable proxy
for differences in labour supply shocks owing to differential conscription during the
Napoleonic Wars.
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Access to coal
Data source: Fernihough and O’Rourke (2014)
For each city in their dataset, the authors calculate minimum distance (km) from
any of Europe’s major coalfields using Chatel and Dollfus (1931) for data on the
location of coalfields. Cities located within a coalfield are coded as having distance
1km. The authors then transform this into a proximity measure by taking the inverse
of this measure. To normalise the distribution, they multiply the inverse distance by
10,000 and take the natural logarithm. I transform this into a departmental measure
for proximity to coal, by using the datapoint for the prefecture of the department.
In a few cases when data for this city is not available, I use the closest city. I also
calculate a different measure which takes the mean across all cities for which data
is available in a department with very similar results.
Access to fast-flowing streams
Data source: European Water Archive, EURO-FRIEND River Discharge Data
Data on monthly mean flow rates for 2,412 collection points across the historical
boundaries of the French Empire were averaged across time to obtain the mean
monthly flow rate for each collection point. The average mean flow rate in each
department is the average of all collection points located within the department.
In the specifications presented in the thesis, I report results which use the natural
logarithm of the mean flow rate, but results are similar when levels are used. Median
flow rates across collection points for each department also give similar results.
Institutional change
Data source: Wikipedia
Institutional change is defined as the date of incorporation into the French Empire
for each department. Departments belonging to France proper are coded as 1789.
Historic location of the cotton industry
Data source: Daudin (2010)
Historic location of the cotton industry is measured using the "Tableaux du Maxi-
mum", compiled at the arrondissement (district) level during the French Revolution.
The Tableaux provide information on trade links between 552 districts in France
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for fifteen different goods categories. Daudin collected a representative sample of
arrondissements across departments in ancien regime France. A binary variable in-
dicates whether a given consuming district reported consuming cotton goods from
a given supplier district. Given this information, I construct a measure of how
many other districts were supplied by districts in a given department. Normalising
by departmental population gives a comparable measure of the size of the cotton
industry for each department. A nice feature of this measure is that it captures
cotton manufacturing for trade rather than own-consumption. Note however, that
it is not a measure of spinning alone, but rather all aspects of the production process
(spinning, weaving, printing).
Raw cotton prices
Data source: Journal du Commerce
Daily raw cotton prices were sporadically reported for various cities during 1798-1815
in the Journal du Commerce, the French commercial newspaper of the time. Within
each category of cotton by supplying region (Levant, US, Colonial, Brazilian), the
exact variety of cotton was matched for a southern and northern city within a short
interval of time (within a few days to within a month) in order to attain as close
a comparison between the north and south of France as possible. Northern cities
used: Anvers, Lille, Rouen, Paris, Havre or Gand. Southern cities used: Bordeaux,
Marseille, Toulouse, Lyon and Bayonne. For Levantine cotton, it was possible to
match Marseille to a northern city for each year. These data were supplemented
with London prices for Brazilian cotton from Tooke (1848).
Departmental population
Data source: Chabert (1951)
Departmental population is used to normalise measures of production capacity in
cotton and woollen spinning and leather tanning. Population data is available for
each department for 1811, including departments annexed to the Empire during the
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In 1806, Corsica was formed of two
departments, Golo and Liamone, which were later merged and called Corse. As
population data is reported for Corse in 1811, I combined the two departments in
1806 and used this in the analysis.
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Industrial census data for 1839-47 and 1860-65
Data source: Chanut et al. (2000)
• The first industrial census in France was conducted between 1839-1847. Data
is missing for firms in Paris and Lyon and for this reason, the departments
Seine and Rhone (to which the respective cities belonged to) are excluded
from all regressions. I use the following variables: value of production, workers
employed, share of women employed, share of children employed, an indicator
variable for whether the firm uses water or steam power and the log of primary
materials used as a measure of firm size. Labour productivity is measured
as the log of the value of production per employee. For cotton spinners, I
collected data on spindles employed from the original data published by the
French government.
• Data from the second industrial census, conducted between 1860-65, was pub-
lished only at the level of the arrondissement (district). I use data on the
value of production, number of employees in a given industry, and total use of
water- and steam-power (measured as horsepower).
French exports and imports
Data source: F/12/251
Value of exports and imports by category and source-destination country for 1787-
1828 ( 1790-1797 and 1806 are missing). All values in francs.1 I supplement this
with data on the value of British cotton exports and exchange rates from Mitchell
(1971).
Consumption of raw cotton per capita
Data source: Mitchell (2007)
I use data on imports of raw cotton and normalise by population as of 1840 to cal-
culate the size of the cotton spinning industry (for which raw cotton is an imported
input) across Continental European countries for 1830-1850.
1Data kindly shared by Guillaume Daudin.
188
British patent data
Data source: Woodcroft Bennet: Subject-matter Index (made from Titles Only) of
Patents of Invention, from March 2, 1617 (14 James I.), to October 1, 1852
This book contains the names of all patents filed in Britain between 1617-1852. The
author classified the patents by industry. I use the 385 patents classified under textile
spinning machinery to construct my measure of technological proximity. A patent
title generally contains a brief description of the patent. For example, patent number
931, Richard Arwright’s waterframe has the following title "Piece of machinery for
the making of weft or yarn from cotton, flax, and wool, much superior in quality to
any heretofore manufactured or made."
Quality measure for British patents
Data source: Nuvolari and Tartari (2011)
The authors collected data from Woodcroft Bennet’s (1864) book which collected
information on the number of times a patent was cited in contemporaneous engineer-
ing literature and legal disputes. The authors argue that these citations measure
patent quality, as engineering literature would discuss important innovations more
frequently, while litigation should be more intensive for economically more valuable
patents. The quality measure is defined as 1+ total citations.
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A.B Construction of data from primary sources
The cotton industry: 1803 - 40
Data on the cotton industry comes from large scale industrial surveys conducted
in 1806 and on a quarterly basis between 1810-1815. The 1806 industrial census
contains almost complete firm level data on all mechanised cotton spinning firms in
regions which were part of the French Empire as of January 1, 1806.2 The quarterly
reports, by department, from 1810 onwards contain data only at the level of the
department, which implies that the unit of observation in the empirical analysis is
the department. Of the 110 departments which formed the French Empire in 1806,
data for both 1803 and 1812 is available for 88 departments. In the following, I
discuss construction of the database for each period.
Champagny’s survey of the cotton industry: 1806
In January, 1806 (about 9 months before the onset of the Continental Blockade), the
Minister of the Interior, Champagny set about conducting an industrial census of
the cotton industry. The questionnaire, an example of which can be seen in Figure
A.2, was sent to the prefects of all departments for completion. 8 out of the 110
departments failed to complete the survey. Data on the precise location of the firm,
the name of the owner, date of foundation, number of employees, (for both 1803 and
1806) number of different types of machines (for both 1803 and 1806), output and
quality of yarn spun (count variable) were provided. Of the 626 entries from the
102 departments which supplied data, I eliminated 43 entries which were not firms.3
These entries are either charitable institutions or jails which produced some cotton
yarn for their own use, or they are entries for rural spinners who used a small jenny
instead of a wheel. I drop the former type of entries, as these are not organised as
for profit institutions. Rural spinners, who generally worked in their own homes for
a piece rate, represent an intermediate step between traditional, rural hand-spinning
and modern, mechanised firms employing wage-labourers in a factory. This is not
2Chassagne (1976) gives the historical background to the survey. Chassagne also collected and
analysed the data, but as spindle data was not available by department for 1803 and 1806, only
a qualitative comparison is made between the location of mechanised spinning activity between
1806 and 1812. Detailed data collected by Chassagne was, to the best of my knowledge, never
published, and for this reason, I transcribed all prefectural reports from original sources.
3Note that this is not equal to the number of firms in the dataset in 1806, because some entries
contain data for firms alive in 1803 which went bankrupt by 1806.
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the type of firm the survey asked for, and for this reason reporting was inconsistent
across regions, which is why I drop these from the analysis.
The only other change I make to the raw data is to create a third category for
type of machine. The survey asked for the number of “mull-jennys” (MJ - French
name for mule jenny), for spinning weft, and “filature continus” (FC), for spinning
warp.4 Firms and prefects would often report “jeanettes” (JEA) which were much
smaller, hand-powered, early type jennys, under the category of MJ. I therefore
create a third category of machine to account for these. The average number of
spindles for a JEA (37) is far smaller than the average number of spindles for an
MJ (112) in the sample. As I impute average spindle by machines type for firms, it
is important to make this distinction.
Imputation model for spindles in 1803 and 1806
Despite the fact that only the number of machines used by the firm was asked for in
Champagny’s survey, some firms or departments reported only number of spindles,
some reported both number of machines and number of spindles and some reported
only number of machines. Because of the different availability of data on capital
across firms, and, because subsequent surveys consistently reported spindles at the
departmental level, it is necessary to impute spindles for the firms who are missing
spindle data in 1803 and 1806. As the number of machines is known for these
firms, once the average number of spindles by machine, for each firm is imputed,
it is possible to calculate the total number of spindles both at the firm, and at the
departmental level.
I imputed the average number of spindles by machine type for each firm and
then aggregate these results up to the departmental level. I check robustness of
the estimation results to the imputation model in two ways. First, I use multiple
imputation (MI) to impute the data for firms. Differently to single imputation
methods, multiple imputation does not treat imputed observations as known in the
analysis. Instead, MI creates multiple imputations for each missing observation, and
accounts for sampling variability due to the missing data. This procedure has been
shown to be statistically valid from both a Bayesian and a frequentist point of view
(Rubin, 2004). I show that both the point estimate and the standard errors change
4The two types of yarn differ in fineness.
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very little when this sampling variability is accounted for. Second, in Chapter 2, I
show that the results are similar when the number of workers employed in cotton
yarn spinning is used as the dependent variable. As this variable is available for
almost all firms in 1803 and 1806, this measure is not imputation-dependent.5
As the most detailed information is available for firms in 1806, I impute the
average number of spindles for a given machine for a given firm for the data available
in 1806 and then use average spindles from 1806 together with number of machines
reported in 1803 to impute spindles in 1803 for the firms where this was missing.
Of the 567 firms alive in 1806, 41 reported only spindles. As the number of their
machines is missing, they need to be excluded from the imputation model and their
data will simply be included when calculating total spindles by department. One
firm reported neither number of machines, nor number of spindles, but only the
average number of spindles per machine, so their machine data will be imputed.
The remaining 525 firms all reported machine data and some of them also re-
ported number of spindles. These are thus the firms that are included in the im-
putation model. Table A.1 contains the pattern of missing data for firms in 1806
for the three different types of machines used by spinning firms, “jeanettes” (JEA),
“filatures continus” (FC), and “mull-jennys” (MJ). Firms usually used only one or
two types of machines, which is why the total number of firms who reported using
a given type of machine is well below 525. As can be seen from the table, the av-
erage number of spindles per firm (by machine type) is missing for around 50% of
the firms. Furthermore, in this particular case, imputation occurs at the level of the
firm for a variable that has a restricted range (average spindle for each machine type
varies based on a few varieties available). As we are interested in spindles by depart-
ment, aggregating up to the departmental level should average out non-systematic
variability in imputation making the results less sensitive to sampling variability.
Imputation proceeds as follows.6 By machine type, I calculate average spindles
per firm for the firms which reported both spindles and number of machines used.
I then use this information, together with data on all other firm characteristics to
5In this sense, it may not be obvious why labour is not the baseline measure of capacity. The
reason for this is that if capital substitutes for labour in the mechanised production process of
spinning, then looking at changes in labour employed will underestimate growth in the sector.
Furthermore, data on number of employees is more susceptible to measurement error because of
fluctuations in capacity utilisation, and it may also contain data from hand-spinning in later years,
when the absence of firm-level data makes this more difficult to detect.
6I use Stata’s multiple imputation tool to estimate the model.
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impute the average spindle per firm for the given machine type. A further compli-
cation arises from the fact that other firm level variables are also incomplete. Table
A.2 contains the information on missing data patterns for all other firm level vari-
ables. As can be seen, the ratio of missing to complete observations is much smaller
in the case of these variables. However, the fact that all variables contain missing
observations in a non-monotone manner implies that imputation is based on a chain
iterative model. Each variable is estimated using a univariate imputation model
with all variables used as independent variables. Iteration is required to account for
the possible dependence of estimated model parameters on imputed values. I use
the date of foundation, output, maximum quality of yarn spun, minimum quality
yarn spun, number of workers and number of each type of machine used to impute
the average number of spindles by machine type for a given firm.
Almost all firm level variables are count variables, therefore a Poisson model
is used for all variables except the three average spindle variables. For these, I use
predictive mean matching to account for the fact that average spindles for a machine
are bounded by technological constraints. In particular, each machine type had a a
number of “varieties” available on the market. For example, MJs usually had 48, 96,
128, 196, 218 and sometime 248 spindles. As the histogram for the average number
of MJs per firm shows in Figure A.1, there is a lot of mass at these points of the
distribution.7 The variable is continuous, because some firms use a combination of
different varieties, and averaging at the firm level will give mass to other points.
Spindles for firm i in 1806 are then simply calculated as the sum of the number
of machines multiplied by average spindles by each type of machine. Calculating
spindles for firms in 1803 is also straightforward. There are 375 firms in the database,
16 of which go bankrupt between 1803 and 1806. For almost all the remaining
firms, the average spindle data per machine type can be used to calculate number
of spindles in 1803, based on how many machines the firm reported for that year.
This clearly does not work for firms that went bankrupt by 1806, but also firms
which switched into new types of machines between the two points in time. For
these firms, I simply use average number of spindles across all firms for the given
machine type. This should not substantially alter the results, as there are only 18
such changes across all firms and machine types. Finally, three departments (Seine
Inferieure, Indre et Loire and Orne) do not report 1803 data. For these departments
7The figure contains data only for the firms where this information is observed.
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(which do supply data for 1806), I take the 1806 numbers for the firms alive in 1803
as the best available measure of spinning activity.
“Enquêtes Industrielles”: 1810-15
Data on spinning is only observed at the departmental level from 1810 onwards. Pre-
fects were asked to initially send reports on industrial activity for various branches
of industry including cotton at 6 month intervals between 1810/1 and 1811/2. From
the beginning of 1812, the reports were to be sent to Paris on a quarterly basis. I ob-
serve number of spindles, number of workers and output at the departmental level.
The reports were intended to inform the government in Paris about fluctuations
in industrial activity and for this reason, prefects sometimes reported capacity and
sometimes they reported utilisation. Therefore, there are sometimes large fluctua-
tions in the numbers reported from one period to the next. To gain the best possible
measure of capacity, I utilise the reports in the following way. In general, I take data
from the year 1812 as this is the year closest to the end of the Blockade where data
coverage was still sufficiently large.8 However, if the number of spindles was larger
in earlier reports (1810-11), I use these years. In accompanying qualitative reports
sent to Paris, prefects usually indicate whether firms have gone bankrupt or whether
they are idle for cyclical reasons. I don’t use earlier numbers in instances where it
is clear that activity in 1812 is lower because firms have gone bankrupt.
Industrial census data: 1839-47
Chanut et al. (2000) collected and compiled almost all the data available from the
first large-scale industrial census in France (1839-47) which was published by the
French government. One notable exception is the spindle data which was reported
by 40% of cotton spinners.9 I collected the spindle data from the original volume
published by the French government and used the same iterative chained imputation
model presented above to impute the missing spindle data. As I did not observe the
average number of spindles, I used a predictive mean matching model to directly
impute the number of spindles for each firm. I used all firm level variables in
the imputation model (value of output, value of raw materials, rental value paid,
8As Napoleon’s power unravelled, and troops invaded the territory of France, fewer and fewer
departments submitted their reports.
9Of the 531 firms in the sample, spindle data was missing for 315 firms.
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property tax paid, number of men, women and children employed and their wages.)
Similarly to the other imputation model, I used a Poisson specification to impute
the very small number of missing observations for other variables (in all cases, the
number of missing observations was less than 5% of the sample).
Woollen spinning and leather tanning: 1792-1811
To construct data on capacity in woollen spinning and leather tanning, I use data
collected at the ‘arrondissement’ (district - one administrative level below the de-
partment) level for both industries in 1792 and data collected at the departmental
level in 1810 for woollen spinning and 1811 for leather tanning. Data from 1792 is
aggregated up to the departmental level to gain a comparable measure of capacity.
Data from 1792 are somewhat noisily measured as they were collected at the level of
the district, and it is often impossible to determine whether a district’s data point is
missing or zero. Furthermore, the survey asked for the state of the industry in 1789,
before the Revolution. The survey only covered departments belonging to France
at the time of its 1789 borders.
Lloyd’s List
Shipping data was extracted using all editions of the Lloyd’s List between 1787-
1814. The Lloyd’s List, one of the world’s oldest newspapers, was set up by Lloyd’s
Coffee House in London as a meeting point for underwriters of marine insurance.
The underwriters needed up to date news on shipping conditions, and for a small
subscription fee Lloyd’s provided what was generally acknowledged to be the most
up to date shipping bulletin of the time.
Lloyd’s hired paid correspondents in each port to send information on ships
arriving to or departing from a given port to the Post Master General with the word
“Lloyds” written in the corner. Each edition featured news on ships sailing from and
arriving to various ports. The coverage on arrival and departure of ships to all ports
in Britain is believed to be a fairly reliable and representative source of information
at the time (Wright and Fayle, 1927).
Editions of the Lloyd’s List have been digitised by Google. To extract data from
this source, I used an OCR programme to convert the images into machine-readable
format and then used a text-matching programme that searched for the names of
195
European ports in the Lloyd’s List. As port names have changed over time, and
even within the time frame that I examine, numerous port names or spelling was
in use for the same port, the names of ports were collected by manually searching
through editions of Lloyd’s Lists. There are multiple sources of measurement error
inherent in this procedure. First, the OCR and text-matching programme introduce
measurement error both in the form of matching mistakes and omitted names (the
ones that could not be matched, or the European ports which I did not identify
as such). By comparing samples to the original, I found that incorrectly matched
names were minimal, and that the procedure picked up about 70-80% of the ports
depending on the quality of the image. Finally, I also had one year (1808) manually
entered in order to check that the sample with which I work is representative. There
are around 3000 observations for each year.
One potential problem with this data source is that some authors claim that
during the blockade, parts of the Lloyd’s List was censored to protect smugglers
and full information was only provided to insurers at the “Books and Notice Boards
in the Subscribers’ Rooms” (Wright and Fayle, 1927). Censoring would have effected
direct routes between Britain and France where ships were at risk of violating the
laws of the Continental Blockade, but not routes via smuggling centres which either
belonged to the British, or were allied to the British. Censoring would undoubtedly
lead to measurement error in quantifying trade routes, however, there are a number
of reasons to believe that the extent of censoring was not quantitatively important.
First, censoring was only in place for part of the Blockade period, and uncensored
and censored years show a very similar pattern calling into question the extent to
which censoring was indeed practised. Second, in response to censoring by Lloyd’s, a
rival newspaper was actually set up by employees of the Post Office. This newspaper,
“General Shipping & Commerce List” was supposedly not censoring shipping news,
which would have given Lloyd’s a disadvantage on the market were it to have been
extensively censoring news. Second, the findings from the Lloyd’s List are consistent
with both historical evidence and other sources of quantitative evidence (British
trade statistics). To the extent that direct smuggling to France and Germany was
actually possible, the finding that indirect routes were used to a large extent points
to either direct smuggling not being quantitatively important, or to the fact that
direct smuggling was so risky (and thus costly) that indirect, and less risky routes
were equally profitable. As I final robustness check, I construct two measures of the
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trade cost shock, only one of which relies quantitatively on results from the Lloyd’s
List.
A.C Primary sources consulted
Archives Nationales (Paris, France)
• AN/IV/1318 Petition from cotton spinners to Napoleon requesting ban on
imports of British yarn
• AN/IV/1060-61 Ministerial reports on commerce and industry
• AN/F7/3040 Daily price for merchandise (including raw cotton) at the Paris
exchange (an 6 - an 10)
• AN/F7/8777-8778 Reports on smuggling from Pyrenees and Eastern border.
• AN/F12/1554-5 Reports on industry. Includes monthly reports from the cot-
ton market in Rouen.
• AN/F12/533 Various documents on the cotton industry from the Napoleonic
period. Contains some prices for spun yarn in Eure department. “Bulletin de
coton” provides qualitative overview of the state of the cotton industry for a
given month (many missing). Firm level data for mechanised spinners in Seine
department for 1808.
• AN/F12/631 Daily price for merchandise (including raw cotton) at the Paris
exchange (1806-1813). Qualitative departmental reports on the state of indus-
try.
• AN/F12/1245B Annual reports from Beaucaire fair (an 6 - 1814).
• AN/F12/1342 Tolozan’s report on the state of the cotton industry in 1789.
• AN/F12/1344-1348 Industrial survey of woollen industry (1792).
• AN/F12/1467-1472 Industrial survey of leather tanning (1792).
• AN/F12/1561 Statistics on cotton industry (predominantly for the period
after 1810)
• AN/F12/1562-1564 Champagny’s survey of the cotton industry (1806)
• AN/F12/1570-1589 Detailed departmental statistics and reports for textile
industry, 1810-1823.
• AN/F12/1590-1600 Industrial survey for leather tanning, 1811
• AN/F12/1602 Aggregate tables for textile industry from industrial surveys
(cotton, wool, linen, silk and hemp).
• F12/1859 French consular reports from across Europe. Cotton yarn prices in
Bosnia and Malta.
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Bibliotheque National de France (France)
• Journal du Commerce Commercial newspaper which sporadically reported
prices from markets across France. Contains raw cotton prices from across
the French Empire for 1798-1815.
• “Statistique de la France. Industrie: 1847”. France: Ministère de l’agriculture
et du commerce (1839-1852). Original census published by the French govern-
ment. Number of spindles used by cotton spinning firms was collected as this
was not published in Chanut et al. (2000).10
10The data were kindly shared by Peter Solar.
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A.D Tables
Table A.1: Missing data pattern for aver-
age spindles by machine at the firm level
JEA FC MJ
Spindles and Machine 20 76 102
Machine only 70 136 190
Total 90 212 292
Table A.2: Missing data pattern for firm
level variables
Observed Missing Total
Foundation 560 7 567
Workers 546 21 567
Max quality 401 166 567
Output 522 45 567
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A.E Figures
Figure A.1: Average spindles per firm for mule-jennys
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A.F Examples of the Primary Data Sources
Figure A.2: Example of prefectural report from 1806 for Escaut department
Figure A.3: Example of Lloyd’s List
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